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As a result of the significant U.S. prison population build-up over the past several 
decades, a large number of inmates are now being released from prison and returned to 
the community.  One mechanism for facilitating this transition to the community is for 
inmates to be conditionally released under parole supervision.  Once on parole, a parolee 
is subject to certain rules and conditions that, if violated, can result in a return to prison, 
even if not a criminal act.  These types of non-criminal parole violations are typically 
referred to as Technical Parole Violations (TPVs).  Many states return a large number of 
TPVs to prison each year, and TPVs contribute significantly to the prison population in 
many states.  However, there is virtually no existing research examining what impact 
returning TPVs to imprisonment has on their subsequent rates of re-offending.  While a 
large body of literature examining the overall impact of incarceration on recidivism has 
mostly concluded that imprisonment has a null or even slightly criminogenic effect, this 
overall finding is not necessarily generalizable to all sub-populations within the prison 
 
 
population.  Strong theoretical cases can be made each way, for the impact on recidivism 
of incarcerating TPVs.   
This dissertation examines the impact on recidivism of sanctioning TPVs to 
imprisonment versus an alternative sanction, and also examines the dose-response impact 
on recidivism of varying lengths of stay in prison for a TPV, using a large sample of 
TPVs in one state (Pennsylvania).  The bulk of the evidence supports the conclusion that 
recidivism rates are mostly lowered by using incarceration in response to first TPV 
violations.  However, the evidence also suggests that the specific mechanism for lowering 
recidivism rates among incarcerated TPVs is largely attributable to aging and exposure 
time rather than to deterrence.   
The findings on the dose-response impact of differential lengths of stay in prison 
for TPVs who are sanctioned to imprisonment are more mixed.  Generally the evidence 
suggests somewhat lowered recidivism rates attributable to longer lengths of stay in 
prison for a TPV violation, yet the effect sizes are generally smaller and in some cases 
statistically insignificant.  It again appears that the particular mechanism for reduced 
recidivism rates associated with longer lengths of stay in prison is associated with aging 
and exposure time rather than with traditionally formulated deterrence mechanisms.        
A few contingencies of these findings are noted.  First, the effect of imprisonment 
on recidivism among TPVs is likely highly contingent upon the swiftness, certainty, and 
perceived fairness of sanctioning, yet measures of these factors were not available for this 
study.  Second, this dissertation only focuses on the first TPV violation instance after 
release from prison, and also is mostly limited to higher risk TPVs.  Third, lower overall 
recidivism rates for TPVs sanctioned to imprisonment, and sanctioned for longer periods 
 
 
of time in prison, were influenced heavily by lower re-incarceration rates, whereas re-
arrest rates did not significantly differ in any of the models.  Since re-incarceration rates 
not only include new criminal activity but also new technical violations, it is unclear 
whether imprisonment for a first TPV reduces serious criminal behavior or rather mostly 
reduces additional technical violations and minor crimes.  Future research must address 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
TECHNICAL PAROLE VIOLATORS IN PRISON 
Over 600,000 inmates are released from U.S. prisons each year, of which 
approximately 80% are conditionally released under some sort of parole supervision.  
This annual number of prison releases is more than quadruple the number of annual 
prison releases just 25 years ago, spawning immense criminal justice interest in a policy 
area commonly referred to as “prisoner reentry.”  One of the primary concerns of 
policymakers and criminologists studying the impact of prisoner reentry is the threat to 
public safety and the contribution to community crime rates posed by increasing numbers 
of returning prisoners (Hipp & Yates, 2009; Petersilia, 2003; Rosenfeld, Wallman, & 
Fornango, 2005).  Parole supervision is purported to serve as an important mechanism for 
protecting the public from the potential threat posed by returning inmates (Piehl & 
LoBuglio, 2005). Specifically, parolees are given conditions of supervision by which they 
are expected to abide.  Violations of these technical conditions of parole supervision are 
considered in many cases to be precursors to impending criminal behavior.  Largely at 
the discretion of the parole agent (but also sometimes based on other factors such as 
agency policy and formal risk assessment guidelines), a parolee may be remanded to 
prison on a technical parole violation if it is deemed that the violation is an indication of 
imminent criminal behavior.  The use of prison as a policy response to parole violations 
is reflected in the fact that the number of parole violator admissions to prison has 
increased seven-fold over the past two decades, currently representing over one-third of 
all state prison admissions (Travis & Lawrence, 2002).  Indeed, research on correctional 
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trends has recently pointed to parole violators as an increasing contribution to state prison 
populations (Blumstein & Beck, 2005).  
However, states vary widely in their use of prison for parole violators (see Figure 
1.1).  For example states such as Florida, North Carolina, Virginia, Idaho, and 
Massachusetts admit less than 10% of prisoners as parole violators, whereas in California 
and Montana approximately 67% of all prison admissions are parole violators (Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, 2008).  Pennsylvania is among the group of states with a relatively high 
proportion and number of parole violator prison admissions, with approximately one-
third of its nearly 18,000 annual prison admissions being for parole violations.  This 
places Pennsylvania in the top half of all states in terms of parole violators as a fraction 
of total state prison admissions.  While the monthly rate of parole violators remanded to 
prison per supervised parole population has actually remained relatively stable in 
Pennsylvania over the past decade at approximately 1.7%, an increase of approximately 
58% in the number of prison releases to parole supervision over the past decade means 
that this relatively stable rate has nonetheless translated into increasing numbers of parole 
violators being returned to prison.  This increasing number of parole violator admissions 
to prison comes at a significant cost to Pennsylvania taxpayers.  According to a recent 
Pew Report (2009), it costs Pennsylvania approximately $98 per day to incarcerate one 
offender in prison, whereas the cost of supervising that same offender for one day in the 
community under parole supervision is approximately $8 (Pew Center on the States, 
2009).  Thus, Pennsylvania can afford to keep a parole violator under parole supervision 
for approximately 12 days at the same cost as only one day in prison.   
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A subset of parole violators who are of particular interest from a policy 
perspective are those who are labeled technical parole violators (TPVs).  What makes this 
group interesting is that a technical parole violation does not require the occurrence of a 
new crime.  A technical parole violation typically occurs when a stipulated condition of 
parole supervision has been violated.  Examples of technical violations can include 
failing to refrain from alcohol use, failing to report routinely to a parole agent, failing to 
obtain employment, failing to comply with required treatment programming, or changing 
an address without providing notification to the supervising parole authority.  While not 
necessarily a criminal violation, a technical violation is nevertheless often considered to 
be a precursor to relapse into criminal behavior.  As a result, parole agents are usually 
granted a certain degree of discretion in deciding to return a TPV to prison for a period of 
incarceration if criminal behavior is considered imminent.   
This discretion to re-incarcerate a technical violator is viewed by parole 
authorities as an important mechanism for protecting the public.  However, this also 
places a sub-population of inmates in prison who have not necessarily committed a new 
crime at all.  It should be noted that sometimes technical parole violations do in fact 
include underlying criminal behavior but are processed as a technical violation instead of 
being prosecuted as a new crime in cases where evidentiary or procedural problems are 
expected to result in a non-conviction if prosecuted by the court (e.g., a likely plea 
agreement, etc.).1  Due to a lack of research in this area, it remains unclear as to the 
degree of overlap between criminal behavior and technical parole violations.  Further, the 
                                                 
1
 This would seem to raise an issue of fairness/legitimacy, since a lack of good evidence might otherwise 
normally preclude a period of incarceration.  Perceived fairness/legitimacy of the technical violation 
sanctioning process may condition the impact of imprisonment. 
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claim that the use of prison for sanctioning TPVs prevents or deters criminal behavior 
remains largely untested.  
 
PAROLE SUPERVISION IN PENNSYLVANIA 
 
In Pennsylvania, approximately three-fifths of all parole violator prison 
admissions are for technical parole violations.  The number of TPV prison admissions has 
in fact increased by approximately 41% over the past 10 years.  The Pennsylvania Board 
of Probation and Parole (PBPP) stipulates six standard supervision conditions for all 
parolees, as well as any number of special supervision conditions for certain parolees, all 
of which can result in a technical parole violation if broken.  The six standard conditions 
are: 
1. Report in person or in writing within 48 hours of release from prison to the 
district office or sub-office and do not leave that district without prior written 
permission of the parole supervision staff. 
2. Do not change residence from the approved residence without the written 
permission of the parole supervision staff. 
3. Maintain regular contact with the parole supervision staff by: a) reporting 
regularly as instructed and following any written instructions of the Board or 
parole supervision staff, b) notifying the parole supervision staff within 72 hours 
of an arrest or a receipt of a summons/citation for an offense punishable by 
imprisonment upon conviction, and c) notifying the parole supervision staff 
within 72 hours of any change in status, including, but not limited to, 
employment, on-the-job training, and education. 
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4. Comply with all municipal, county, state and Federal criminal laws, as well as the 
provisions of the Vehicle Code and the Liquor Code. 
5. Abstain from a) the unlawful possession or sale of narcotics and dangerous drugs 
or any drugs without a valid prescription, b) owning or possessing any firearms or 
other weapons, and c) any assaultive behavior. 
6. Pay fines, costs, and restitution imposed by the sentencing court, which includes 
establishing within thirty days of release from prison a payment schedule for the 
fines, costs and restitution owed. 
Special parole conditions may include: following treatment referrals, submitting 
to urinalysis testing, refraining from alcohol consumption, taking prescribed psychotropic 
medication, refraining from contacting or associating with specific individuals, paying a 
supervision fee of at least $25 per month, refraining from entering certain establishments 
such as bars or those that sell or dispense alcohol, providing dependent support, 
maintaining employment or educational/vocational training, and/or engaging in an active 
job search during a period of unemployment.   
Technical parole violators sent to prison in Pennsylvania serve an average of 14 
months (median of 12 months) in prison.  According to PBPP’s most recent statistics 
(Alibrio & Findley, 2005), the single most prevalent category of technical violations 
among those returned to prison is for an unapproved change of residence (20%).  The 
broader category of drug and alcohol substance use violations (which is covered by 
multiple standard/special conditions) accounts for approximately 24% of all TPVs 
returned to prison.  Other prevalent reasons for technical violations resulting in a prison 
term include failure to report for supervision or to report arrests (16%) and failure to 
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comply with the rules of a residential halfway house (17%).  The average number of 
conditions violated for those returned to prison is 2.1 per case.  At least some preliminary 
research in Pennsylvania suggests that approximately 40% of technical parole violator 
cases returned to prison also involve criminal behavior (Kramer, Silver, Van Eseltine, 
Ortega, & Rutkowski, 2008; Bucklen, 2005).   
One other important note about the parole violation process in Pennsylvania is 
that not all technical parole violators are returned to prison.  Indeed, there are a number of 
alternative or diversionary options in the community that are available for sanctioning 
TPVs.  These options include written warnings, travel restrictions, increased reporting 
requirements or urinalysis testing, imposed curfews, placement in in-patient or outpatient 
treatment, placement in a Day Reporting Center, imposition of electronic monitoring, 
placement in a Community Corrections Center (CCC) under a “halfway back” status, or 
placement in a secure violation center.  While PBPP maintains a Violation Sanctioning 
Grid for guiding violation sanctioning decisions and generally views sanctioning along a 
continuum of seriousness, significant discretion is still granted to the parole agent for 




From a theoretical standpoint, there is a case to be made that sending TPVs to 
prison can serve: a) a deterrent effect by preventing future criminal behavior, b) a null 
effect by simply removing the violator from the community for a “time out” period, or c) 
a criminogenic effect by actually increasing the probability of future criminal behavior.  
From a deterrence point of view, the “broken windows” perspective (Wilson & Kelling, 
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1982) is particularly germane.  Specifically, “broken windows” policing purports that 
serious crime is best prevented by devoting criminal justice resources to addressing minor 
crimes or community disorder.  Applying this perspective to TPVs, it may be reasonable 
to expect a drop in serious criminal behavior by implementing a “zero tolerance” policy 
response to minor parole violations through the use of prison, with the expectation that 
minor technical violations are essentially equivalent to the type of “broken windows” 
disorder that can lead to more serious crime if left unaddressed.   
Deterrence theory also purports that punishment must be certain, severe, and swift 
in order to be effective (Beccaria, 1764).  More recent deterrence research has found that 
the certainty and swiftness of punishment appear to be more important factors than the 
severity of punishment (Kleiman, 2009).  One might argue that a broad policy of 
returning TPVs to prison increases the certainty and swiftness of punishment in 
comparison to the certainty and swiftness of punishment typically delivered through the 
court system in traditional criminal cases.  Thus, any deterrent impact of prison may be 
more effective for TPVs than for new court commitments.   
However, those who would hypothesize a null effect from sending parole 
violators to prison will likely point to the general conclusion from recent reviews of the 
literature that the overall deterrent effect of prison is modest at best (Nagin, Cullen, & 
Jonson, 2009).  More evidence appears to support an overall incapacitative effect of 
prison, where inmates are simply restricted from criminal behavior during their time of 
incarceration but largely return to their same level of criminal offending after prison.  
Best estimates to date suggest that a 10% increase in the prison population can lead to 
approximately a 4% decrease in the crime rate primarily through the incapacitation of 
8 
 
additional criminals (Stemen, 2007).  Bhati and Piquero (2008) examined the degree to 
which incarceration has a deterrent, criminogenic, or null effect on subsequent criminal 
offending, and concluded that for the largest proportion of prison releases incarceration 
has a null effect (they observed a null effect on subsequent criminal offending for 56% of 
the prison releases in their sample).  Sending TPVs to prison thus may only temporarily 
delay any impending criminal behavior.  
Recent research suggests that the benefits of prison are facing diminishing 
marginal returns due to expansive prison build-up over the past several decades (Liedka, 
Piehl, & Useem, 2006).  It may thus be the case that the system has reached a “tipping 
point” and that sending parole violators to prison no longer has a deterrent or null effect 
(if it ever did), but instead may actually be criminogenic.  From a labeling theory 
perspective, incarceration is indeed expected to lead to an increase in future criminal 
behavior through what is referred to as secondary deviance (Lemert, 1951).  Sampson 
and Laub (1997), in their classic longitudinal follow-up of a sample of Boston boys who 
came of age during the 1950s, found that those boys who served time in prison were 
generally at an increased risk of future criminal behavior through a process they refer to 
as cumulative disadvantage (Sampson & Laub, 1997).  Under this process of cumulative 
disadvantage, the adverse effect of prison is indirect, leading to disruption of social ties 
such as employment and family, which in turn leads to an increased risk of criminal 
activity.  We do know that the recidivism rates for parole violators who are returned to 
prison and subsequently re-released are significantly higher than the recidivism rates for 
first time parole releases (Blumstein & Beck, 2005), which would on the surface suggest 
a criminogenic effect of returning parole violators to prison.  Yet it is unclear as to 
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whether this simply represents a selection effect, where those who are returned to prison 
on a parole violation were already at an increased risk of subsequent re-offending due to 
a higher criminal propensity as evidenced by their parole violation.  However, research 
by Petersilia and Turner (1993) found little evidence that technical parole violations are 
proxies for criminal behavior, which suggests that a selection effect might not necessarily 
fully explain higher recidivism rates among TPVs.  Thus, there is theoretical ground for 
expecting that a policy of returning TPVs to prison may lead to a criminogenic effect, 
actually increasing future criminal behavior. 
   
CONCLUSION 
 
The following dissertation will examine whether and to what extent a policy of 
returning technical parole violators to prison will reduce criminal behavior.  More 
specifically, I will examine the use of prison for technical parole violators in 
Pennsylvania and attempt to disaggregate the degree to which prison serves a deterrent, 
null, or criminogenic effect.   
An outline for this dissertation is as follows: Chapter 2 will review the literature 
on parole supervision practices and parole violation sanctioning as well as the general 
theoretical and empirical literature on the deterrent, null, and criminogenic effects of 
prison.  Chapter 3 will review the data and methods utilized.  This dissertation will 
investigate two different aspects of the impact of incarceration among TPVs: 1) the 
impact of the decision to incarcerate compared to delivering an alternative sanction for 
technical violations, and 2) the dose-response impact of length of stay in prison 
contingent upon being returned to prison for a technical violation.  Datasets from the 
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Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (PA DOC), the Pennsylvania Board of 
Probation and Parole (PBPP), and the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) are utilized.  I 
make use of propensity score matching methods to examine both the impact of the 
decision to incarcerate a TPV and the dose-response impact of length of stay in prison for 
TPVs who are incarcerated.   
Chapter 4 reports on results from models examining the relationship between the 
decision to incarcerate and subsequent recidivism among TPVs.  Specifically, propensity 
score matching is used to compare a group of TPVs who are returned to prison for their 
first recorded violation sanction while on parole supervision to a group of TPVs who are 
not returned to prison for their first recorded sanction but instead receive an alternative 
community-based sanction.  The sample will consist of 12,705 parolees who were 
initially released from prison onto parole between October 2006 and December 2009, and 
were either returned to prison or sanctioned to a community alternative for a TPV.  Six-
month, one-year, and three-year recidivism rates will be examined and compared for the 
two groups.  Covariates in these models will be used to examine sub-populations of TPVs 
for which prison is more or less effective. 
Chapter 5 will examine the issue of the dose-response impact of varying lengths 
of incarceration for technical violations on subsequent offending.  Specifically, this 
analysis is limited to the 1,758 TPVs from the full sample for whom their first recorded 
post-release sanction for a technical violation was imprisonment.  Again using propensity 
score techniques, varying lengths of incarceration among TPVs will be examined in order 
to estimate whether length of stay in prison for a technical violation demonstrates a 
positive, negative or null relationship to subsequent offending.   Covariates in these 
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models will be used to examine varying dose-response impacts among sub-populations of 
TPVs who are sent to prison.   
Lastly, Chapter 6 is a concluding chapter, which summarizes the study findings 












































Research on the impact of prison on individual criminal behavior is growing, but 
significantly limited in its ability to lead to firm policy conclusions.  For a variety of 
reasons outlined in this chapter, estimates of the impact of imprisonment on reoffending 
are fragile.  The extant research is even more limited in its ability to disaggregate the 
impact of imprisonment on subsequent criminal behavior among various subgroups of 
offenders.  For example, only one known study specifically examines the impact of 
prison on subsequent criminal behavior among parole violators returned to prison.  This 
is striking, given that parole violators comprise a relatively large percentage of state 
prison admissions nationwide.  The following chapter will proceed by examining the 
general theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of imprisonment on criminal 
behavior and then conclude with a review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
relevant to parole violator sanctioning and the effectiveness of parole supervision. 
Theories on the impact of imprisonment on subsequent criminal behavior can 
generally be divided into one of three categories: 1) prison as a specific deterrent, 2) 
prison as criminogenic, or 3) prison as a null impact.  
 
PRISON AS DETERRENT 
 
The earliest school of thought, prison as a specific deterrent, purports that prison 
discourages offenders from future criminal behavior by imposing a significant cost of 
offending.  It should be noted at the outset that criminologists have long distinguished 
between general deterrence and specific deterrence.  General deterrence considers the 
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broad impact of the threat of punishment on would-be criminals within society at large, 
whereas specific deterrence is concerned with the impact of punishment on the individual 
who is actually punished or threatened with punishment.  I focus on specific deterrence 
here, since I am most concerned with the impact of imprisonment on individual 
trajectories among known criminals rather than the impact of imprisonment on society at 
large. 
Deterrence theory originated from the writings of 18th century political 
philosophers, most notably that of Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, who proposed 
that punishment must be certain, severe, and swift in order to be effective in preventing 
criminal behavior (Beccaria, 1764; Bentham, 1781).  The mechanics behind deterrence, 
as outlined by these early writers, were based on a rational actor view of human behavior 
in which humans weigh costs and benefits and make choices favoring actions in which 
benefits are perceived to outweigh costs.  This early work in deterrence theory came to be 
known as the “classical school” of criminology.   
Deterrence thought dwindled by around the mid-19th century and did not resurface 
until the late 1960s among economists and a select group of criminologists who sought to 
more fully elucidate the mechanisms behind how punishment might deter criminal 
behavior.  Most notably among this group of scholars was the seminal work of Gary 
Becker (1968).  Becker, an economist, argued that an expected utility model (or 
economic model of choice) was best suited to explain criminal behavior.  The key 
elements of this model were that: 1) offenders hold expected rewards from alternate 
courses of legal and illegal actions, 2) offenders also hold expected costs for these 
actions, 3) the expectations of rewards and costs are subjective, and 4) if the subjectively 
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perceived expected utility (i.e., rewards minus costs) for a criminal act is greater that the 
subjectively perceived expected utility for a non-criminal act then the individual will 
engage in the criminal act.  Becker’s work (1968) opened up the possibility that 
deterrence was not only realized through the formal properties of incarceration, but also 
through indirect effects such as psychological effects, loss of income while incarcerated, 
and the stigmatization of serving time in prison.  Becker’s work (1968) also made room 
for the fact that humans are not perfectly rational actors but that they have what Herb 
Simon (1957) referred to as a “bounded rationality” (or differential utility function).  
Beccaria (1764) had hinted around this potential for differential motivation but did very 
little to describe how it might operate.  These contingencies of the deterrent impact of 
punishment formed what became known as rational choice theory, which is really an 
extension of classical school deterrence.   
The first theoretical contingency of the deterrent effect of incarceration is the 
degree of importance and the relative presence of the three traditional components of 
deterrence: certainty, severity, and celerity.  Most of the work to date has focused 
primarily on the certainty and severity of punishment, with evidence suggesting that the 
certainty of punishment serves more of a deterrent impact than the severity of punishment 
(Nagin, 1998; Paternoster, 1987; Pratt, Cullen, Blevins, Daigle, & Madensen, 2006).  
Further, in an early paper by Tittle and Rowe (1974), the authors hypothesized that there 
is a “tipping point” threshold for the certainty of punishment, with little deterrent impact 
when the probability of punishment falls below a “tipping point” threshold but a 
significant deterrent effect when the probability of punishment crosses above this 
threshold.  Thus it may be that prison will serve little deterrent impact until the 
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probability of arrest, conviction, and incarceration can be raised above a threshold of 
certainty.  Similarly, Geerken and Gove (1977) proposed that the criminal justice system 
can reach a point of “overload” in which crime rates are too high, thus making it virtually 
impossible to capture, convict, and imprison offenders in a manner that would maintain a 
necessary threshold of punishment certainty needed in order for punishment to deter.   
Relatively little attention in the literature has been given to the celerity (or 
swiftness) of punishment (Blumstein, 2011).  A few noted exceptions are Nagin and 
Pogarsky (2001), Howe and Loftus (1996), Legge and Park (1994), and Yu (1994).  What 
these authors point out is a relevant concept in economics known as discount rates (used 
to account for consequences realized at different times).  It is well known that offenders 
are more impulsive and present-oriented (Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985; Gottfredson & 
Hirschi, 1990).  They also tend more towards deliberately discounting future costs.  Thus, 
the swiftness of punishment would seem to be all the more important to focus on for a 
group of individuals with an already established criminal history, such as parole violators.  
Focusing on increasing the swiftness of sanctioning for parole violators would also seem 
to be more feasible than doing so through a court system, since typically there is less due 
process for returning a technical parole violator to prison than there is for incarcerating an 
individual for the commission of a new crime.  Conversely, some have hypothesized that 
deterrence may be stronger through a delayed punishment, since the offender may wish to 
simply “get it over with”, and the anticipation of the punishment (as long as it is of 
sufficient certainty) might present an additional cost to the cost-benefit calculation of 
offending (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2000).  Thus, there is likely an interaction between the 
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certainty, severity, and swiftness of punishment, but theoretical work in this area is fairly 
new in development. 
The second theoretical contingency of the deterrent effect of incarceration is the 
relative congruence between the actual properties of punishment and the perception of 
punishment.  In early work on perceptual deterrence, Geerkin and Gove (1977) pointed 
out that deterrence is really a social psychological theory of threat communication.  Thus, 
even if the reality is that the certainty, severity, and swiftness of punishment are 
sufficiently high, if the general perception among offenders is that these properties are 
low then the perception may drive reality and lead to no deterrent impact from 
punishment.  Other scholars have laid out a significant body of literature on perceptual 
deterrence (see Jensen, Erickson, & Gibbs, 1978; Kleck, Sever, Li, & Gertz, 2005; 
Paternoster, 1987).  Results from subsequent empirical work have been mixed on whether 
the formal properties of punishment coincide with perceptions of those formal properties.  
It has been shown, for example, that the types of committed offenders who are more 
likely to end up in prison may also tend to perceive that punishment is unlikely, and 
therefore prison may not serve as a deterrent for these types of committed offenders 
(Pogarsky & Piquero, 2003).   
Based on social learning variables, offenders may also change their perceptions of 
the properties of deterrence, which reflects the idea that perceptions are not static but 
instead dynamic.  In economics, this has been referred to as “Bayesian updating”.  
Emerging research has examined how offenders go through this process of updating their 
perceptions of risk over time based on signals that they receive in their offending 
experience (Anwar & Loughran, 2011; Hjalmarsson, 2009; Horney & Marshall, 1992; 
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Lochner, 2007; Matsueda, Kreager, & Huizinga, 2006).  Stafford and Warr (1993) 
outlined a learning theory of perceptual deterrence in which four factors updated risk 
perceptions: 1) personal punishment- being personally punished, 2) vicarious 
punishment- witnessing the punishment of someone else, 3) personal punishment 
avoidance- personally escaping punishment, and 4) vicarious punishment avoidance- 
witnessing someone else escape punishment.  It is thus likely that parolees witness parole 
revocation policies and update their perceptions of the risk of being sent to prison for a 
parole violation based on their own experience as well as the experience of other 
parolees.      
A third contingency of the deterrent impact of prison is what has been described 
as the “resetting effect” of punishment (or “the gambler’s fallacy”), first put forth by 
Pogarsky and Piquero (2003).  Under this notion, offenders who have already been 
subjected to punishment (e.g., incarceration) may find it exceedingly unlikely that they 
will again be subjected to punishment and thus may be undeterred by punishment.  Under 
this proposition, offenders not yet incarcerated would be more likely deterred by the 
threat of imprisonment than would offenders who have already been incarcerated at least 
once in the past.  Thus, there is reason to believe that parole violators, who by their very 
definition have already served time in prison, may be less deterred by incarceration than 
would other types of “newer” offenders. 
A fourth contingency of the deterrent impact of prison is the oft-neglected 
element of the rational actor calculus- the benefits (or rewards) from crime.  The three 
traditional deterrence elements – certainty, severity, and celerity – are about the cost side 
of the equation.  A few scholars have pointed out that the net effect of the benefits of 
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crime should be equally as important to consider (Piliavin, Gartner, Thornton, & 
Matsueda, 1986).  There are of course the financial rewards for some types of crimes like 
drug selling, burglary, and theft.  But in addition there are non-financial benefits, which 
Katz (1988) describes as the “seductions of crime.”  Offenders tend to be thrill-seekers 
and thus generate some benefit from their criminal lifestyle simply by the criminal act 
itself.  So to the extent that offenders find more or less reward from their criminal 
endeavors, they may or may not be deterred by incarceration or the threat thereof.  Even 
technical parole violators who commit no crime may find reward from a certain lifestyle 
(e.g., spending time in a bar, etc.) which outweighs the calculated cost of punishment for 
their technical violations. 
A fifth contingency of the deterrent impact of prison involves a consideration of 
the heterogeneity of different types of offenders.  Certain types of offenders may be 
found to be more or less deterred by actual or threatened incarceration.  For example 
Pogarsky (2002) outlines three hypothetical types of offenders who vary in their 
susceptibility to deterrence: 1) “acute conformists” who are likely to comply in the future 
regardless of punishment, 2) “deterrables” who are the most susceptible to being deterred 
by punishment, and 3) “incorrigibles” who are likely so committed to the criminal 
enterprise that they will continue criminal behavior regardless of punishment.  As was 
previously mentioned, there is also some debate around whether more impulsive types of 
offenders are more or less deterrable (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993).  Several scholars have 
described and tested persistent individual differences that make offenders more or less 




Certain crime types might be more or less deterrable also.  For example, Exum 
(2002) proposed that intoxicated and violent offenders may not be deterred because their 
crimes frequently are crimes of passion which involve less of a rational calculus.  
Similarly, Bouffard (2002) described sex offenders as being more impacted by current 
emotional states rather than by rational calculations of the costs and benefits of crime.  
Bachman, Paternoster, and Ward (1992) suggested that moral beliefs rather than rational 
assessments of costs and benefits have more of an impact on sex offenders.  Similarly, 
Paternoster and Simpson (1993) found that costs and benefits of crime were irrelevant for 
corporate offenders when moral inhibitions were high.  Grasmick and Bursik (1990) 
found that deterrence worked better for theft crimes, while shame was more important for 
drunk drivers.   
A sixth contingency of the deterrent impact of prison is the degree to which an 
offender participates in rehabilitative programming during incarceration.  A significant 
body of literature demonstrates that in-prison treatment programming can be effective in 
reducing future criminal behavior (Andrews & Bonta, 1998).  Also, evidence suggests 
that offenders may benefit from educational or vocational training while incarcerated as 
well (MacKenzie, 2002).  In this regard, in-prison treatment programming is part of the 
mechanics of deterrence.  Note that there are two further contingencies on in-prison 
treatment programming though.  The first is that it must be assumed or demonstrated that 
offenders are being appropriately treated at the individual level, with effective 
interventions.  Second, it must be recognized that there is a cost imposed by prison 
programming in that quality programs typically take a significant amount of time to 
complete and thus may delay an offender’s prison release date, especially if there are 
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large waiting lists to get into programs.  Thus, the trade-off must be considered of 
whether it is worth it to keep an offender incarcerated for perhaps a longer period of time 
in order to potentially generate a rehabilitative benefit from programming.  The broader 
point, however, is that typically the literature has distinguished between rehabilitation 
and deterrence as separate purposes of prison, when in fact they serve very similar 
purposes, and rehabilitation, with its goal of restraining or correcting future criminal 
behavior, can actually be viewed as a subset of deterrence. 
 
PRISON AS CRIMINOGENIC 
 
An equally compelling theoretical case can be made that prison actually plays a 
criminogenic role, increasing the future criminal behavior for those who experience it.  
The theoretical tradition from which this school of thought primarily derives is labeling 
theory.  Labeling theories came to prominence in criminology during the early 1970s.  
Paternoster and Iovanni (1989) describe two primary components of labeling theory: 1) 
the “status characteristic” hypothesis derived from conflict theory, and 2) the “secondary 
deviance” hypothesis derived from symbolic interaction theory.  Of primary relevance to 
the relationship between punishment and future criminal behavior is the “secondary 
deviance” hypothesis, which generally holds that those who are punished subsequently 
experience some sort of negative social reaction or societal label which is internalized as 
a core identity and actually serves to reinforce or increase the propensity for future 
criminal behavior (Lemert, 1951).  In a similar vein, Braithwaite (1989) has suggested 
that a stigmatizing label of imprisonment impacts socially relevant factors after an 
offender is released from prison, such as denying employment opportunities to ex-
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offenders and eroding ties to family and the community, which in turn serve to increase 
the propensity for subsequent criminal behavior.  Braithwaite (1989) contrasts this kind 
of stigmatizing label (or “shaming”) with what he refers to as “reintegrative shaming,” in 
which the act of the offender is condemned by the community, but at the same time the 
community works to embrace the offender back as a member (the old adage of “hate the 
sin but love the sinner”).  Thus, the criminogenic impact of prison, according to 
Braithwaite (1989), would be contingent upon whether the offender experiences 
reintegrative shaming rather than stigmatizing shaming after release from prison. 
Sampson and Laub’s (1993) age-graded theory of informal social control has also 
incorporated elements of labeling theory in order to explain the impact of incarceration 
on subsequent criminal behavior within a developmental/life course perspective.  In a 
process which they refer to as “cumulative continuity”,  imprisonment can lead to 
increases in future criminal behavior by altering the offender’s identity, by excluding the 
offender from normal routines or conventional opportunities such as employment, and by 
increasing contact with deviant others (Sampson & Laub, 1997).   
Matsueda’s (1992) version of labeling theory, rooted in the symbolic 
interactionist tradition of sociological theory (Mead, 1934), views the impact of 
punishment leading to a criminogenic effect through what he refers to as “reflected 
appraisal,” which involves an individual’s perception of how others view the self.  When 
offenders are more likely to perceive that others view them in a negative light, this 
perception takes on a dynamic of its own and in essence becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy for predicting increased future criminal behavior.  This is in essence the 
labeling equivalent of perceptual deterrence in the deterrence literature; a negative label 
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may or may not exist, but if through reflection the individual perceives one to exist then it 
essentially has the same impact. 
Another body of literature that has been closely tied to labeling theory and speaks 
to the potential for a criminogenic impact of imprisonment is the theoretical work on 
procedural justice and the legitimacy of punishment.  Tom Tyler, in his book entitled 
“Why People Obey the Law” (1990), outlines how process (i.e., procedural justice) is just 
as important as outcome (i.e., distributive justice) in determining the impact of criminal 
justice intervention on future offending.  Offenders, like the rest of us, desire to be treated 
fairly, and if they perceive that there is legitimacy in the way that justice is handed out by 
the system, then they will be more likely to comply even under circumstances of 
unfavorable outcomes of punishment (e.g., a sentence of imprisonment or a longer 
sentence length).  Tests of Tyler’s (1990) theory have mostly confirmed its validity 
among different groups of offenders (see Paternoster, Brame, Bachman, & Sherman, 
1997 for a test among domestic violence offenders).  Recently Franke, Bierie, and 
MacKenzie (2009) have also examined the issue of legitimacy specifically within a 
correctional setting.  It may be that prison is found to serve a criminogenic purpose 
among parole violators if they largely view the process of their revocation to prison to be 
arbitrary or unfair, and that prison may actually serve a deterrent impact by improving the 
legitimacy and transparency of the process for revoking parole (see Kleiman, 2009 for 
this basic argument). 
An integrated perspective on the potential for a criminogenic impact of 
imprisonment is also found in defiance theory, which sets out to describe the conditions 
under which criminal sanctions reduce, increase, or have no impact on future crime 
23 
 
(Sherman, 1993).  Defiance theory purports that sanctioning such as incarceration may 
lead to deterrence, defiance, or irrelevance depending on four primary factors: 1) the 
perceived legitimacy of the punishment, 2) the degree of social bonding, 3) the extent of 
recognized shame, and 4) the nature of pride.  Specifically, if the offender experiences 
imprisonment as illegitimate, is weakly bonded to the sanctioning community, denies 
shame resulting from the sanction, and takes pride in isolation, then imprisonment is 
likely to have a criminogenic impact and increase future defiance of the law.  The reverse 
of these factors lead to a deterrent impact of incarceration.   If these four factors are 
evenly counterbalanced, then incarceration would likely have no impact on future 
criminal behavior (i.e., “irrelevance”).  Defiance theory integrates Braithwaite’s (1989) 
criminological theory on reintegrative shaming, Tyler’s (1990) political science theory of 
procedural justice, and Scheff and Retzinger’s (1991) sociological theory of the “master 
emotions” of pride and shame. 
Prison is also hypothesized to increase future criminal behavior through social 
learning mechanisms.  In early sociological studies on prison culture, it was found that an 
oppositional subculture, characterized by values supportive of crime, was typically 
present in prisons (Sykes, 1958).  The origins of this deviant prison subculture have been 
variously attributed, but generally fall into one of two categories.  Deprivation theory 
suggests that the “pains of imprisonment” lead to embracing a deviant subculture of 
adaptation in order to cope with the deprivation of prison life (Sykes, 1958).  Importation 
theory, on the other hand, suggests that the prison subculture is simply a continuation of 
the street subculture that offenders bring with them to prison.  Regardless of the specific 
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mechanism, prison is viewed as a school of crime, in which criminal behavior is learned 
and reinforced during incarceration.  
 
PRISON AS A NULL EFFECT 
 
Writers on the topic of the impact of incarceration recognize that it may be that 
prison simply has a null impact on future criminal behavior, neither raising nor lowering 
the probability of a subsequent return to crime.  Specifically, psychologists have tended 
to take the “minimalist” view of the effect of imprisonment (Gendreau, Cullen, & 
Goggin, 1999).  Drawing upon the literature on learning and behavior modification, the 
social psychological literature on persuasion/coercion, and the personality literature, 
these psychologists find convincing theoretical reasons to believe that a term of 
imprisonment simply serves as a “psychological deep freeze” in which offenders 
maintain the same level of criminal propensity before, during, and after prison (Zamble & 
Porporino, 1988).  In terms of the learning and behavioral modification literature, 
psychologists point out that it is unlikely that many of the previously outlined necessary 
contingencies of deterrence (e.g., immediacy and predictability of punishment, etc.) are 
present under the current system of imprisonment.  In terms of the persuasion/coercion 
literature, it is pointed out that many of the prerequisites of human persuasion, such as 
credibility and empathy on the part of the messenger, are also highly unlikely under our 
current system of imprisonment.  It is purported that repeated threat communication, such 
as that which operates through a system of mass imprisonment, leads to psychological 
“inoculation” in which individuals devise reasons to resist change (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993).  This is very similar to the theoretical mechanisms previously outlined in the 
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literature on legitimacy, procedural justice, and defiance theory.  Finally, in terms of the 
literature on personality, it is suggested that imprisonment is not well-suited to serve as 
an effective change of behavior given the personality type of the typical criminal, which 
is characterized as antagonistic, egocentric, manipulative, and impulsive (Andrews & 
Bonta, 1998).  Together, these various literatures form the minimalist view, 
hypothesizing a largely null impact of imprisonment.  
One note of importance is that a null impact of imprisonment on subsequent 
criminal behavior does not necessarily mean that prison has no impact on restraining 
criminal behavior during the period of incarceration.  Prison may serve a mere 
incapacitative effect, taking a slice out of the criminal career during the period of 
incarceration but having no impact on future criminal behavior.  Thus, I introduce the 
incapacitation literature below, even though a null and incapacitative effect of 
imprisonment need not necessarily go together.  Indeed prison can potentially 
simultaneously serve both an incapacitative and a deterrent/criminogenic effect.     
Incapacitation research grew out of early criminological work examining criminal 
careers.  Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin’s groundbreaking work in 1972 found that 
approximately 6% of a Philadelphia birth cohort accounted for 52% of the arrests 
attributable to the same cohort.  This spawned the notion of “selective incapacitation”, in 
which it was suggested that it may be possible to identify a small group of high frequency 
offenders and incarcerate them for an extended period of time in order to prevent a large 
proportional share of criminal activity through incapacitation.  Following the work of 
Wolfgang and colleagues, the concept of “lambda” was introduced into the discussion on 
incapacitation (Blumstein, Cohen & Nagin, 1978; Blumstein, Cohen, Roth, & Visher, 
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1986).  Lambda is a value that represents the frequency of individual criminal behavior.  
The criminal career paradigm suggests that if lambda values, as well as lengths of 
criminal careers, could be reliably estimated, then it could be possible to generate 
estimates of how much crime is prevented through incapacitation by taking a slice out of 
the criminal career trajectory through imprisonment (Blumstein et al., 1986).  Empirical 
research on the incapacitative effects of imprisonment blossomed between the mid-1970s 
and mid-1990s.  This literature is reviewed in the next section of this chapter.   
  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF IMPRISONMENT 
 
Three seminal reviews of the literature on the impact of imprisonment on 
subsequent criminal behavior have been completed to date.  The first review, a meta-
analysis by Gendreau et al. (1999), examined 50 studies dating to 1958 involving 336,052 
offenders and producing a total of 325 correlations.  Results were broken down by studies 
examining: 1) the impact on recidivism of serving a prison sentence versus receiving an 
alternative community-based sanction, and 2) the dose-response impact on recidivism of 
serving differential lengths of time in prison.  The overall conclusion of this review was 
that prison produced a slight increase in subsequent recidivism rates.  In three out of 
every four of the outcomes examined, recidivism rates were higher for those sentenced to 
prison or serving longer periods of time in prison.  The average weighted effect size just 
among those studies which examined the difference between imprisonment and 
community sanctions was zero, meaning that prison was found to have no impact one 
way or the other on subsequent recidivism when compared to community-based 
sanctions.  The average effect size for just those studies which examined the impact of 
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length of time in prison was .03, meaning that a one unit increase in the length of time 
served in prison was associated with a 3% increase in recidivism.  Low risk offenders 
were found to have particularly larger increases in recidivism associated with longer 
periods of time served in prison.  The impact of imprisonment versus community-based 
sanctions was not found to vary by offender risk level, however.  Reviewed studies which 
used more methodologically rigorous methods were more likely on average to find an 
increase in recidivism for those who went to prison compared to those who did not, but 
were not more likely to find differences in recidivism based on the length of time served 
in prison. 
The second review of the literature on the impact of imprisonment on subsequent 
re-offending was a Campbell Collaboration systematic review conducted by Villettaz, 
Killias, and Zoder (2006) of over 3,000 abstracts.  Only 23 studies met the criteria for 
inclusion in the final review.  To be included, the study had to use: a) a randomized or 
natural experiment design, or b) a quasi-experimental design in which more than three 
potentially relevant independent variables were controlled for.  Only studies conducted 
between 1961 and 2002 were included.  Of the final 23 studies, only five studies used a 
randomized or natural experiment design.  The final set of 23 included studies allowed 
for 27 statistical comparisons between custodial (e.g., prison) and non-custodial groups.  
Thirteen of these 27 comparisons produced statistically significant differences; re-
offending rates were lower for non-custodial offenders in eleven comparisons, and were 
lower for custodial offenders in two comparisons.  The remaining fourteen comparisons 
showed no statistically significant differences.   
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The authors of this review point out several limitations to their findings, however.  
First, randomized controlled experiments provide the strongest design for determining 
with a high degree of confidence the impact of custodial sanctions compared to non-
custodial sanctions, but such experiments are exceedingly rare.  Second, follow-up 
periods for recidivism rates rarely extended past two years in the included studies.  Third, 
most studies used re-arrest or re-conviction as the measure of recidivism, instead of 
alternative measures such as self-reports.  Fourth, in most of the studies only the 
occurrence of recidivism was examined, and not the frequency with which it occurred.  
Fifth, other outcomes such as on employment, health, family, and social networks were 
rarely examined.  Sixth, no study considered placebo (or Hawthorne) effects where, for 
instance, offenders randomly assigned to non-custodial sanctions may have felt more 
fairly treated and adjusted their behavior accordingly.  One final contingency that the 
authors of this review point out is that there is a lot of variation in the types of offenses 
examined in each of the included studies, and that prison might very well have a different 
impact for different types of offenses or offenders.  Thus, for example, a null to slightly 
criminogenic effect of imprisonment might be found overall but a significant deterrent 
effect might be found if just examining parole violators.   
In the last section of their review, Villettaz et al. (2006) perform a separate meta-
analysis on just the five experimental design studies included in their review.  From this 
meta-analysis, they find no overall significant difference in recidivism between custodial 
and non-custodial sanctions, and thus conclude based on these studies that prison has a 
null effect on subsequent re-offending.  Given the methodological rigor of the five 
experimental studies, they warrant describing individually.  The first study (Bergman, 
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1976) reports on the random assignment of “second felony” offenders in Michigan who 
would have otherwise received a prison sentence, to either probation or prison.  A one-
year follow-up period was used.  The authors of this study found the probation group to 
have a lower recidivism rate (14% for probation vs. 33% for prison).   
The second experimental study (Schneider, 1986) was a juvenile intervention 
implemented in Idaho, in which juvenile delinquents were randomly assigned to either 
probation or detention.  After a 22-month follow-up, the probation group generally fared 
better (53% of the probation group versus 59% of the detention group reported further 
contact with the court), although the differences between groups in both incidence and 
prevalence of re-offending were not found to be statistically significant.  
The third experimental study (Barton & Butts, 1990) reports on an intervention 
for male juvenile delinquents in Michigan.  Participants were randomly assigned to either 
intensive community supervision or incarceration.  A two year follow-up period was 
reported.  Overall the results were mixed.  The incarceration group indicated less frequent 
subsequent charges, but more self-reported delinquency.   
The fourth experimental study (Killias, Aebi, & Ribeaud, 2000) reports on an 
interesting experiment in Switzerland in which a group of offenders were randomly 
assigned to either community service or jail.  The incarcerated group served only up to 14 
days in jail.  The formula for community service was 8 hours for every potential day in 
jail for which the offender would have otherwise served.  After a two year follow-up, no 
statistically significant differences were found, although the jail group reported a slightly 
higher incidence and prevalence of re-arrest. 
30 
 
The fifth experimental study (Van der Werff, 1979) was a natural experiment in 
which a royal pardon in honor of the wedding of Princess Beatrix of the Netherlands led 
to an automatic suspended sentence of offenders who committed their offense before a 
fixed date.  These pardoned offenders were compared to offenders whose offense fell 
after the fixed cutoff date and were thus ineligible for the suspended sentence and served 
time in jail.  After a six year follow-up period, no significant differences were found for 
traffic and property offenders, but significantly lower recidivism rates were found for 
violent offenders who received a suspended sentence and were not required to serve time 
in jail.   
The third major review of the literature on the impact of imprisonment on 
reoffending was conducted by Nagin et al. (2009).  These authors begin their review with 
a lengthy discussion of the various methodological difficulties faced by researchers 
attempting to study the impact of imprisonment on criminal behavior.  These studies face 
a basic inference problem, in which the establishment of a causal (not merely 
correlational) link between imprisonment and subsequent criminal behavior is attempted.  
Offenders are non-randomly assigned to imprisonment in the vast majority of studies, 
which raises the immediate question as to whether pre-existing conditions explain any 
differences in observed recidivism rates between custodial and non-custodial groups.  
Nagin and colleagues (2009) lay out three aspects of the basic inference problem which 
are important to address in studies of the impact of imprisonment on re-offending: 1) the 
target population from which inferences are being drawn, 2) specification of treatment 
and control conditions, and 3) randomization.  The target population of the study is 
important because many studies on the impact of imprisonment are conducted on lower 
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risk samples of offenders, yet the results may be mistakenly conferred to the larger 
population of offenders who are sentenced to prison.  Alternatively, focusing on a widely 
heterogeneous population can make inference of the results misleading or inaccurate 
when applied to any one subset of the total group.  Therefore, there is a tradeoff between 
the cost of narrowness and the benefits of reduced heterogeneity which is important to 
consider.   
Also important to consider, according to Nagin et al. (2009), is the specifics of the 
treatment and control conditions.  These conditions can vary widely between studies and 
can greatly affect the results.  It is thus important, for example, to specify the length and 
conditions of confinement for the custodial group as well as the length and conditions of 
treatment for the noncustodial group.    
Finally, a third consideration is randomization of assignment to the treatment or 
control conditions.  The benefits of randomization for determining causality have been 
clearly elucidated in the program evaluation literature (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 
2002).  The goal of randomization is to ensure that the subjects assigned to treatment and 
control groups (e.g., custodial versus noncustodial sanctions) differ in only one way (i.e., 
their treatment status).  In the real world, most studies on the impact of imprisonment are 
not able to meet the so-called “gold standard” or randomization, however.  In such cases, 
it becomes imperative on the researcher to use methods which approximate a random 
assignment process, or to use statistical techniques in order to understand and control for 
other significant differences between the treatment and control groups which may impact 
outcomes.   
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Nagin et al. (2009) break down their review of the literature into four types of 
studies: 1) experimental or quasi-experimental studies, 2) matching studies based on 
observational data, 3) regression studies based on observational data, and 4) studies using 
unique or sophisticated methodological/statistical techniques.  Under the category of 
experimental or quasi-experimental studies, they identify the same five experimental 
studies as were identified in the previous review by Villettaz and colleagues (2006).  
Their conclusion from these five studies are that the studies point to a criminogenic effect 
of imprisonment, but that this conclusion is weak based on a small number of studies, 
few statistically significant relationships, and sample groups limited to juveniles or to 
shorter stays in prison.   
The second category of studies, matching studies, included studies in which 
members in the custodial and noncustodial groups were matched either on a variable-by-
variable case or through propensity score matching techniques.  Eleven studies under this 
category were identified.  Studies using a variable-by-variable matching approach 
overwhelmingly pointed towards a criminogenic effect of imprisonment for juveniles, but 
produced inconsistent results among adults.  The propensity score matching studies also 
pointed to mixed results, but tended towards a criminogenic effect of imprisonment.  On 
the whole, although the preponderance of the point estimates were not statistically 
significant, the matching studies provided even more evidence for a statistically 
significant criminogenic effect than did the experimental studies.   
By far the largest category of studies was regression-based studies.  Thirty-one 
studies were identified in this category, with 22 studies predominately favoring 
noncustodial sanctions, seven studies favoring custodial sanctions, and two studies 
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producing mixed results.  While more studies tended to favor a criminogenic effect of 
imprisonment, Nagin and colleagues (2009) were careful to point out that the sample 
characteristics of these studies were too varied to lead to an overall generic conclusion on 
the effect of imprisonment.   
Seven studies fell under the final category of studies using unique or sophisticated 
methodological/statistical techniques.  These studies are as much interesting for their 
methodology as they are for their results.  The first study in this category (Drago, 
Galbiati, & Vertova, 2009) reports on a clemency bill in Italy in which more than 20,000 
inmates were granted early conditional release from prison.  Using a natural experiment 
framework, the authors found that each additional month that the offender would have 
otherwise served in prison but were instead allowed to serve in the community (i.e., their 
residual sentence length) was associated with a 1.24% reduction in reoffending, 
suggesting a criminogenic impact of imprisonment.  The second study (Helland & 
Tabarrok, 2007) examined California’s “three strikes” law by comparing reoffending 
rates for offenders who had one strike versus offenders who had two strikes.  Those with 
two strikes were found to have about a 20% lower re-arrest rate, suggesting a deterrent 
impact of imprisonment based on the lengthier sentence which would have been served 
by this group had they been arrested for a third strike.  The third study (Bhati & Piquero, 
2008) uses an “information theoretic” hazard model to compare actual post-imprisonment 
criminal trajectories with estimated post-imprisonment criminal trajectories based on pre-
imprisonment offending patterns.  It was concluded from this study that imprisonment led 
to a very large reduction in reoffending due to a combination of deterrence and 
incapacitation.  The fourth study (Wimer, Sampson, & Laub, 2008) applied recently 
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developed advanced statistical methods for examining causal inference with non-
experimental data, using the Glueck’s famous longitudinal sample.  They concluded that 
imprisonment was associated with higher re-arrest rates, but that these results were 
fragile when subjected to their more advanced methods of sorting out causal inference.  
The fifth study (Manski & Nagin, 1998) examined a sample of juvenile delinquents in 
Utah using a bounding approach rather than a traditional approach which produces a 
point estimate.  Overall, results leaned towards a criminogenic impact of imprisonment, 
although assigning the highest rate offenders to custodial confinement tended to result in 
more of a deterrent effect.  The final two studies (Berube & Green, 2007; Green & 
Winik, 2010) were both examinations of the same sample, in which the random 
assignment of cases to judges in the U.S. federal court system (who had different rates of 
sentencing offenders to prison) was exploited in order to approximate a natural 
experiment.  Neither study found evidence that imprisonment affected recidivism rates 
one way or another, with point estimates equally divided between positive and negative 
results.   
Nagin et al.’s (2009) review also examined 19 studies on the dose-response 
impact of imprisonment (i.e., the impact of the length of imprisonment).  Only two of 
these studies used an experimental design in which offenders were randomly sentenced to 
longer versus shorter sentences in prison (Deschenes, Turner, & Petersilia, 1995; 
Berecochea & Jaman, 1981).  Findings from the two experimental studies generally 
produced non-significant differences based on imprisonment length, although the 
Berecochea and Jaman (1981) study tended to favor longer sentences.  It was concluded 
that the 17 remaining non-experimental studies on the dose-response issue were 
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inconclusive and all suffered from a methodological weakness of failing to properly 
account for the impact of aging on recidivism.   
Overall, Nagin et al.’s (2009) review is the most comprehensive to date.  Their 
final assessment is that imprisonment has a null to slightly criminogenic impact on future 
criminal behavior, but that the existing evidence is not solid enough to lead to firm policy 
decisions.  This assessment is closely aligned to the final assessment of the previous two 
reviews of the literature, and represents the state of the evidence on what we tentatively 
know about the impact of imprisonment on subsequent criminal behavior.   
While it appears that on the whole imprisonment has a null to slightly 
criminogenic rather than a deterrent impact on future criminal behavior, this speaks 
nothing of the possible incapacitative impact of imprisonment.  Empirical research on the 
incapacitative impact of incarceration is largely divided into two bodies of work.  At the 
macro-level, economists have predominately investigated the relationship between 
incarceration rates and crime rates over time and between jurisdictions.  At the micro-
level, criminologists have used individual level data to generate estimates of “lambda” 
(or the frequency of offending), which are then used to simulate estimates of the amount 
of crime prevented through imprisonment. 
Macro level studies of the relationship between imprisonment and crime rates 
face several methodological difficulties.  First, such studies must account for a 
simultaneous relationship between prison and crime rates in which each theoretically 
influences one another.  For example, we might reasonably expect that the use of 
imprisonment will go up in response to rising crime rates, but conversely if imprisonment 
serves any incapacitative effect at all then we would expect high imprisonment rates to be 
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associated with lower crime rates.  Sorting this issue of simultaneity out is a difficult task.  
The second methodological issue faced by macro-level studies is deciding what level of 
aggregation to use.  Results differ by whether the association between crime rates and 
imprisonment rates are examined at the county level, state level, or national level.  
Generally, studies to date have found a smaller impact of incarceration rate on crime rates 
at lower levels of aggregation (Steman, 2007).  The third methodological issue faced by 
macro-level studies is properly  isolating the impact of imprisonment rates on crime rates 
net the wide variety of other factors that can also affect crime rates.  Good models must 
account for these other factors.  Finally, the last difficulty faced by macro-level studies is 
separating the incapacitative effects of imprisonment from the deterrent effects of 
imprisonment.  By just examining incarceration rates at an aggregate level, there is no 
good way to date of isolating the incapacitative effects from the deterrent effects of 
imprisonment.   
Several macro-level studies have been published, with widely varying estimates 
of the impact of incarceration rates on crime rates.  Based on existing studies, one could 
conclude that a 10% increase in imprisonment rates could lead to anywhere from a 22% 
decrease in crime rates (Devine, Sheley, & Smith, 1988) to having no impact or actually 
even slightly increasing crime rates (Liedka et al., 2006).  These varying estimates might 
be a function of the time period investigated too, since estimates are also likely dependent 
on the marginal incarceration rate and at a certain point incapacitation of larger numbers 
of offenders is likely to produce diminishing returns (Liedka et al., 2006).  Three of the 
existing macro-level studies to date have dealt seriously with the major methodological 
issues outlined above (Levitt, 1996; Spelman, 2000; Spelman, 2005).  Interestingly, these 
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studies come to remarkably similar conclusions on the impact of incarceration rates on 
crime rates.  These three studies generally conclude that a 10% increase in incarceration 
rates leads to somewhere between a 2 and 4% decrease in crime rates.  The one factor 
that these three studies were still not able to account for was separating the incapacitative 
from the deterrent effects of imprisonment, which means that not all of the 2 to 4% 
decrease in crime rates is necessarily attributable to incapacitation.  However, given the 
previously discussed literature on the deterrent, null, and criminogenic effects of 
imprisonment, it seems unlikely that much of this 2 to 4% decrease in crime rates is due 
to deterrence (or at least to specific deterrence).   
Micro-level incapacitation studies by criminologists face their own set of 
difficulties (Piquero & Blumstein, 2007).  Most of the problems relate to estimating the 
key parameter for simulating the incapacitative impact of prison, namely “lambda.”  
First, lambda estimates typically rely on self-reports of the number of crimes committed 
within a given timeframe.  Self-report measures are potentially susceptible to known 
problems of reporting and recall biases.  Second, lambda estimates must account for, 
although often neglect, heterogeneity in offending levels across groups of offenders and 
types of offenses.  Third, lambda estimates often assume a constant rate of offending at 
different ages, although there is strong evidence that offending declines with age.  Fourth, 
estimates must also consider the length of the criminal career, and most estimates to date 
have assumed that the criminal career length is exponentially distributed.  This 
assumption may or may not be accurate across different settings or types of offenders or 
crimes, however.  Fifth, lambda estimate must contend with selection bias effects, in that 
most of the estimates of lambda are generated from among inmate populations which are 
38 
 
known to offend at higher rates than other offenders who are not caught, arrested, and 
imprisoned.  Sixth, most simulations assume that periods of incarceration do not change 
the rate of offending or length of a criminal career for a given offender.  Seventh, most 
models do not account for crimes which involve co-offending, and as such assume that 
co-offending is irrelevant. 
All estimates of lambda and subsequent micro-level simulation models are based 
on the early model of Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar (1973; see also Shinnar & Shinnar, 1975).  
This model is called a “steady-state” model, and proceeds by estimating the following 
five inputs: 1) the rate of offending (lambda), 2) the likelihood of an offender being 
caught and convicted, 3) the likelihood of receiving a prison sentence if convicted, 4) the 
average time served in prison, and 5) the average length of the offender’s criminal career.  
Based on this model, widely varying estimates of lambda (and thus of crime prevented by 
incapacitation) have been generated (Piquero & Blumstein, 2007).  Estimates of lambda 
vary from anywhere between 3 crimes to 187 crimes per person per year.  Due to the 
complications of estimating lambda as well as the other parameters for these models, and 
due to the now dated work upon which much of these models/estimates are based, micro-
level research by criminologists has not led to anything near a consensus on the average 
incapacitative effect of imprisonment.   
 
PAROLE SUPERVISION AND SANCTIONING 
 
Now that the research and theoretical work on the overall impact of imprisonment 
on criminal behavior has been examined, I turn my attention to the impact of 
imprisonment specifically on technical parole violators.  Unfortunately empirical insight 
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is extremely limited in this area.  I begin by providing a brief history of parole 
supervision in America, then discuss some theoretical work which has been used to 
explain the potential mechanisms by which imprisonment of technical parole violators 
may impact their subsequent criminal behavior, and finally discuss the limited empirical 
work on effective sanctioning of parole violators.   
The term “parole” derives from the French word “parol”, which literally means 
“word”, as in giving one’s word or promise (Petersilia, 2003).  Thus, parole was first 
designed as a system in which offenders were granted early release from prison in 
exchange for their promise that they would abide by certain rules or conditions and obey 
the law.  The earliest parole supervision system operated in an English penal colony off 
the coast of Australia, as implemented by Alexander Maconochie in the early 1800s.  The 
practice was later adopted by the Irish penal system under the leadership of Sir Walter 
Crofton during the mid-1800s.  Under Crofton’s system, parolees submitted monthly 
reports to the police, and were supervised by a civilian inspector (the precursor of the 
modern-day parole agent).  Later in the 1800s, American penal reformers began taking 
notice of this system, which they referred to as the “Irish system”.  Zebulon Brockway, a 
Michigan penologist, is largely credited with first adopting the parole system in the 
United States.  The most complete workings of Brockway’s parole system were first 
implemented in New York’s Elmira Reformatory in 1876.  The New York system held 
all of the elements of a modern day parole system: 1) an indeterminate sentencing 
structure, 2) a parole release mechanism, 3) post-release supervision, and 4) conditions 
for parole revocation for violation of rules.  New York’s parole system spread so rapidly 
that by 1942, all of the states plus the federal government had a parole system.  For a 
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variety of reasons beginning in the mid-1970s, many states began to rethink the 
indeterminate sentencing structure as well as the parole release mechanism associated 
with the indeterminate structure, and took steps to repeal it.  However, even among states 
that moved to repeal indeterminate sentencing and parole release, the one function of 
parole which has largely remained intact is using a period of post-release supervision 
after prison (Petersilia, 2003).   
Primary questions about the functioning of the modern day parole system, which 
have remained largely unanswered, revolve around what the purpose of, and most 
effective sanctioning response to, technical parole violations should be.  The thinking of 
those who support returning technical parole violators to prison is that technical 
violations are precursors to a return to criminal behavior, and that by sending technical 
violators back to prison we prevent or deter further criminal behavior (Piehl & LoBuglio, 
2005).  Critics point out that sending technical violators back to prison is costly and is a 
significant contributor to increased prison populations, with little evidence that such a 
policy actually prevents criminal behavior or is any more effective than less restrictive 
intermediate sanctions for technical violators (Burke, 1997).   
While many of the theoretical frameworks previously discussed under the section 
on the general impact of incarceration may specifically apply to explaining the impact of 
imprisonment among technical parole violators, perhaps the most relevant theoretical 
perspective to this issue is the “broken windows” perspective.  The “broken windows” 
perspective was first articulated by political scientists James Q. Wilson and George 
Kelling (1982).  The basic idea behind the “broken windows” perspective is that there is a 
causal link between disorder and more serious criminal behavior, in which unaddressed 
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disorder and minor nuisance offenses will eventually lead to more serious crimes if left 
unaddressed (Kelling & Coles, 1996; Wilson & Kelling, 1982).  The primary policy 
implication extending from broken windows theorizing is that a strategy based on the 
criminal justice system closely responding to minor offenses and disorder will pay 
dividends in increased public safety.   
The broken windows strategy, as has been utilized by the police, is also variously 
referred to as “zero-tolerance policing” or “order maintenance policing.”  Both labels are 
variants on the idea that there is some relationship between disorder/minor crimes and 
more serious crimes.  It is important to note that the broken windows theory was 
originally formulated within the policing literature to explain crime rates at the aggregate 
level, rather than individual criminal behavior.  According to the original authors, letting 
disorder and nuisance crimes go unattended in neighborhoods sends a signals to would-be 
criminal offenders that these neighborhoods lack investment and social controls.  This in 
turn is theorized to lead to social decay and community lawlessness in which more 
serious crime can flourish.  The original formulation of the “broken windows” approach 
therefore is seemingly closer related to the concept of general deterrence rather than 
specific deterrence.  General deterrence considers the broad impact of the threat of 
punishment on would-be criminals within society at large, whereas specific deterrence is 
concerned with the impact of punishment on the individual who is actually punished or 
threatened with punishment.  Given that this study is primarily focused on the specific 
deterrent impact of imprisonment among technical parole violators, the “broken 
windows” analogy is not perfectly applied, and may rather be more suitable for 
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explaining how technical parole violation rates at the aggregate level could generally 
deter would-be criminal offenders from within the entire parole supervised population.        
To date, the “broken windows” framework has primarily been adopted as a 
policing innovation and used by police forces in several jurisdictions, most notably New 
York City during the mid-1990s.  While a natural connection would also seem to exist 
between the broken windows framework and community supervision (e.g., probation or 
parole supervision), “broken windows” has not specifically been raised as a relevant 
perspective in the community supervision literature, with a few noted exceptions 
(Farabee, 2005; Kleiman, 2009; Piehl & LoBuglio, 2005; Reinventing Probation Council, 
1999).  Technical violations of the conditions of probation/parole supervision largely do 
not involve criminal behavior, and would thus be analogous to the types of minor 
nuisance infractions or disorder which is thought to lead to more serious crime under the 
broken windows framework.  Therefore, an increased focus on sanctioning of technical 
parole violators may results in substantial gains in terms of reducing serious crime rates.   
Recent work by Mark Kleiman (2009) provides primary support for a deterrence-
based, broken windows approach to sanctioning technical parole violators.  The central 
premise of Kleiman’s (2009) work is that certain and swift (but not necessarily severe) 
sanctioning of even minor technical infractions is most effective in reducing criminal 
behavior among probationers and parolees.  The problem with the current operation of 
probation/parole, in Kleiman’s (2009) view, is that sanctioning for technical infractions is 
done in almost a random manner, where technical violators are given many breaks before 
being sent back to prison.  Kleiman’s (2009) proposed strategy is to provide frequent and 
close monitoring of the behavior of probationers/parolees, coupled with quick and 
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consistent enforcement of even minor infractions.  Kleiman (2009) describes such a 
deterrence-based approach as holding particular promise among probationers/parolees 
because they are already subjected to monitoring and supervision (which can increase the 
certainty of punishment due to increased detection) and are also not typically subjected to 
the same level of due process for infractions as is a crime in a criminal court case (which 
can facilitate increased swiftness of punishment).   
While Kleiman (2009) most clearly articulates a broken windows approach for 
sanctioning technical parole violators, he was not the first to draw a link between broken 
windows policing and probation/parole supervision.2  In an early report by the Manhattan 
Institute on reforming probation supervision practices, the authors laid out a new model 
for probation supervision which they referred to as “Broken Windows Probation” 
(Reinventing Probation Council, 1999).  As described under this approach, violations of 
probation conditions are to be enforced quickly and strongly.  David Farabee (2005), in 
his monograph describing what he sees as disappointing results favoring reforming 
criminals through in-prison rehabilitation programs, lays out an alternative model for 
reforming criminals which is based directly on broken windows policing and is similar in 
nature to Kleiman’s (2009) proposed model of focusing on increase certainty and 
swiftness of sanctioning among probation/parole violators (Farabee, 2005).  In a review 
of the literature on supervision, Piehl and LoBuglio (2005) acknowledge the relevance of 
the broken windows perspective to the sanctioning of probation/parole violators, stating 
that in light of broken windows theory, “the revocation of the conditional terms of release 
                                                 
2
 Although Kleiman’s (2009) proposed approach to the sanctioning of technical probation/parole violators 
conforms closely to a broken windows model, and while Kleiman himself draws a link between broken 
windows policing and his deterrence-based sanctioning approach for technical violators, he does not 
specifically refer to his approach as a “broken windows” approach. 
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for a large number of recent inmates, who increasingly comprise a larger percentage of 
new commitments to prison, may be a desired outcome.”  
Hawken and Kleiman (2009) provide the most convincing empirical evidence in 
support of a broken windows type of approach for sanctioning technical violators.  They 
report on a randomized experiment of the Hawaii HOPE initiative, in which a group of 
repeat probation violators were randomly assigned to receive either probation as normal 
or a monitoring and sanctioning type of deterrence strategy.  HOPE participants were told 
that from there forward they would be consistently and immediately sanctioned with 
short stays in jail for each and every violation of a technical condition of their 
supervision.  The HOPE probationers, mostly meth addicts, were required to randomly 
receive drug testing at least on a weekly basis.  The results of the HOPE experiment were 
impressive.  The re-arrest rate for HOPE probationers was 21%, compared to 47% for the 
comparison group.  The positive drug test rate for HOPE probationers was 13%, 
compared to a 46% positive drug test rate for the comparison group.  Based primarily on 
the results from the Hawaii HOPE pilot, several recent policy papers on best practices for 
responding to probation/parole violations have advocated employing swift, certain, and 
consistently applied responses to technical violations in order to reinforce a deterrent 
effect (Pew, 2007; Urban Institute, 2008). 
Evidence contrary to the broken windows style of enhanced monitoring and 
sanctioning for technical violators comes from the famous RAND study of Intensive 
Supervision Programs (ISP) conducted in the late 1980s to early 1990s (Petersilia & 
Turner, 1993).  In this randomized field experiment, ISP programs across 14 sites (9 
states) were compared to standard supervision practices.  The authors concluded that ISP 
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increased recidivism rates in most incidents.  After a one-year follow-up, 37% of ISP 
participants had been re-arrested compared to 33% of the control group, and 27% of the 
ISP participants were returned to prison compared to 19% of the control group.  The most 
significant difference was in the rate of technical violations, with 65% of the ISP group 
receiving a technical violation compared to 38% of the control group.  In the end, the 
authors questioned whether the increased recidivism rates for ISP participants were due 
to increased monitoring and thus increased detection of violations, or whether the results 
simply spoke to a criminogenic effect of ISP supervision.  Their preliminary evidence 
suggested that the differences were primarily due to increased detection.  The next 
question then became whether increased detection and sanctioning of technical violations 
led to decreased criminal outcomes.  Preliminary evidence from one of their evaluation 
sites (Washington state) suggested that technical violations were not a proxy for criminal 
behavior, although their assessment in this area was far from conclusive.   
It is important to note that while theoretical and empirical work drawing on 
broken windows responses to technical violations might explain why imprisonment 
should be expected to exert a deterrent impact on technical parole violators, it does not 
necessarily speak directly to the issue of the relationship between imprisonment and 
subsequent criminal behavior among technical parole violators.  The “broken windows” 
approach does not require prison as a necessary sanctioning response.  Indeed, a parallel 
movement in the best practices literature on probation/parole supervision promotes 
“graduated sanctions” for technical violations (Pew, 2007; Urban Institute, 2008).  Under 
a graduated sanctioning approach, imprisonment would largely not represent the most 
appropriate response for most types of technical violations.  Interest in graduated 
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sanctioning for technical (or administrative) violations began within the drug court 
movement (Harrell & Roman, 2001; Taxman, Soule, & Gelb, 1999).  A graduated 
sanctioning matrix provides a structure of increasingly severe penalties for violations, 
with imprisonment serving as a last resort.  Importantly, graduated sanctioning 
approaches such as those used in early drug court models can still rely on swift and 
certain sanctioning, but without coupling such sanctioning with an immediate return to 
incarceration as was done in the Hawaii HOPE model.   
The empirical work on graduated sanctioning among probation/parole violators 
has been extremely limited to date.  Two existing studies which have evaluated the 
impact of a graduated sanctioning protocol on probationer/parolee outcomes have found 
that graduated sanctioning reduced prison/jail time, but have found little support for any 
significant decrease in recidivism rates.  Martin and Van Dine (2008) examined Ohio’s 
progressive sanctioning grid for parole violators, and found that while moving to 
graduated sanctioning increased the progressiveness of responses to technical violations 
and decreased reliance on imprisonment, it had no statistically significant impact on 
reducing recidivism rates.3  An earlier study in Pennsylvania examined outcomes among 
probationers under a “zero tolerance” model of more immediate returns to jail compared 
to probationers operating under a graduated sanctioning schema, and found generally 
lower recidivism rates for probation violators returned more immediately to jail (Civic 
Institute, 2005).  
                                                 
3 In their bivariate analysis, recidivism rates were actually found to be higher among violators sanctioned 




One type of intermediate sanctioning option for technical violators is residential 
halfway house centers.  This option is often referred to as “halfway back,” indicating its 
status as a sanction which is halfway back to prison.  Offenders in “halfway back” 
programs typically reside in a center for a short period of time, during which they are 
allowed out during daytime hours to maintain employment and other social ties.  There 
has only been one published study to date of a “halfway back” program (White, Mellow, 
Englander, & Ruffinengo, 2011).  This study examined a “halfway back” program for 
New Jersey technical parole violators.  Using propensity score matching techniques, the 
authors compared “halfway back” completers to a matched sample of technical parole 
violators who were returned to prison.  No significant differences were found in re-arrest 
rates, although “halfway back” participants were found to have a slightly lower number 
of total arrests.  Findings were further obscured by the fact that only “halfway back” 
completers were included, rather than following an intent-to-treat model where both 
program failures and completers were included.  Since generally program completers are 
found to be more motivated to succeed, it may be that technical violators who were 
returned to prison would have demonstrated lower re-arrest rates if program failures and 
completers were included in the treatment group, although the completion rate for the 
“halfway back” program was found to be quite high. 
  While empirical evidence on the impact of graduated sanctioning grids for TPVs 
is far from conclusive, one hypothesized benefit of such an approach over a “zero 
tolerance” approach is that it enhances transparency and procedural justice, thereby 
enhancing the perceived legitimacy of the supervising authority (Taxman et al., 1999).  
This may in turn reduce re-offending rates among TPVs, and suggests that conversely an 
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over-reliance on imprisonment for TPVs may in fact generate a criminogenic effect.  
Similar to the theoretical mechanisms previously discussed under the section on the 
overall criminogenic potential of imprisonment, sending TPVs to prison may actually 
lead to defiance (Sherman, 1993) if they perceive that the process of revocation to prison 
is not fair and transparent.  This becomes particularly germane since most TPVs in prison 
have not committed a new crime and thus may find their punishment unfair. 
One recent empirical study which is most germane to drawing a conclusion that 
incarcerating TPVs may actually have a criminogenic effect is a study conducted by the 
Washington State Institute for Public Policy (Drake & Aos, 2012).  This study is in fact 
the only known study that comes close to the precise purpose of the current study 
reported on in the subsequent chapters here.  In their evaluation using data on parolees in 
Washington state, Drake and Aos (2012) assess the impact of confinement for a TPV 
violation on felony recidivism rates using an instrumental variable (IV) approach based 
on a “natural experiment.”  Drake and Aos (2012) take advantage of the discovery that 
Community Corrections Officers (CCOs) who supervise parolees use confinement as a 
sanction for a TPV violation at differing rates, and that the Washington State Department 
of Corrections attempts to evenly distribute offenders to CCO caseloads by risk for re-
offense in a way that mimics random assignment.  Essentially, this random assignment of 
parolees to caseloads with differing rates of returning TPVs to imprisonment provides 
methodological advantages similar to the “gold standard” of a randomized controlled 
experiment for estimating the causal impact of the use of imprisonment for TPVs on 
subsequent recidivism rates.  This approach is a very similar methodological approach to 
previous studies that use a similar “natural experiment” situation to examine the overall 
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impact of imprisonment on incarceration by taking advantage of the observation that 
court cases are randomly assigned to judges with differing rates of sentencing offenders 
to prison (see Berube & Green, 2007; Green & Winik, 2010; Nagin & Snodgrass, 2013). 
Drake and Aos’s (2012) study began with all offenders in Washington state who 
were at risk for recidivism in the community between July 1, 2001 and June 30, 2008.  
They focus on 1,273 parolees during this timeframe with at least one violation and who 
were supervised by only one single CCO during the observation period.  Their main 
finding is that felony recidivism is not lowered by using confinement for offenders who 
violate the technical conditions of their community supervision.  In fact, in all of the 
models that they estimated, confinement for a violation was actually associated with 
increased recidivism.  They offer two possible explanations for this finding of a 
criminogenic effect of incarceration for a TPV violation.  First, they suggest that 
confinement may actually have a deleterious effect on the offender by leading to 
increased difficulties in the parolee reintegrating back home, such as increased 
difficulties in reentering the labor market.  This explanation suggests a causal 
criminogenic impact of incarceration on recidivism for TPVs.  Their second explanation 
is that CCOs had the ability to observe a parolee’s risk for recidivism beyond what is 
measured in the department’s risk classification system used for assigning parolees to 
caseloads, thus suggesting that the increased recidivism for those TPVs returned to prison 
may simply imply that some CCOs are routinely better at assessing higher risk offenders 
and using confinement accordingly.  This second explanation would suggest a selection 
effect, in which it is unclear as to whether the criminogenic impact of incarceration for 
TPVs is causal.   
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Drake and Aos (2012) point out several limitations to their study.  First, they do 
not estimate the number of potential crimes avoided during the confinement period for 
TPVs, which would examine the incapacitation effect of imprisonment.  Second, the 
strength of their research design rests on the assumption that the assignment of parolees 
to CCO caseloads is essentially random.  While they find evidence of this, there is always 
some uncertainty absent a true randomized controlled trial.  Third, they point out that the 
generalizability of their results may be limited given that they restrict their analysis to 
only two percent of all parolees who had a violation event during the follow-up period.  
In addition to the limitations noted by the authors, another limitation is that the study 
does not examine the dose-response issue of the length of incarceration for a TPV on 
subsequent recidivism.  These limitations aside, however, this study is the closest to the 
current study reported on in the chapters that follow.  Based on this being the only 
existing study close to the current study, the tentative conclusion is that incarceration for 
a TPV violation has a slightly criminogenic effect.  This is a far from conclusive result, 
however, since there remain questions by the authors of this study on the causal nature of 
the impact noted, the generalizability and external validity of the results both in 
Washington State and in other states, and the impact of relevant contingencies that may 
matter in determining differing impacts of incarceration for TPVs such as the certainty 
and swiftness of the response to the violation.      
Taking one step back, some may ask whether supervision/sanctioning of released 
ex-prisoners even matters at all.  For example, California has recently responded to the 
large number of technical violators filling up its prison system by enacting a parole status 
entitled “non-revokable parole”, in which parolees are not under supervision 
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requirements and thus can only be revoked to prison for a new crime.  One study to date 
which has examined whether supervision matters in terms of recidivism outcomes is a 
study by the Urban Institute based on a sample of offenders released from prison across 
15 states during 1994 (Solomon, Kachnowski, & Bhati, 2005).  This study examined 
recidivism rates for three groups: 1) unconditional releases from prison, 2) conditional-
mandatory releases from prison, and 3) conditional-discretionary releases from prison.  
Both of the conditional release groups received community supervision, with the only 
difference being that the “conditional-mandatory” group was not released based on a 
parole board decision whereas the “conditional-discretionary” release group was.  In their 
bivariate analysis, the authors find slightly lower two-year recidivism rates for the two 
supervised groups (61% for the conditional-mandatory group and 54% for the 
conditional-discretionary group) compared to the non-supervised group (62%).  
However, in the multivariate analysis, where several controls were included, these 
differences became insignificant, suggesting no added benefit in terms of lower 
recidivism rates for supervised versus non-supervised offenders.    
Other than this Urban Institute study, only one additional study published to date 
has examined the impact of community supervision versus no supervision.  This recently 
published study compared a group of parole releases in New Jersey to two groups of non-
supervised max-out releases (Ostermann, 2011).  After controlling for various differences 
between the groups, the author found no difference in terms of re-arrest rates, again 
suggesting no added benefit in terms of lower recidivism rates for supervised versus non-
supervised offenders.  The primary weakness faced by these studies, however, is that 
offenders were not randomly assigned to supervision versus non-supervision, and thus it 
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becomes difficult to determine the true impact on recidivism rates attributable to 
supervision alone.   
 
SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PAROLE IN PENNSYLVANIA 
 
 Before concluding this chapter, a brief summary of the context of sentencing, 
corrections, and parole in Pennsylvania is provided, since this particular study uses 
Pennsylvania specific data to examine the primary questions posed.  It is important to 
understand the context of the study, since the results may be impacted by this particular 
context.   
 Pennsylvania is an indeterminate sentencing state with presumptive sentencing 
guidelines.  Convicted offenders receive both a minimum and a maximum sentence date, 
with the maximum sentence length required to be at least double the minimum sentence 
length.  Judicial sentencing discretion is limited by presumptive sentencing guidelines, 
with a judge having to justify in writing any sentence given outside of the guideline 
range.  Guideline ranges are based on ‘offense gravity score’, ‘prior record score’, and 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  Before November 2011 (which includes the 
timeframe for which all participants in this study would have been initially sentenced), 
offenders receiving a maximum sentence length of five years or more are automatically 
sentenced to the PA DOC.  Judges are given discretion to sentence offenders receiving a 
maximum sentence length of between two years and less than five years to either PA 
DOC custody or to a county jail.  All sentences with a maximum sentence length under 
two years are sent to a county jail. 
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 Offenders sentenced to PA DOC custody are required to serve at least up to their 
minimum sentence date in state prison before even being considered for release.  At the 
minimum sentence date, an offender then becomes eligible to be considered for parole 
release.  The PBPP consists of nine parole board members who hear parole eligible cases 
and determine whether the offender may be released under parole supervision.  If an 
offender is rejected for parole at the minimum sentence date, he or she may be re-
considered for parole release at any time in between his or her minimum and maximum 
sentence date.  An offender may serve no longer than his or her maximum sentence date 
in state prison, at which time the offender is unconditionally released with no parole 
supervision (referred to as a “max-out”).  If an offender is in fact paroled somewhere 
between his or her minimum sentence and maximum sentence, the offender is released 
onto parole supervision and must be supervised on parole until the maximum sentence 
date is reached.      
 While under parole supervision, a parolee is subject to standard and special 
conditions of parole (as were outlined in Chapter 1).  Any violation of these conditions 
may be considered a technical parole violation and can be sanctioned to a range of 
sanctioning options up to and including return to state prison.  If returned to prison, a first 
level hearing is held within 14 days as a preliminary hearing for determining guilt for the 
technical violation charge(s).  At this point the parolee may waive his or her right to a 
second level hearing and admit guilt.  If essentially pleading not guilty, the parolee 
receives a second level hearing generally within three months of being re-incarcerated.  If 
found guilty at the second level hearing, the parolee will serve a standard length of time 
in prison (referred to as a “parole hit”), and eventually will be reconsidered by the parole 
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board for re-release back to parole supervision.  If found not guilty at the second level 
hearing, the parolee is immediately re-released back to parole supervision under what is 
referred to as a “no recommit action” (NRA).  Parolees who are sanctioned to anything 
less than imprisonment for a technical violation charge are actually not formally revoked 
and removed from active parole supervision, but rather are continued under parole 




Our knowledge of the impact of imprisonment on subsequent criminal behavior is 
growing, but remains far from lending to firm policy conclusions.  One under-
investigated area is the impact of imprisonment among specific subsets of the overall 
prison population.  For example, prison may well serve a deterrent impact among one 
subset of offenders while at the same time serving a criminogenic impact among another 
subset of offenders.  Given the large number of technical parole violators who are sent to 
prison each year in many states, we know remarkably little about what impact 
imprisonment serves for this subset of the prison population.  Theoretical insight further 
complicates matters, since there are solid theoretical reasons to believe that the 
imprisonment of technical parole violators could serve either a deterrent, criminogenic, 
incapacitative, or null effect. 
This chapter has reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on the overall 
impact of imprisonment on criminal behavior, as well as reviewed the more limited 
theoretical and empirical literature on best parole supervision/sanctioning practices and 
on the impact of sending technical parole violators to prison.  The tentative conclusion to 
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date is that imprisonment serves a null to slightly criminogenic effect on subsequent 
criminal behavior, while simultaneously serving a marginal but diminishing 
incapacitative effect during the time of imprisonment.  Among TPVs, it is not yet clear 
whether supervision or imprisonment matter at all in terms of reducing criminal behavior.  
Further, even if supervision matters, it is not clear as to what the most effective 
sanctioning strategy should be.  Some theoretical and recent empirical evidence suggests 
that a “zero tolerance” type of approach in which technical violators are returned swiftly 
and consistently to prison may serve a significant deterrent effect.  On the other hand, 
some evidence suggests that technical violators could be sanctioned certainly and swiftly 
but using less costly intermediate sanctioning options rather than relying on an immediate 
return to incarceration, with at least equal rates of reoffending.  Given the large number 
of technical parole violators returned to prison each year, understanding the impact of 
imprisonment on criminal behavior among this subset of the prison population would 









CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS 
INTRODUCTION 
This study uses a quasi-experimental design, with propensity score matching 
techniques, to explore the impact of both the use of incarceration and the length of 
incarceration in response to TPVs on recidivism.  Ideally a randomized controlled 
experiment would be the “gold standard” for exploring these questions, where TPVs are 
randomly assigned to either imprisonment or some other diversionary option, and where 
those TPVs who are assigned to imprisonment are further randomly assigned to 
differential lengths of incarceration.  This type of experimental design would account for 
both observed and unobserved heterogeneity between TPVs who are sanctioned to 
imprisonment versus another option, and between imprisoned TPVs with varying lengths 
of stay in prison, thus addressing any potential selection bias in these sanctioning 
decisions.  It is likely that there are important differences between TPVs who are 
sanctioned to imprisonment versus an alternative option and who are sanctioned to 
imprisonment for varying lengths of time, which affect the outcome of recidivism 
independently from the impact of imprisonment itself. 
To explore the impact of imprisonment among TPVs, this study examines data 
from one state (Pennsylvania).  Unfortunately, a randomized controlled experiment is not 
possible in this situation, since decision-makers in Pennsylvania are not willing to set 
aside current practice and assign TPVs to imprisonment and to varying lengths of 
imprisonment on a random basis.  Fortunately one possible alternative technique for 
reducing selection bias is the use of propensity score matching to retrospectively assign 
TPVs to either a treatment or control group based on their propensity to receive the 
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treatment condition.  The impact of two separate treatment conditions are explored: 1) the 
impact of imprisonment for TPVs, and 2) the dose-response impact of varying lengths of 
stay in prison given that a TVP is sanctioned to prison.  
 
DATA 
This study is based on a primary sample of 12,705 parole releases from the PA 
DOC between October 2006 and December 2009 who were subsequently sanctioned for a 
TPV to either imprisonment or to an alternative sanctioning option.  Important to note is 
that the primary sample is not a set of unique individuals since some individuals were 
released to parole multiple times within the sampling timeframe.  The number of unique 
individuals in the sample is 12,242.  The treatment group consists of 1,758 parole 
releases (1,593 unique individuals) whose sanction for their first detected TPV violation 
after their parole release from prison was re-imprisonment, and the control group consists 
of 10,947 parole releases (10,649 unique individuals) whose sanction for their first 
detected TPV violation after their parole release was any other alternative option other 
than re-imprisonment.   
The primary dataset originated from staff in the PA DOC’s Bureau of Planning, 
Research, and Statistics, who created a file from the PA DOC’s inmate records database 
system of all parole releases between October 2006 and December 2009.  PA DOC staff 
also attached various inmate demographics to the dataset, to be used as covariates and 
propensity score predictors.  PA DOC staff also provided re-incarceration recidivism data 
and dates to calculate periods of incarceration.  Based on the primary dataset provided 
from the PA DOC, the PBPP provided data on the subsequent TPV violations and 
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sanctions received after each parole release date, as well as an indication of which 
geographic parole district office each case was primarily supervised in, and at what level 
of supervision the parolee was supervised upon release from prison.   Full arrest history 





The sampling timeframe of October 2006 to December 2009 was selected for two 
primary reasons.  First, the beginning of the sampling timeframe (October 2006) was 
selected based on feedback from PBPP staff that complete and accurate parole violation 
and sanctioning data was only available starting in the fourth quarter of 2006.  Second, 
the ending of the sampling timeframe (December 2009) was selected in order to allow 
enough time for recidivism follow-up, particularly for those in the treatment group since 
they were sanctioned to a period of re-incarceration and had to be re-released before 
being tracked for recidivism. 
During the sampling timeframe (Oct. 2006 – Dec. 2009), a total of 31,561 parole 
releases from PA DOC prison custody were recorded.  This includes 24,569 first-time 
parole releases on the given sentence (77.8%), and 6,992 reparole releases (22.2%).  As 
noted before, these are not unique individuals but rather parole release incidents.  The 
total parole releases during the sampling timeframe (n = 31,561) is comprised of 29,826 
unique individuals.   
For several reasons, certain cases from the universe of 31,561 parole releases 
during the sampling timeframe were removed in order to establish the primary analysis 
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sample of 12,705 parole releases.  These various reasons for removal are summarized and 
tabulated in Table 3.1.   
First, 7,739 cases were removed because the parolee never received a TPV after 
the parole release date according to the PBPP and PA DOC data. These cases appear to 
be non-recidivists.   There were 936 additional cases removed because they appeared to 
have a return to prison for a parole violation according to PA DOC data, but showed no 
sanctioning history for a return to prison from PBPP data.  From further exploration of 
these 936 cases within PA DOC data, it is clear that the vast majority of these cases was 
returned to PA DOC for a police re-arrest and/or charge of a new crime rather than a 
TPV, and thus would not be included in the study since the study is limited to TPV 
violators.  An additional 1,361 cases were removed because they could not be matched 
with PBPP violation/sanctioning data based on unique IDs provided by PA DOC.  The 
unique ID provided by PA DOC for matching with PBPP data was the Parole Board 
Number, which was the only feasible field for matching cases between PA DOC and 
PBPP datasets.  In all of these 1,361 unmatched cases, the only Parole Board Number that 
PA DOC databases had on record was actually the DOC Inmate Number, which is an 
altogether completely different number which PBPP staff do not have access to.       
Of the remaining 21,525 cases, additional cases were removed for a variety of 
other reasons.  A total of 5,521 cases were removed because there was an indication that 
the first violation (and associated sanction) was actually for a new crime and not a 
technical violation.  All of the analysis in this study is based only on outcomes after the 
first recorded technical violation after parole release from prison, and is restricted only to 
cases where the first recorded violation was for a technical reason and not for an 
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indication of a new crime being committed.4  Of the 5,521 cases removed because of an 
indication that the first violation involved new criminal activity, 4,130 showed “Pending 
Criminal Charges” as the reason (or one of multiple reasons) in the PBPP violation data 
for their first violation after release from prison.  Another 1,186 had an arrest record 
present between their release from prison and their first recorded sanction for a parole 
violation.  An additional 205 cases showed up in PA DOC databases as being adjudicated 
for the first violation as a Convicted Parole Violator (CPV) or Technical Convicted 
Violator (TCV), indicating criminal activity.   
One of the difficulties with the PBPP data is that the violation and sanctioning 
data are not directly connected.  In other words, a sanction or set of sanctions is not 
explicitly assigned by PBPP in their data as being associated with a specific violation 
incident.  To connect sanctions to violations some inference based on violation/sanction 
dates have to be made.  In many cases violations and sanctions are recorded as happening 
on the same date, which is the simplest case to interpret.  However sometimes a sanction 
date is actually before the next closest violation date, or is a significant period of time 
after the next closest violation date.  For this study, only violations on the first violation 
date after parole release from prison were used, and only sanctions on the first 
sanctioning date after parole release from prison were used. To match the first 
violation(s) with the first sanction(s), the dates were compared.  For the primary sample 
dataset a conservative approach was used, which means 178 cases were removed because 
the first sanctioning incident was before the first violation incident, and another 1,034 
                                                 
4 While drug relapse is technically a new crime, in most cases drug relapse is included as a TPV violation 
here for this analysis, as long as it was processed as a TPV by PBPP staff and not prosecuted as a new 
crime.  In addition, some low level misdemeanors and summary offenses are treated as TPVs if processed 
as TPVs by PBPP staff rather than as a new crime.  
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cases were removed because the first sanctioning incident was more than one month after 
the first violation incident.  In addition, 253 cases were removed because another 
violation date was recorded between the first violation date and the first sanction date, 
making it unclear as to which violation incident the sanction was in relation to.  In later 
analysis, these rules will be relaxed in order to test the sensitivity of the results to the 
rules set in place for connecting violations to sanctions.   
Another 1,637 total cases were removed because of a disconnect among the 
treatment group, between the sanction to prison date as recorded in the PBPP sanctioning 
data and the incarceration date as recorded in the PA DOC data.  Among these 1,637 
cases, a total of 582 cases were removed because the PA DOC re-incarceration date was 
before the PBPP sanction to prison date, and another 793 cases were removed because 
the PA DOC re-incarceration date was more than one month after the PBPP sanction to 
prison date.  Another 55 control group cases were removed because their first TPV 
sanction was something other than imprisonment based on the PBPP data, yet the PA 
DOC data showed them returning to prison within five days of the first violation date, so 
it was unclear as to whether these cases should have been in the treatment or control 
group.  Finally, 207 cases were removed because the first TPV sanction in the PBPP data 
was a sanction to incarceration, but there was no record in the PA DOC dataset of a 
return to incarceration.  Again, as with the connection of the PBPP violation to 
sanctioning data, later sensitivity analysis will be conducted in order to test the sensitivity 
of model results to the rules set in place for matching the PBPP arrest date with the PA 
DOC re-incarceration date.  
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Lastly, 105 treatment cases were removed because the PA DOC data showed no 
prison re-release date after the TPV re-incarceration date, which means that these cases 
cannot be followed for recidivism since they have not been subsequently re-released after 
their TPV incarceration. Approximately 75% of these 105 cases were re-incarcerated 
before 2010, meaning that they have been in PA DOC custody for a parole violation for 
as long as 4.5 years.  An inspection of PA DOC records indicates that these cases are 
mostly parole violators who are pending adjudication for criminal charges, and thus 
would not be included in the study anyways because they are not TPVs.  Also, 92 
treatment cases were removed because they received some other sanction in addition to 
incarceration for their first TPV violation, so the impact of the treatment cannot be 
determined in these cases since they received both the treatment and control condition.   
To summarize these reasons for cases being removed, the above reasons can be 
grouped into five basic categories (see Table 3.1).  A total of 7,739 cases (41%) were 
removed because no recidivism incident was recorded after release from prison, 6,457 
cases (34.2%) were removed because the first violation incident appeared to be for new 
criminal offense charge(s), 1,465 cases (7.8%) were removed because of difficulties in 
connecting the first violation incident to the first sanction, 2,943 cases (15.6%) were 
removed due to difficulties in matching PA DOC records to PBPP records, and 252 cases 
(1.3%) were removed for other miscellaneous reasons noted above.    
Since approximately 27% of the total sample of cases with a first TPV violation 
(minus those cases showing no parole violation or a violation for a new crime rather than 
a TPV; n = 17,365) were removed for the reasons outlined above, one important factor to 
consider is how comparable the final sample is to the sample before removing this 27% 
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of cases, based on various relevant covariates.  Table 3.2 provides a comparison of the 
primary analysis sample (n = 12,705) to the excluded cases (n = 4,660) across all of the 
covariates described in the next section.   Table 3.2 shows several statistically significant 
differences between the primary analysis sample and the original sample before removing 
cases.  Specifically, the final analysis sample shows statistically significant differences 
across age, race, criminal risk score, prior treatment programs, sentencing county, parole 
district office where supervised, supervision level, severity of first TPV violation, and 
whether the first violation occurred in a community corrections center.  The final sample 
appears to be a slightly lower risk population.  A particularly large difference is observed 
in the severity of the first TPV violation, with 40.4% of the final sample having a high 
severity first TPV violation, and 68.4% of the original sample before removing cases 
having a high severity first TPV violation.  As such, a sensitivity analysis will be 
performed in later analysis by relaxing rules for matching violations to sanctions and for 
matching PA DOC imprisonment data to PBPP violation data, in order to add back in 
cases from the original sample and examine this impact on results.  
   
MEASURES 
Treatment Indicator Variables 
There are two primary treatment indicator variables for this study.  The first 
variable is a binary indicator of whether the case received a sanction for the first TPV 
violation of either imprisonment (n = 1,758; 13.8% of the total sample) or any other 
alternative, lower-level sanctioning option (n = 10,947; 86.2% of the total sample).  One 
important note is that cases in the control group can receive multiple different sanctions 
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for their first TPV violation(s).  Sanctioning options are based on PBPP’s standard 
Violation Sanctioning Grid (see Figure 3.1 -   “Con I – Con II Arrest Worksheet”) and 
vary across a continuum of seriousness.  Sanction options are grouped on PBPP’s 
Violation Sanctioning Grid into one of three levels of severity – Low, Medium, and High.  
Table 3.3 provides a tabulation of the various sanctions received for the first TPV among 
the control group.  Again, the sum of this tabulation does not equal the control group 
sample size because each case may receive more than one sanction for the first 
violation(s).      
On average, the control group received 1.6 sanctions for their first TPV violation 
incident (median=1 sanction).  The number of sanctions for the first violation incident 
ranged from 1 to 9 sanctions.  Approximately 63.9% of the control group only had one 
sanction for the first violation incident, and approximately 86.2% had either 1 or 2 
sanctions for the first violation incident.  The single most prevalent sanction within the 
control group was a written warning (32.4% of all sanctions).  Approximately 18.0% of 
sanctions within the control group were to either drug/alcohol treatment (14.2%) or to 
increased urinalysis drug testing (3.8%).  Another 8.4% of sanctions within the control 
group were to increased reporting requirements to parole staff, 12.4% to a curfew or 
increased curfew, and 1.4% to travel restrictions.  Approximately 3.0% of sanctions were 
to electronic monitoring or GPS monitoring.  Approximately 9.8% of sanctions were to a 
residential placement like a “Halfway Back” home or community corrections center.  
Finally, about 11.1% received some sort of “other” undetermined sanctioned, classified 
as either an “other-low” sanction (5.4%), “other-medium” sanction (4.1%), or “other-
high” sanction (1.6%).  
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The second treatment variable is a continuous variable representing the calculated 
length of stay in prison (in months) for those who are in the first treatment condition of 
being returned to prison for a first TPV violation after release from prison.  This variable 
is used to answer the second primary question of this study, which is the dose-response 
impact of varying lengths of stay in prison for a TPV.  In order to use the length of stay 
variable in later propensity score modeling, a second categorical variable for length of 
stay is created, which represents the length of stay categorized into quintiles.   
The average length of stay in prison for the treatment group cases who were 
returned to prison for a TPV is 12.3 months, and ranges from a low of 4 days to a high of 
78.5 months.  Figure 3.2 shows a histogram of the distribution of time served in prison 
for a TPV violation for the treatment group sample.  Quintiles for the prison length of 
stay distribution are 0 to 3.6 months, 3.7 to 7.9 months, 8.0 to 12.1 months, 12.2 to 18.3 
months, and 18.4 to 78.5 months. 
Outcome Variables 
The outcome examined in this study is recidivism after the first TPV.  Three 
different measures of recidivism are used.  The first measure of recidivism is ‘re-
incarceration’, defined as the first instance of return to PA DOC custody after either 
being sanctioned to prison for a TPV and subsequently re-released, or after being 
sanctioned to a control group condition of any other type of sanctioning option.  Re-
incarceration data is provided by the PA DOC.   
The second measure of recidivism is ‘re-arrest,’ defined as the first instance of 
police arrest after either being sanctioned to prison for a TPV and subsequently re-
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released, or after being sanctioned to a control group condition of any other type of 
sanctioning option.  Re-arrest data comes from police RAP sheets, provided by the PSP.   
The third measure of recidivism is ‘overall recidivism,’ defined as the first 
instance of either return to PA DOC custody or police arrest, after either being sanctioned 
to prison for a TPV and subsequently re-released, or after being sanctioned to a control 
group condition of any other type of sanctioning option.   
Given different dates for sample participants of either being sanctioned to 
alternative options or being sanctioned to prison and re-released, times of recidivism 
exposure varies.  Based on recidivism data being pulled by PA DOC and PSP staff during 
mid-August 2014, recidivism exposure times for the sample varies from 2.5 months to 
7.8 years.  This study examines three recidivism follow-up periods for all three measures 
of recidivism: 6-month recidivism rates, 1-year recidivism rates, and 3-year recidivism 
rates.  For the 6-month recidivism follow-up period, approximately 99.9% of the sample 
have six months or more recidivism exposure time (n = 1,754 for treatment group; n = 
10,933 for control group).  For the 1-year recidivism follow-up period, approximately 
99.5% of the sample have one year or more recidivism exposure time (n = 1,748 for 
treatment group; n = 10,906 for control group).  For the 3-year recidivism follow-up 
period, approximately 94.8% of the sample have three years or more recidivism exposure 
time (n = 1,547 for treatment group; n = 10,495 for control group).  The vast majority of 
the sample thus clearly has three years or more of exposure for recidivism follow-up.   
Covariates 
Several covariates are considered, which may predict recidivism rates and also are 
likely to predict whether the sanction for a first TPV violation is to prison (treatment 
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condition) or to another alternative (control condition).  Thus, these covariates will be 
used in later propensity score matching models to predict the propensity for assignment 
to the treatment condition.  The covariates considered are age at time of the first TPV 
violation, race, gender, LSI-R criminal risk assessment score, offense type, the number of 
prior treatment programs participated in, sentencing county, prison release type, parole 
district office reporting to under supervision, level of supervision, and the severity of the 
most serious violation for the first TPV violation.  Table 3.4 provides summary 
descriptive statistics of these covariates for the overall sample, and comparisons between 
the treatment and control group samples.  
On basic demographic statistics, approximately 42% of the sample is white, 92% 
of the sample is male, and the average age at the time of the first violation among the 
sample is 35.  The treatment group is slightly younger than the control group.  No 
statistically significant differences on race were identified between the treatment and 
control groups.  There is a statistically significant difference between the treatment and 
control groups by gender, with males representing approximately 94.6% of the treatment 
group and 91.4% of the control group. 
One factor that should influence the decision of parole staff of whether to sanction 
a TPV to prison or to another option, is the parolee’s criminal risk assessment score.  
PBPP utilizes the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) as its primary criminal risk 
assessment tool.  The LSI-R is a widely used, 54-item assessment instrument which 
measures an individual’s propensity to criminally recidivate.  Each item on the LSI-R is 
scored as a 0 or 1, with all of the 54 items summing up to generate an overall test score.  
Higher scores indicate a higher risk of criminal recidivism.  Potential scores range from 0 
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to 54.  PBPP staff administer the LSI-R to all parolees just prior to their release from 
prison onto parole, and then again at least once per year for every year under parole 
supervision in the community.  This study considers the LSI-R score for the last LSI-R 
assessment date on record before the first TPV violation associated with the sanction that 
triggers treatment assignment.  LSI-R scores in the sample range from 2 to 54, with an 
average score of 22.4.  The treatment group indicates a significantly higher average LSI-
R score than the control group (25.1 vs. 21.9), suggesting that those in the treatment 
group are at a higher pre-violation risk of criminal recidivism than the control group.  
A breakdown of the primary offense type for the sample’s originally sentenced 
offense reveals that approximately 27% of the total sample had a violent offense, 21% 
had a property offense, 33% a drug offense, and 18% a public order or other type of 
offense.  Group differences reveal that the treatment group is significantly more likely to 
have a violent or property offense, while the control group is more likely to have a drug 
offense. 
The decision to sanction a first TPV violation either to prison or to another 
alternative is likely to be influenced by the number of prior treatment programs the 
parolee participated in.  Parole agents will theoretically be more willing to sanction TPVs 
to prison for those already given multiple chances to improve behavior through prior 
treatment program participation.  One covariate considers a count of the total number of 
prior in-prison treatment programs participated in before the first TPV violation.  On 
average, the total sample participated in 2.85 treatment programs prior to receiving their 
TPV violation.  Note that treatment participation includes any program that the parolee 
participated in during prison, regardless of whether the program was successfully 
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completed.  Standard programs include cognitive behavioral therapy, violence 
prevention, batterer intervention, and various alcohol and other drug (AOD) treatments 
like a Therapeutic Community (TC) or outpatient treatment.  As theorized, the treatment 
group participated in a statistically significant higher number of prior treatment programs 
than the control group (3.2 vs. 2.8). 
One statistically significant difference is observed between the treatment and 
control groups in the county that the parolee was originally sentenced from.  Sentencing 
county is measured in two ways.  The first variable is a binary indicator of whether the 
county of sentencing was Philadelphia or Allegheny County (the two most populous 
counties in Pennsylvania) versus any other county.  The treatment and control groups do 
not significantly differ on this county indicator.  The second variable is a binary indicator 
of whether the sentencing county was a Class 3 or higher county based on definition in 
Pennsylvania statute.  By statute all of Pennsylvania’s 67 counties are classified into one 
of nine classes based on population size.  A Class 1 county has a population of 1.5 
million or more.  Philadelphia is the only Class 1 county.  A Class 2 county has a 
population of between 800,000 and 1,499,999.  Allegheny County (which contains the 
city of Pittsburgh) is the only Class 2 county.  A Class 2-A county has a population of 
500,000 to 799,999, and a Class 3 county has a population of 210,000 to 499,999.  Any 
county with less than a 210,000 population is a Class 4 county or lower.  The control 
group is significantly more likely to have been originally sentence from a Class 3 or 
higher county than the treatment group.  Approximately 28% of the total sample was 
originally sentenced from either Philadelphia or Allegheny County, and approximately 
71% of the total sample was originally sentenced from a Class 3 county or higher.     
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The decision to sanction a first TPV to either imprisonment or to an alternative 
option may also be influenced by whether the parolee is released from prison for a first 
parole release on the sentence or alternatively is being re-released after already serving 
time in prison for a parole violation.  Approximately 76% of the total sample was initial 
parole releases, and 24% were re-parole releases.  The treatment group was significantly 
more likely than the control group to be re-parole releases (32% of the treatment group 
versus 22% of the control group).  This makes sense intuitively, since parole agents are 
probably more willing to sanction a TPV to imprisonment if the parolee has already 
served time in prison for a parole violation. 
A sanction to imprisonment for a TPV may also be influenced by length of time 
the parolee is to be under parole supervision.  The length of parole supervision is defined 
as the difference between the parolee’s release from prison and the parolee’s maximum 
sentence expiration date.  Overall, the parole supervision term for the sample averages 
47.3 months.  The control group shows a significantly longer total supervision period 
than the treatment group (48.1 months versus 42.1 months respectively).   
Due to the discretionary nature of parole sanctioning, there is also likely to be 
differences in TPV sanctioning severity for a first TPV violation across different parole 
district offices.  In Pennsylvania there are ten geographic parole district offices covering 
state parolees throughout the state, and an eleventh parole district office category (Central 
Office) which supervises special cases.  The covariate utilized here records the parole 
district office that the parolee is supervised in at the time of the first TPV sanction.  The 
largest parole district offices for the total sample are the Philadelphia District Office 
(supervising 24% of the cases), Harrisburg District Office (supervising 17% of the cases), 
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Pittsburgh District Office (supervising 15% of the cases), and Allentown District Office 
(supervising 15% of the cases).  A significantly higher proportion of cases sanctioned to 
prison for a first TPV (i.e., the treatment group) were supervised in the Allentown, 
Pittsburgh, and Scranton district offices.  A significantly higher proportion of cases 
sanctioned to an alternative option for a first TPV (i.e., the control group) were 
supervised in the Chester, Erie, Harrisburg, Mercer, and Williamsport district offices.   
Another factor which is likely to affect whether a first TPV is sanctioned to 
imprisonment or to an alternative option is at what level of intensity the parolee is being 
supervised.  There are four primary levels of state parole supervision in Pennsylvania, 
ranging from the least intense being “minimum” supervision to the most intense being 
“enhanced” supervision.  Minimum supervision level requires one face-to-face parolee 
contact per three (3) months, with at least every other face-to-face being at the parolee’s 
approved residence, and one face-to-face collateral contact per three (3) months with an 
employer, spouse, treatment provider, relative, etc.  Medium supervision level requires 
three face-to-face contacts per three (3) months, one of which being at the parolee’s 
approved residence, and one face-to-face collateral contact per three (3) months.  
Maximum supervision level requires six face-to-face contacts per three (3) months, two 
of which must be at the parolee’s approved residence, and one face-to-face collateral 
contact per month.  Enhanced supervision level requires four face-to-face contacts per 
month, one of which must be at the approved residence, and two collateral contacts per 
month, one of which must be face-to-face.  Supervision level is primarily determined by 
the results of the LSI-R risk assessment score, which is administered to parolees just prior 
to their release from prison, and then again at least once per year during their supervision 
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period.  The variable used here for supervision level represents the supervision level at 
the time of the parolee’s first TPV sanction.  Approximately 20% of the total sample was 
released to a minimum supervision level, 23% to a medium supervision level, 53% to a 
maximum supervision level, and 3% to an enhanced/special supervision level.  As 
expected, those in the treatment group (sanctioned to prison for a first TPV) were 
significantly more likely to be supervised at a higher supervision level.   
Perhaps the most important factor that should predict the decision to sanction a 
first TPV to either imprisonment or to an alternative sanction is the severity of the 
associated violation(s).  Table 3.5 provides a breakdown of the TPV violations associated 
with the first TPV sanctioning incident for the total sample, as well as a comparison of 
the breakdown of the TPV violations between the treatment and comparison groups.  
Note that a TPV violation incident may be associated with multiple violation reasons.  On 
average, there were 1.5 TPV violations associated with the first TPV sanctioning incident 
(an average of 2.1 violations for the treatment group and 1.4 violations for the control 
group).  The range of number of TPV violations associated with the first sanctioning 
incident was between 1 and 18 (between 1 and 10 for the treatment group, and between 1 
and 18 for the control group).  Overall, the most prevalent violation was a positive 
urinalysis for alcohol or other drugs (33% of the total violations).  Yet a violation for a 
positive urinalysis was nearly three times more likely in the control group as in the 
treatment group (38.0% vs. 12.7%).   Other overall prevalent violations for the entire 
sample were: 
• failure to pay supervision fees (6.4% of all violations; 0.3% of treatment 
group violations; 7.9% of control group violations),   
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• changing residence without permission (5.9% of all violations; 14.4% of 
treatment group violations; 3.8% of control group violations), 
• removal from treatment or a community corrections center (5.8% of all 
violations; 14.5% of treatment group violations; 3.7% of control group 
violations), 
• failure to abide by Board imposed special conditions (7.0% of all violations; 
8.7% of treatment group violations; 6.5% of control group violations), 
• absconding or failure to report as instructed (8.2% of all violations; 22.0% of 
treatment group violations; 4.8% of control group violations) 
According to PBPP’s Violation Sanctioning Matrix (see Figure 3.1), all violations 
are assigned a severity level of low, medium, or high.  The descriptive statistics table 
(Table 3.4) and later models examine the severity level of the most serious violation 
associated with the first TPV violation incident.  Approximately 16% of the total sample 
was first violated for a low severity violation, 45% for a medium severity violation, and 
39% for a high severity violation.  As expected, the treatment group was significantly 
more likely than the control group to be sanctioned for a high severity violation for their 
TPV associated with their first sanction (90% of the treatment group versus 31% of the 
control group).  The control group was significantly more likely than the treatment group 
to be sanctioned for a low severity first TPV violation (19% of the control group versus 
0.4% of the treatment group).     
One final covariate indicates whether or not the parolee was housed in a 
community corrections center (i.e., a “halfway house”) at the time of the first TPV 
violation.  Approximately 16% of the total sample was housed in a community 
74 
 
corrections center at the time of their first TPV violation.  The treatment group indicates a 
significantly higher percent of TPVs housed in a community corrections center at the 
time of the first violation when compared to the control group (25% of the treatment 
group versus 14% of the control group). 
The above description of the various covariates highlights significant baseline 
differences across several relevant factors between the treatment and control groups, 
which likely influence recidivism rates through group assignment, thus confounding an 
evaluation of the impact of the treatment condition itself on recidivism rates.  Those in 
the treatment group (assigned to prison for a first TPV) are younger males who are more 
at risk of criminal recidivism, more likely to have been to prison already for a parole 
violation, more likely to have been originally sentenced for a violent or property offense, 
more likely to have participated in a larger number of prior treatments, supervised at a 
higher supervision level, and whose first TPV violation was for something more serious.  
The treatment group is thus at an overall higher risk for recidivism across a number of 
different dimensions.  These covariates will therefore be used in later propensity score 
models to generate a predicted score of the propensity to be in either the treatment or 
control condition, which will later then be used in the models to reduce the confounding 
effects of these individual differences on the outcomes. 
  
METHODS 
Propensity Score Matching 
When there are significant differences between treatment and control group 
conditions on a significant number of observable covariates (as is seen in Table 3.4 for 
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the covariates examined in this study) this presents difficulties in determining whether the 
observed outcomes (in this case recidivism rates) are due to the treatment itself or to the 
confounding effect of pre-existing differences in other factors.  In the case of this study, it 
is thus difficult to isolate the causal effect of imprisonment for a technical violation on 
recidivism rates.  A randomized controlled trial (RCT) would be an ideal (a “gold 
standard”) for answering this question, as random assignment sanctioning decisions to 
either imprisonment or to an alternative sanctioning option would maximize 
comparability between these two conditions on observable and unobservable 
characteristics.  In an RCT, assignment to a treatment or control condition is based on 
pure chance (p = .50), so that the only differences between treatment and control groups 
on all observed and unobserved covariates are due to chance alone.  This is often referred 
to as “conditional independence.”  The results of an RCT experiment are thus said to 
produce unbiased and consistent estimates of the average treatment effect on the subjects 
in the experiment.  
Unfortunately a prospective RCT is not feasible for this study.  Parole agents in 
Pennsylvania are not willing to relax discretion in assigning sanctions for technical 
violations so that a sanction to imprisonment versus an alternative option is assigned 
randomly.  We are thus left with observational data for attempting to explore the impact 
of imprisonment for a TPV on subsequent recidivism.  The apparent selection bias from 
observed covariates must be addressed in order to try and draw causal inference, 
however. 
Several quasi-experimental methods exist for attempting to deal with the problem 
of selection bias within observational data, in attempting to draw causal inferences.  One 
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particularly strong quasi-experimental method for attempting to deal with this problem is 
propensity score matching techniques, developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).  In 
propensity score techniques, a score of the propensity for assignment to a treatment group 
condition, based on a set of observed predictors, is used to balance observed 
characteristics so that they are independent of the treatment assignment.  For this study, 
two types of propensity score techniques will be used in order to answer the primary 
research questions.  Traditional propensity score matching techniques will be used 
primarily to examine differences between those who are sanctioned to prison versus an 
alternative sanction for a first TPV.  Based on common support issues (discussed later), a 
few extensions of propensity score modeling (i.e., propensity score weighting and 
propensity score stratification) may be further used to examine the question of the impact 
of TPV imprisonment assignment on recidivism.  The second type of model used in this 
study is an extension of propensity score modeling for measuring treatment in doses, at 
different levels (Lu, Zanutto, Hornik, & Rosenbaum, 2001; Zanutto, Lu, & Hornik, 
2005).  This is used to examine the “dose-response” question of the impact of differential 
lengths of incarceration for those who are sent to prison for a first TPV.  
Propensity score matching models are advantageous to other non-experimental 
methods in addressing selection bias for several reasons.  First, traditional regression 
models assume a linear relationship between independent and dependent variables.  
Propensity score matching models make no such assumption since the outcome is not 
used in the matching procedure.  Second, regression-based models ignore whether there 
is sufficient overlap in the distribution of the covariates between the treatment and 
control groups.  If sufficient overlap does not exist, regression models draw conclusions 
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outside of the range of the treatment and control group overlap thus leading to less 
meaningful comparisons.  Third, propensity score models allow for matching on one 
score rather than controlling for many variables.  One extension of this benefit is that it 
leads to an ease in understanding and interpretation of results for a non-technical 
audience.  Fourth, propensity score models facilitate balance over many observed factors 
that impact the treatment assignment decision, thus more closely replicating the benefits 
of an RCT, at least for observed and measurable covariates.  The goal here, as is the goal 
with an RCT, is to develop a convincing counterfactual (i.e., what would have happened 
to subjects in the treatment condition had they in fact been assigned to the control 
condition instead).  While the counterfactual can never actually be observed (i.e., 
individual are always only either in the treatment or control condition at a given point in 
time), propensity score models can build a strong case for making conclusions about the 
counterfactual.  
In propensity score matching, the propensity score is defined as “the conditional 
probability of assignment to a particular treatment given a vector of observed covariates” 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983).  The propensity score is represented by the following 
formula: 
e(x) = pr(Z=1|x) 
where Z is a binary indicator that is one if the TPV sanction is to imprisonment and zero 
if the TPV sanction is to any other alternative, and x is a vector of individual observed 
characteristics.  The estimated propensity score, e(x), ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher 
score representing a greater likelihood of being assigned to the treatment group (in this 
case sanctioned to prison). 
78 
 
The propensity score can be estimated with either a logit or probit model.  I use a 
logit model in this study for estimating the propensity score.  To maximize the benefit of 
propensity score modeling, it helps if there is a strong understanding of, and ability to 
measure, the decisional rules that affect the assignment to the treatment condition.  In this 
case, that would mean it is important to have a strong understanding of the predictors of 
sanctioning to prison for a first TPV.  Propensity score models can only balance on 
factors that can be observed and measured.  RCTs have the added advantage of also 
balancing unobserved/unmeasurable factors.  Fortunately the dataset for this study 
demonstrates strong predictors for the treatment assignment, indicating a decent 
understanding of what factors are considered by PBPP staff in deciding whether to 
sanction a first TPV violation to prison.  Specifically, the supervision level of the parolee, 
the severity of the violation, and the actuarial criminal risk of the parolee are all strong 
predictors of whether or not the parolee is sanctioned to prison for a first TPV.   
After generating a propensity score from the logit model, it is important to assess 
whether there is sufficient overlap in the propensity score distribution of the treatment 
and control groups.  This is referred to as ‘common support.’  Figure 3.3 and 3.4 provide 
graphical representations of the distributions and overlap of the propensity scores 
between the treatment and control groups used in this study. These are useful graphical 
representation of common support.  As is seen, there is very little overlap at the high and 
low ends of the propensity score range between the treatment and control groups.  There 
are very few treatment group cases with a low propensity for assignment to treatment, 
and virtually no control group cases with a very high propensity for assignment to 
treatment.  While on the one hand this situation of relatively low common support makes 
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modeling more challenging, on the other hand it highlights the benefit of propensity score 
modeling over traditional regression-based modeling, since regression models simply 
ignore this problem of low common support.   
One important distinction to make at this point is the difference between the 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATT).  The ATE is the expected effect of the treatment on a randomly drawn case from 
the population and is represented by the following formula: 
E( - ) 
In cases where there is low common support as is demonstrated here, estimating the ATE 
is not practical because it averages across the entire population and there are likely cases 
that are simply not eligible for treatment.  In this example, low common support at high 
values of the propensity score distribution due to virtually no control group cases with a 
propensity score above .6 means that there clearly seems to be situations where a first 
TPV violation would simply never be eligible to be sanctioned to imprisonment for the 
violation.  
An alternative to estimating the ATE is to estimate the ATT.  The ATT is the 
average treatment effect for those who actually are “treated” (or in this case sanctioned to 
imprisonment for a TPV).  Estimating the ATT is a more appealing quantity to estimate 
here given the observed low common support and the evidence that there are certain TPV 
violators who simply do not appear eligible to be sanctioned to imprisonment for their 
violation.  The formula for the ATT is: 
E( - ) | Z = 1) 
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After determining common support, the next step in propensity score modeling is 
to determine the matching technique.  The matching technique that can be used is in part 
constrained by the identified degree of common support.  Since relatively low common 
support is identified in this study, there are primarily three matching options to consider.  
The first option is to consider an inverse probability of treatment weighting, which in 
effect weighs cases with lower propensity scores for treatment assignment as a higher 
value, with stronger emphasis in later models for calculating the effect size.  The second 
option is to consider stratifying the propensity score, generating estimates of effect sizes 
within each stratum, and averaging over strata to generate an overall estimated effect 
size.  The third option is to use traditional nearest-neighbor matching, but with 
replacement of appropriate control cases to be used multiple times, and with a caliper of 
an accepted range of nearest neighbors to match.  
Nearest neighbor matching with replacement and a caliper will primarily be used 
for this study.  In nearest neighbor matching, each treated unit i is matched to a non-
treated unit j as such: 
| -  | = min
∈{}{|-  |} 
This selects the control group case which looks the most similar to each treatment 
group case.  Using replacement allows for each matched control group case to be re-used 
by being returned to the reservoir after being matched with a treatment group case.  By 
doing so, it maximizes utilization of the control group cases that are able to be matched, 
given that there are unmatchable control group cases at the far right end of the propensity 
score distribution.   
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Selecting a caliper addresses the potential situation with low common support 
where the “nearest neighbor” may actually be far away and therefore may not look 
similar enough to be useful in developing the counterfactual.  The caliper sets a 
maximum distance between nearest neighbors for matching.  The caliper range is the 
number of standard deviations of the propensity score within which to select control 
cases.  While difficult to determine a priori what the appropriate distance should be for 
setting a caliper, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest a caliper size of .25 times the 
standard deviation of the logit for the estimated propensity score estimation.  This 
generally translates into a caliper of around .05.  
After selecting a matching technique and performing the match between treatment 
and control group cases, there are a few ways to assess that the selected matching 
technique has adequately balanced the treatment and control groups on the observed 
covariates.  First, t-tests can be used to assess the mean difference in covariates between 
treated and non-treated cases after matching.  Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) also 
recommend using the standardized difference in means between the treatment and control 
group for each observed covariate.  This standardized bias measure can be calculated as 
such: ̅		̅ +	2  
where ̅ and ̅ represent the mean of the covariate for the treatment and control group 
and  and  represent the variance of the covariate for the treatment and control group. 
If the standardized bias is an absolute value of less than 0.25, the covariate is 
considered balanced.  Graphical summaries, such as quantile-quantile plots, can also be 
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used to compare the distribution of treatment and control group cases after matching.  If a 
number of covariates outside of random chance remain statistically unbalanced, 
alternative matching strategies must be attempted until an acceptable balance between the 
treatment and control groups is achieved.   
Once balance is achieved through a successful matching technique, the treatment 
effect size can be estimated (in this case the ATT effect size).  The ATT effect size 
resulting from an appropriately balanced model allows for an inference of the 
counterfactual to be drawn.  In other words, the effect size indicates the causal impact of 
the treatment condition on the outcome for those who receive the treatment.  In this case, 
the effect size would indicate the causal impact of imprisonment for a first TPV among 
those who are imprisoned for a first TPV.    
Dose-Response Model 
 
The second main question examined in this study is the impact of differential 
lengths of incarceration on recidivism, among the treatment group of those who are 
sanctioned to prison for a first TPV violation.  This type of effect is often referred to as 
the dose-response impact.  As with the first main research question of the effect of 
incarceration itself on recidivism, propensity score modeling can again be used here to 
examine the dose-response impact of differential lengths of stay in prison for a TPV on 
recidivism, while addressing potential selection bias in the assignment of differential 
lengths of stay in prison.  It is not likely that the length of incarceration for TPV is 
assigned at random by PBPP staff, but rather affected by factors such as the seriousness 
of the violation preceding the TPV and the general riskiness of the parolee for 
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recidivating, which themselves should predict recidivism and thus confound the ability to 
isolate the impact of the length of imprisonment itself on recidivism. 
One issue with modeling a dose-response impact like differential lengths of 
incarceration is that the length of incarceration is not a binary variable.  Fortunately 
recent extensions of propensity score matching techniques have been utilized for 
addressing this problem.  Specifically, two approaches have been recently developed.  Lu 
et al. (2001) use an expanded version of the original Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) model 
to accommodate a categorical treatment effect of multiple dosage categories, where the 
propensity score is calculated using an ordinal logic model.  In this model, the 
distribution of doses for an individual, i, Di, given a vector of observed covariates, xi is 
model as:  
log( 	!")( 	$")% = ∝"+ '′ for d=2,3,4,… 
The distribution of doses given covariates thus depends on the observed 
covariates only through b() = ', such that the observed covariates, x, and the doses, 
D, are conditionally independent, given the propensity score, b().  After this, the 
propensity score from the above model can then be used like in traditional propensity 
score models to balance the distribution of a large number of covariates among 
individuals with various treatment doses simultaneously.  Lu et al. (2001) suggest 
matching individuals of different dose levels.     
Zanutto et al. (2005) use a slightly different approach, suggesting that the 
propensity score identified from the above ordinal logit model be sub-classified instead of 
matched.  This sub-classification approach is the one employed here in this study.  Sub-
classification on the propensity score is accomplished by stratifying the propensity score 
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into equally sized groups, usually five groups based on quintiles.  Once the propensity 
score is sub-classified, covariates should no longer predict treatment dose level.  In other 
words, the covariates for cases in the same sub-class should look as if the cases were 
randomly assigned to one of the dosage levels.   
Table 3.6 shows descriptive statistics for the quintiles of the prison length of stay 
dosage groups, across all of the considered covariates, at baseline before a propensity 
score is estimated.  ANOVAs and logit regressions are used to test the statistical 
significance of baseline differences across the various covariates.  There are clearly 
several factors that show statistically significant differences across the treatment dosage 
groups.  In particular, 12 covariates (age, race, LSI-R risk score, offense type, whether 
sentenced from Philadelphia/Pittsburgh, parole supervision length, whether the 
supervising district office is Philadelphia or Scranton, and the severity of the first TPV 
violation) all significantly differ across the treatment dosages.  This represents 
significantly more differences than would be expected from chance alone, thus 
suggesting imbalance across the treatment dosages on these covariates before sub-
classification.   
Once the propensity score is sub-classified, balance of the covariates can be 
assessed through a two-way ANOVA, where the dependent variable is the covariate, and 
the two factors are the propensity score sub-class and the treatment dosage level.  If the 
main effect of the treatment dose level, or the interaction of the propensity score sub-
class and the treatment dose level, are statistically significant, a given covariate is 
considered unbalanced.  If covariates remain unbalanced after sub-classification, the 
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procedure to estimate the propensity scores can be repeated using quadratic and 
interaction terms to improve the model.  
After generating a propensity score model that demonstrates balance on covariates 
after sub-classification, the next step is to use the sub-classifications in order to identify 
the average dose-response effect of differential lengths of the treatment on the outcome.  
This can be done by estimating stratum-weighted averages of the outcome, which in this 
case is recidivism.  The stratum-weighted mean for the outcome, conditional on receiving 





where )*", is the observed mean outcome among individuals receiving dosage level, d, in 
balancing score quintile, i.  The standard error is calculated as:  




where "  and 4" are the sample variance and frequency, respectively, among 
individuals in treatment dose level d in propensity score quintile i.  One note, while the 
standard error estimate has been found to be a reasonable approximation, as noted by 
Zanutto et al. (2005), it is not totally unbiased due to the fact that the sub-classification is 
based on propensity scores, which are estimated from the data, and the outcomes, both 
between and within each sub-class, are not independent.   
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The averages from each propensity score quintile can then be plotted to create a 
dose-response curve to determine whether a change in dosage (in this case incarceration 




In order to determine the impact of incarceration for a TPV on recidivism, ideally 
a randomized controlled trial would be utilized.  In many cases, including this study, an 
RCT design is not feasible.  Fortunately several strong alternatives exist for 
approximating an RCT design in order to make causal conclusions about the impact of a 
treatment (in this case imprisonment for a TPV).  This study makes use of quasi-
experimental propensity score models using observational data for estimating the impact 
of incarceration for a TPV on recidivism.  Models are derived from a large primary 
sample of 12,705 parolees released from prison onto parole in Pennsylvania between 
October 2006 and December 2009.  The primary sample contains a treatment group of 
1,758 cases which subsequent to their release from prison receive a first TPV violation 
which is sanctioned to imprisonment, and a control group of 10,947 cases which 
subsequent to their release from prison receive a first TPV violation which is sanctioned 
to any other alternative other that imprisonment.  From this sample, a propensity score 
matching model is used in order to generate estimates of the impact of imprisonment 
itself for a TPV on subsequent recidivism.  A sub-classification model is used, also based 
on generating a propensity score, in order to further determine the dose-response impact 
within the treatment group of differential lengths of imprisonment for a TPV.  In both 
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cases, a large number of relevant covariates are utilized for generating the propensity 
score later used for either matching or sub-classification.   
The next chapter (Chapter 4) presents the results of the propensity score matching 
models for estimating the impact of imprisonment itself for a first TPV on various 
measures of recidivism.  Chapter 5 explores the dose-response models for determining 
the impact of different lengths of stay in prison for a TPV on various measures of 
recidivism.  Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary of findings, a discussion of policy 
implications, and future directions for further understanding the impact of the use of 

















CHAPTER 4: PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING MODEL OF  
TREATMENT EFFECT 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter details results from the propensity score models used to examine the 
first of the two primary questions explored in this study – the treatment effect on 
recidivism of using imprisonment in response to a first TPV violation after release from 
prison compared to using another alternative sanctioning option.  Before matching, 
baseline comparisons of differences between the treatment and control groups across 
various relevant covariates are first examined.  Baseline recidivism rates prior to 
matching are also first examined.  Then the results of propensity score matching models, 
using different matching parameters and different measures of recidivism outcomes, are 
detailed.  Following the details of the propensity score matching outputs, a profile of the 
matched cases is next provided in order to examine a profile of the relevant (on-support) 
group of TPVs for which policy conclusions from these models can be drawn.  Finally, 
this chapter concludes with several post-estimation sensitivity analyses to examine the 
robustness of the findings generated from the propensity score matching models. 
 
BASELINE COMPARISONS 
Comparisons of Covariate Differences Between Treatment and Control Group 
Prior to the utilization of propensity score matching, it is first important to 
determine whether there are significant differences between the treatment and control 
groups across covariates that may impact both the treatment assignment and the 
recidivism outcomes.  If significant differences do exist, this can lead to selection bias 
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that must be addressed (in this case through propensity score matching) prior to making a 
causal inference of the impact of the treatment itself on the outcome.  Making the 
treatment and control groups similar on all important/relevant variables prior to 
estimating the effect size of the treatment on the outcome is referred to as “balancing” the 
two groups.   
As was detailed in Chapter 3 (see Table 3.4), there are indeed important covariate 
differences that exist between the treatment and control groups.  These differences are 
further highlighted in Table 4.1.  As can be seen from Table 4.1, a large number of 
covariates differ significantly between the treatment and control groups.  Using a T-test 
to test for statistically significant differences, 26 of the 36 covariates (72% of the 
covariates) show statistically significant differences between the treatment and control 
groups at p<=.01.  This is well above the number of covariates that might be expected to 
be statistically different by chance alone.  
Some have argued that hypothesis tests such as T-tests are not most appropriate 
for assessing balance because they are impacted in part by other factors than balance 
alone (see Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 2007).  Thus, another way to inspect pre-matching 
balance between the treatment and control groups on the covariates is to examine the 
standardized bias statistic (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985) for each covariate.5  This statistic 
is the standardized difference in means between the treatment and the control group on an 
                                                 
5 The standardized bias statistic is calculated as follows: ̅ −	 ̅	 +	2  
where ̅ and ̅ represent the mean of the covariate for the treatment and control group and  and  
represent the variance of the covariate for the treatment and control group. 
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observed covariate.  The covariate is considered out of balance if the associated 
standardized bias has an absolute value of greater than 0.2.  As shown in Table 4.1, nine 
of the 36 covariates (25% of the covariates) have an absolute standardized bias score 
above 0.2. 
Overall, it is clear that there are some fairly large and significant differences 
between those who are sanctioned to imprisonment for a first TPV violation versus those 
who are sanctioned to an alternative sanction for a first TPV violation, across several 
different covariates.  These differences are in the direction of what might be expected, 
with TPVs sanctioned to imprisonment mostly being higher risk and more serious TPV 
violators.  The largest selection effect appears to come from the severity of the first 
violation, the parole supervision level, and the LSI-R criminal risk assessment score.  
TPVs with a higher severity TPV violation, who are supervised at a more intense level, 
and who have a higher LSI-R criminal risk score are much more likely to be sanctioned 
to imprisonment rather than an alternative sanction for a first violation.   
Comparisons of Recidivism Rates Before Matching 
 
Three measures of recidivism are used in the subsequent analysis.  The re-
incarceration rate represents the first instance of return to PA DOC imprisonment.  A 
parolee can be re-incarcerated either as a parole violator (charged with a technical and/or 
new crime violation), or through police arrest, prosecution, and then sentencing to 
incarceration by a court.  The re-arrest rate represents the first instance of a police arrest.  
The overall recidivism rate is a combination of re-arrest and re-incarceration, and 
represents the first instance of either of those two events.  A re-incarceration can happen 
without being preceded by a re-arrest instance as is the case with technical parole 
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violators, and a re-arrest may not always result in a re-incarceration.  Thus the most 
inclusive definition of recidivism is to consider the overall recidivism rate by combining 
re-arrest and re-incarceration.  It is still useful, however, to examine the re-arrest and re-
incarceration rates separately in order to better understand the source of what is driving 
observed recidivism as measured by the overall recidivism rate combining re-arrest and 
re-incarceration. 
Using multiple follow-up time periods is also useful when examining recidivism 
rates.  Patterns of short-term change in recidivism may differ from patterns of longer-
term change in recidivism.  Three follow-up periods are used in this analysis: 6-month 
recidivism rates, 1-year recidivism rates, and 3-year recidivism rates.   
For framing purposes, first presented here are the recidivism rates for the full 
population of all parolees released from PA DOC custody during the time period 
examined (parole releases from PA DOC between October 2006 and December 2009).  
The 6-month re-arrest rate is 11.1%, the 1-year re-arrest rate is 22.0%, and the 3-year re-
arrest rate is 46.0%.  The 6-month re-incarceration rate is 12.6%, the 1-year re-
incarceration rate is 25.5%, and the 3-year re-incarceration rate is 47.7%.  The 6-month 
overall recidivism rate is 19.2%, the 1-year overall recidivism rate is 35.8%, and the 3-
year overall recidivism rate is 61.7%.     
Next examined are the observed recidivism rates before matching among the 
primary analysis sample of those sanctioned for a TPV after release from prison.  
Observed recidivism rates are compared between the treatment group (those sanctioned 
to imprisonment for a first TPV) and the control group (those sanctioned to any other 
alternative sanction for a first TPV).  Table 4.2 presents these observed recidivism rates.  
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For the 6-month follow-up recidivism rates, TPVs sanctioned to imprisonment (the 
treatment group) are 13.9% more likely to be re-arrested (	= 4.8, p = 0.028), and have 
an 11.7 % higher overall recidivism rate (	= 6.9, p = 0.008).  While the observed re-
incarceration rate is 1.5 percentage points lower for the treatment group than the control 
group at the 6-month follow-up, the difference is not statistically significant (	= 2.1, p 
= 0.143).  At the 6-month follow-up mark, approximately 52% of the first recidivism 
events are re-arrests and 48% are re-incarcerations.   
For the 1-year follow-up recidivism rates, the treatment group of those TPVs 
sanctioned to imprisonment have a 17.1% higher re-arrest rate (	= 14.4, p < 0.001) and 
a 9.4% higher overall recidivism rate (	= 10.2, p = 0.001), but a 15.1% lower re-
incarceration rate (	= 16.7, p < 0.001).  At the 1-year follow-up mark, approximately 
59% of the first recidivism events are re-arrests and 41% are re-incarcerations.   
For the 3-year follow-up recidivism rates, the treatment group of those TPVs 
sanctioned to imprisonment have a 9.1% higher re-arrest rate (	= 12.0, p = 0.001) and a 
4.3% higher overall recidivism rate (	= 6.0, p = 0.014), but an 11.6% lower re-
incarceration rate (	= 21.1, p < 0.001).  At the 3-year follow-up mark, approximately 
71% of the first recidivism events are re-arrests and 29% are re-incarcerations.   
These observed recidivism rates thus generally show statistically significant 
higher recidivism rates for the treatment group of TPVs sanctioned to imprisonment for a 
first violation, especially as measured by re-arrest rates and overall recidivism rates at all 
follow-up periods.  At least at the 1-year and 3-year follow-up, those TPVs sanctioned to 
imprisonment have significantly lower re-incarceration rates, but these lower re-
incarceration rates do not have enough impact on overall recidivism to lead to lower (or 
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non-significant) overall recidivism rates.  Re-incarceration has a diminishing impact on 
overall recidivism rates with longer follow-up periods, as re-incarceration events 
compose less and less of the first recidivism events with longer follow-up periods. The 
important question to now turn to is whether these generally higher recidivism rates for 
TPVs sanctioned to imprisonment hold up after matching on relevant covariates that 
affect both the type of sanctioning response (i.e., the treatment assignment) and the 
recidivism outcomes.  
 
PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING MODELS 
Naïve Logistic Regression Model 
As a first step before presenting propensity score matching results, Table 4.3 
presents the results from logistic regression models using all covariates plus the treatment 
assignment indicator to predict recidivism outcomes.  As detailed in Chapter 3, traditional 
regression models have several disadvantages to propensity score matching models for 
adequately drawing causal inference about the treatment effect.  The logistic regression 
models might be thought of as naïve models to compare to the later propensity score 
matching models, however.  The results of these models (see Table 4.3) generally show a 
change in the sign of the relationship between treatment and recidivism rates compared to 
the raw recidivism rates observed above.  Specifically, re-incarceration rates and overall 
recidivism rates at all three follow-up periods now show significantly lower recidivism 
for TPVs who are first sanctioned to imprisonment versus an alternative sanction.  For 
TPVs first sanctioned to imprisonment, the odds of re-incarceration are 40% lower at 6 
months, 48% lower at 1 year, and 50% lower at 3 years.  The odds of overall recidivism 
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are 17% lower at 6 months, 18% lower at 1 year, and 27% lower at 3 years.  Re-arrest 
rates generally show non-significant differences between the treatment and control 
groups, except for at the 1 year follow-up where the odds of re-arrest are 18% higher for 
TPVs first sanctioned to imprisonment.   
Calculating Propensity Score 
 
The first step in developing propensity score matching models is to calculate the 
propensity score itself.  The propensity score is the likelihood, based on the distribution 
of the covariates, that an individual will be assigned to the treatment group, regardless of 
actually observed treatment group assignment.  The propensity score may be generated 
through either a logit or probit regression model.  For ease of interpretation, the 
propensity score here is estimated using a logit regression model.  It is important that the 
covariates used to generate the propensity score are measured prior to treatment 
assignment and are at least theoretically relevant to the assignment decision.  All of the 
covariates meet both criteria, and thus are all used in the logit regression in order to 
generate the propensity score.  Table 4.4 presents the logit regression output used to 
generate the propensity score.   
Common Support 
 
Once a propensity score has been generated for each individual in the sample, it is 
next important to consider the common support between the treatment and control groups 
across the distribution of the propensity scores.  Common support for the propensity 
score distribution based on the propensity scores generated for the primary sample was 
previously discussed in Chapter 3 (see discussion in Chapter 3, as well as Figure 3.3 and 
Figure 3.4).  To review, an examination of the common support reveals that there is very 
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little overlap at the high and low ends of the propensity score distributions between the 
treatment and control groups.  There are very few treatment group cases with a low 
propensity for assignment to treatment, and virtually no control group cases with a very 
high propensity for assignment to treatment.  There is an apparent region of common 
support in the middle of the distributions, however, where the propensity score 
distribution of the treated group (i.e., those sanctioned to imprisonment for a first TPV 
violation) overlaps with the propensity score distribution for the control group (i.e., those 
sanctioned to an alternative option for a first TPV violation).  Since I only examine the 
ATT in this analysis, it will be important to profile and understand which group falls in 
the overlap region of the propensity score distributions between the treatment and control 
groups, since this will be the policy relevant group for which the results will be able to be 
generalized to in the end.  On the surface, from an examination of the common support 
graphs (Figure 3.3 and 3.4), it does appear that there may be a sizeable enough region of 
common support to continue with matching procedures. 
Selecting Matching Algorithm 
 
Choosing an appropriate matching procedure requires optimizing several 
objectives.  The first objective is to keep the largest number of cases in the total sample 
for matching.  In order to match it requires that the cases are “on-support” and chosen for 
matching by the particular matching algorithm parameters selected.  A larger matched 
sample is better, all else equal.  The second objective is to maximize the balance between 
the treatment and control groups on all observed covariates after matching.  The third 
objective is to minimize the distance between the individual treatment and control group 
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cases that are matched.  The “distance” is the difference in the propensity score value for 
each matched pair in the matching sample.   
Based on the above three objectives, several nearest neighbor matching strategies 
were considered here.  In nearest neighbor matching, the treatment group cases are 
randomly sorted and then matched, one at a time, to control group cases with the closest 
propensity score.  Options to consider within nearest neighbor matching are whether are 
not to allow replacement so that control group cases can be matched more than once, and 
whether or not to set a caliper of the maximum distance that will be allowed between the 
propensity scores of treatment and control cases.  Fundamentally, these options are 
constructed to deal with the reality that distance between “nearest neighbors” can become 
quite large over successive matches as matching proceeds.  On the surface, both setting a 
caliper level and allowing for the replacement of control group cases to be matched more 
than once would seem appropriate here since it has already been illustrated that there is 
fairly low common support on the two tails of the overlap in distributions between the 
treatment and control group propensity scores.   
To run the propensity score matching models, the ‘psmatch2’ procedure within 
Stata 13.0 was used.  The nearest neighbor propensity score matching models that were 
attempted were one-to-one nearest neighbor matching with replacement, without 
replacement, with a caliper of .01, with a caliper of .05, and with the “common” option 
selected within ‘psmatch2’.  The “common” option imposes a common support by 
dropping treatment group observations whose propensity score is higher than the 
maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of the control group cases.  All 
combinations of the above one-to-one nearest neighbor matching options were attempted, 
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also including models with no caliper or common support trim selected.  The model that 
consistently produced the best results was one-to-one nearest neighbor matching with 
replacement and with a caliper of .01 imposed.  Models using matching with replacement 
were clearly advantageous, with the average distance in propensity scores between 
matched cases being on average 25 times higher for the models without replacement 
versus the models with replacement.  A caliper or .01 produced the lowest average 
distance between matched cases without suffering a significant drop in the sample size of 
matched cases.  For the large dataset of n=11,934 cases for which a propensity score 
could be estimated and for which a full three years of follow-up was available for 
calculating recidivism rates, the number of cases retained for matching using one-to-one 
nearest neighbor matching with replacement and a .01 caliper was 2,645 (1,542 treatment 
group cases and 1,103 control group cases).  The average distance between propensity 
scores for matched cases was .00016, with a range of a minimum distance of 0 and a 
maximum distance of .0068.  Only approximately 26% of the control group cases were 
matched more than once, and only 8% of the control group cases were matched more 
than twice (maximum number of matches of a control group case was 8; only one control 
case was matched 8 times).  Finally, the average standardized bias score for the 
covariates after matching was only 1.9%, for the one-to-one nearest neighbor matching 
with replacement and a .01 caliper.  As such, all models below use one-to-one nearest 
neighbor matching with a caliper of .01 imposed.   
Assessing Balance Pre- and Post-Matching 
 
Once a matching algorithm has been chosen, the next important step before 
examining the outcomes is to examine the improvement in balance on all of the 
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covariates between the treatment and control groups before versus after matching.  The 
goal is to maximize balance on all observed covariates.  Several steps can be taken in 
order to examine balance after matching.  First, T-tests are conducted in order to 
determine whether there are remaining statistically significant differences between the 
means of the covariates between the treatment and control groups.  Table 4.5 presents 
measures of balance between the treatment and control groups for all of the covariates 
after matching, and the improvement in balance from before matching.  As can be seen 
from Table 4.5, none of the mean differences between the treatment and control groups 
on any of the covariates remain statistically significant at p<=.05 after matching, 
suggesting that conditional independence has been met.   
As was previously discussed, however, some have argued that conventional 
hypothesis testing is not adequate for assessing balance (see Ho et. al., 2007).  For this 
reason, the standardized bias statistic (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985) is suggested as a 
better indicator of balance.  A standardized bias statistic for a given covariate of less than 
an absolute value of 0.2 indicates a balanced covariate.  Table 4.5 shows the standardized 
bias statistic for all of the covariates before versus after matching as well.  Before 
matching, the average standardized bias score for the covariates is 0.22, above the critical 
0.2 value.  All standardized bias scores after matching are clearly well below the critical 
0.2 value, with the absolute value of the highest standardized bias score of only 0.063, 
and an average standardized bias score of 0.02 for all of the covariates.  Further, the 
average reduction in bias from before versus after matching for all of the covariates is 
84%, and is above 90% for nearly half of the covariates.  This clearly confirms the 
adequacy of the matching.  In fact, this balance is better than might be expected through 
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randomization given that two out of 31 covariates might be expected to show statistically 
significant differences between the treatment and control groups by chance alone even 
under randomization.   
The balance after matching between the treatment and control groups can also be 
visualized graphically.  Figure 4.1 shows a jitter dot-plot of the propensity score 
distributions of the matched treatment and control cases.  As can be seen from Figure 4.1, 
the distributions after matching are now closely aligned and very similar.  Figure 4.2 also 
provides a histogram comparison of the propensity score distributions between treatment 
and control group cases after matching.  When compared to the histogram of the 
distributions before matching (see Figure 3.3 from previous chapter), the selected 
matching parameters clearly significantly improve the overlap in distributions between 
the treatment and control groups after matching.  These figures provide strong further 
confirmation that balance has been achieved. 
Effect Sizes from Propensity Score Matching Results 
 
Now that a propensity score has been generated, a suitable matching strategy has 
been selected, and balance on all observed covariates after matching has been 
demonstrated, the results of the selected matching model can be simply presented as the 
ATT.  Table 4.6 shows the recidivism rates and effect sizes (i.e. the ATT) for the 6-
month, 1-year, and 3-year recidivism rates based on all three measures of recidivism (i.e., 
re-arrest rate, re-incarceration rate, and overall recidivism rate).  After matching, re-
incarceration rates at all three follow-up points are significantly lower for the treatment 
group of those TPVs first sanctioned to imprisonment versus the control group of those 
TPVs sanctioned to an alternative sanction.  The 6-month re-incarceration rate is 7.2 
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percentage points lower for the treatment group (18.3% vs. 25.5%), the 1-year re-
incarceration rate is 14 percentage points lower for the treatment group (29.2% vs. 
43.2%, and the 3-year re-incarceration rate is 13.1 percentage points lower for the 
treatment group (48.1% vs. 61.2%).  All of these differences are highly statistically 
significant at p < .01.   
Re-arrest rates mostly show no statistically significant differences between the 
treatment and control groups.  Only the 1-year re-arrest rate is statistically significantly 
higher for the treatment group than for the control group.  At the 1-year re-arrest rate 
mark, the re-arrest rate is 4.5 percentage points higher for the treatment group than for the 
control group (30.1% vs. 25.6%), and this difference is statistically significant at p < .05.   
Overall recidivism rates are lower for the treatment group than for the control 
group at all three follow-up points, and the effect size grows with longer follow-ups.  The 
6-month overall recidivism rate is 2.1 percentage points lower for the treatment group 
(30.9% vs. 33%), but this difference does not quite reach a level of statistical significance 
at p < .05.  The 1-year overall recidivism rate is 5.2 percentage points lower for the 
treatment group (49.2% vs. 54.4%).  The 3-year overall recidivism rate is 6 percentage 
points lower for the treatment group (72.5% vs. 78.5%).   
Interestingly, these results after propensity score matching generally confirm the 
“naïve” logistic regression results with covariate controls performed before matching (see 
Table 4.3), and both tell a somewhat different story than the raw observed recidivism 
differences before covariate controls or matching is considered (see Table 4.2).  Before 
matching, and without consideration of relevant covariates, recidivism rates were 
generally higher for the treatment group of TPVs first sanctioned to imprisonment 
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compared to the control group of TPVs first sanctioned to another alternative.  After 
matching, recidivism rates (specifically overall recidivism and re-incarceration) are 
significantly lower for the treatment group of TPVs first sanctioned to imprisonment.  
Since overall recidivism is the most comprehensive definition of recidivism, it is 
especially notable that overall recidivism rates are lower for the treatment group than for 
the control group.  While re-arrest rates appear slightly higher for the treatment group, 
they are generally not statistically significant differences.  Clearly lower re-incarceration 
rates are heavily driving lower overall recidivism rates.  It thus appears that after 
propensity score matching the general evidence supports a deterrent effect from 
sanctioning TPVs for a first violation to imprisonment rather than to an alternative 
option.   
 
DESCRIPTION OF MATCHED CASES 
 
In the process of matching, only a select group of comparable cases which are on-
support and able to be matched are retained in order to generate the recidivism outcomes 
presented above.  As a result of matching, 9,397 cases are discarded – 0.3% (n=5) of the 
treatment group and 89.5% (n=9,392) of the control group.  Very few of the treatment 
group cases are discarded, but a significant proportion of the control group cases are 
discarded.  It is thus important to especially examine a profile of the control group cases 
which are retained for matching, so that the results previously presented may be placed in 
context.  From the previous examination of common support before matching, it was 
clear that a large proportion of the control group cases showed a very low probability of 
receiving treatment.  Since the effect estimated here is the ATT, the matched group for 
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which the ATT effect sizes can be generalized should be profiled.  This is also important 
since the control group is a quite heterogeneous group, containing a continuum of various 
sanctioning alternatives for a first TPV.   
Table 4.7 shows a comparison in mean differences between the matched and 
unmatched groups across all of the covariates.  In addition, Table 4.8 shows a comparison 
between the matched and unmatched groups of the individual types of most serious TPV 
violations associated with the first TPV instance.  Also, Table 4.9 shows a comparison of 
the distribution of different sanctions among the control group using the most serious 
sanction, between the matched and unmatched groups.   
From Table 4.7, several differences are observed between the matched and 
unmatched groups.  Among the most important differences, the matched group appears to 
be at a higher risk of criminal re-offending (i.e., a higher LSI-R score), are much more 
likely to be supervised at the maximum supervision level, and are much more likely to 
have violated for a high severity technical violation.  The matched group is also more 
likely to have been supervised in a halfway house at the time of their first TPV violation, 
and is also more likely to have been re-released from prison after already previously 
serving time in prison for a parole violation at the time of their first TPV violation.  
Altogether, this paints a picture of the matched sample as a group of higher risk TPVs 
who commit a more serious technical violation.   
Table 4.8 shows several differences between the matched and unmatched groups 
on the individual types of TPV violations for the most serious violation associated with 
the first TPV.  Among the largest differences, the matched group is significantly more 
likely to receive a violation for changing residences without permission, failure to abide 
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by Board imposed special conditions, absconding, and removal from or failure in 
treatment.  On the other hand, the matched group is significantly less likely to receive a 
violation for failure to pay supervision fees and a positive urinalysis or use of drugs 
among those with no previous history of positive urinalysis and/or use of drugs.  The 
most prevalent violations among the matched group are changing residences without 
permission (21.4%), a positive urinalysis for use of alcohol among those with a previous 
history of positive urinalysis for alcohol use (21.3%), failure to abide by Board imposed 
special conditions (15.8%), and removal from or failure in treatment (15.8%).   
An examination of sanctioning differences between the matched and unmatched 
samples among the control group (in Table 4.9) also shows some differences.  The most 
frequent sanction among the control group cases retained for matching is placement in a 
“Halfway Back” community corrections center (24.9% of matched control group cases).  
A “Halfway Back” community corrections center is a non-secure residential halfway 
house which is used as an intermediate sanction, where residents are still provided a large 
degree of latitude to leave the center for various reasons such as employment.  The 
second most frequent sanction among the matched control group cases is a written 
warning (16.9% of matched control group cases), although the prevalence of written 
warnings among all sanctions for matched control group cases is only about half of the 
prevalence of written warnings among the sanctions for unmatched control group cases 
(16.9% vs. 33.3%).  So while written warnings are quite prevalent amongst matched 
control group cases, they are significantly less prevalent than among unmatched control 
group cases.  The third most frequent sanction among the matched control group cases is 
placement in an inpatient drug and alcohol facility (12.1% of matched control group 
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cases).  Overall, it appears that Halfway Back placements and inpatient drug and alcohol 
placements are significantly more prevalent among the matched group sample than 
among the unmatched group, whereas less severe sanctions such as written warnings 
(although still quite prevalent), travel restrictions, and increased reporting requirements 
are much less prevalent among the matched group sample than among the unmatched 
group.  It thus appears that the treatment effect being compared in the previously 
described propensity score matching models is largely between the imposition of 
imprisonment versus the imposition of a less secure residential placement for a first TPV 




The propensity score matching results presented above appear to mostly show a 
deterrent effect (i.e., mostly lower recidivism rates) for TPVs who are first sanctioned to 
imprisonment versus an alternative sanction, especially when the trade-off is between 
imprisonment versus a non-secure residential placement such as in-patient treatment or a 
halfway house.  The question to now to turn to is how consistent and robust this finding 
is.  Several sensitivity analyses can be performed in order to examine the robustness of 
these propensity score model results.   
Scenario 1: Relaxing Data Exclusion Criteria 
 
The first sensitivity analysis performed is to relax some of the exclusion criteria 
applied to the original dataset.  In particular, as was detailed in Chapter 3, cases were 
removed from analysis because the first TPV sanction date was either before the first 
TPV violation date or was more than 30 days after the first TPV violation date.  Also, 
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cases were removed because the PBPP violation/sanctioning data indicated a first TPV 
sanction to imprisonment but PA DOC data did not indicate the presence of a re-
incarceration date, or the PA DOC re-incarceration date was more than 30 days after the 
first violation date.  These exclusion rules were placed in order to address difficulties in 
directly connecting PBPP violation incidents to sanctioning incidents, and also in 
connecting PBPP sanctioning records to PA DOC imprisonment records for those 
sanctioned to imprisonment.   
In order to examine the potential impact of these data restrictions on the results, 
some of the eliminated cases are added back in.  Specifically, cases are added back in 
where the first TPV sanction date is more than 30 days after the first TPV violation date 
but no other violations or police arrests are recorded in between them.  Also, cases are 
added back in where the PBPP data indicates that the TPV is a treatment group case (i.e., 
the first TPV sanction is to imprisonment) and yet there is no matching indication of 
imprisonment in the PA DOC data records, or the next available record in the PA DOC 
data is an incarceration date more than 30 days afterward with no other PBPP violation or 
police arrest in between.  By adding these cases back in which were previously removed, 
an additional 1,070 cases are included in the dataset before matching (n=13,004).   Using 
the same matching parameters (i.e., one-to-one nearest neighbor matching with 
replacement and a caliper of 0.01), an additional 668 treatment group cases are retained 
for matching (a 43% increase in matched treatment group cases), and an additional 365 
control group cases are retained for matching (a 33% increase in matched control group 
cases).  A total of 2,210 treatment group cases are matched with a total of 1,468 control 
group cases.  Post-matching balance shows good balance on all covariates, with none of 
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the covariates showing statistically significant differences between the treatment and 
control groups, and none showing a standardized bias score above 0.20.   
Scenario #1 in Table 4.10 shows the resulting estimated effect sizes from the 
propensity score matching model after relaxing the data exclusion criteria.  The results 
show generally larger effect sizes than the original propensity score matching model 
results.  Specifically, the overall recidivism rate differences between the treatment and 
control groups under this scenario of relaxing the data exclusion rules are generally 
around twice as large as the recidivism rate differences from the original propensity score 
matching results.  The 6-month overall recidivism rate is 7.0 percentage points lower for 
the treatment group than for the control group (27.8% versus 34.8%), compared to the 
original estimate of a 2.1 percentage point lower overall recidivism rate for the treatment 
group than the control group (30.9% versus 33.0%).  The 1-year overall recidivism rate is 
8.3 percentage points lower for the treatment group than for the control group (44.6%% 
versus 52.9%%), compared to the original estimate of a 5.2 percentage point lower 
overall recidivism rate for the treatment group than the control group (49.2% versus 
54.4%).  The 3-year overall recidivism rate is 12.3 percentage points lower for the 
treatment group than for the control group (65.0% versus 77.3%), compared to the 
original estimate of a 6.0 percentage point lower overall recidivism rate for the treatment 
group than the control group (72.5% versus 78.5%).  Similar to the original model, re-
incarceration rate differences appear to drive the lower overall recidivism rates for the 
treatment group.  Also similar to the original model, re-arrest rates generally show non-
significant differences.  So at least under this sensitivity analysis, it not only confirms a 
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deterrent impact of incarceration for a first TPV sanction, but it also generally shows a 
larger deterrent impact than previously estimated using the primary sample group.   
Scenario 2: Only High Severity TPV Violations 
 
Another type of sensitivity analysis that can be performed is to limit the analysis 
sample to only those TPVs who have a high severity violation for their first TPV 
violation.  As has been previously demonstrated, the estimated ATT effect is largely 
limited to high severity violations given that high severity violations are much more 
prevalent in the matched group than in the unmatched group from the original sample.  
Scenario #2 in Table 4.10 also shows estimated effect sizes from a propensity score 
matching model limited to only those TPV cases that had a high severity TPV violation 
for their first violation.  One-to-one nearest neighbor matching with replacement and a 
caliper of 0.01 is once again used.  Good balance after matching is once again achieved.  
A total of 937 control group cases are matched with 1,376 treatment group cases.  The 
results are similar to the primary results from the original propensity score matching 
model.  Overall recidivism rates are significantly lower for the treatment group than for 
the control group at the 6-month, 1-year, and 3-year follow-up, with slightly larger effect 
size estimates when compared to the original propensity score matching estimates.  The 
6-month overall recidivism rate is 7.4 percentage points lower for the treatment group 
than for the control group, the 1-year overall recidivism rate is 8.4 percentage points 
lower, and the 3-year overall recidivism rate is 8.7 percentage points lower.  Once again, 
it appears that significantly lower re-incarceration rates for the treatment group are 
primarily driving the lower overall recidivism rates, and re-arrest rates are not 
significantly different between the treatment and control group. 
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Scenario 3: Limiting TPV Sanction Types Among Control Group 
 
One other way to examine the robustness of these findings is to create a more 
homogenous group within the control group by limiting the control group to only certain 
sanctioning options for which to compare to incarceration among the treatment group.  
Since it was previously demonstrated that a high percent of the control group cases 
retained for matching in the primary analysis were sanctioned to either a “Halfway Back” 
non-secure residential community corrections center placement or to inpatient treatment, 
it may be instructive to limit the control group sample to only those who receive one of 
these two sanctions.  A propensity score matching model is thus generated, comparing 
the treatment of imprisonment for a first TPV to a comparison group consisting of either 
“Halfway Back” placement or inpatient treatment placement for a first TPV.  One-to-one 
nearest neighbor matching with replacement and a caliper of 0.01 is once again utilized, 
and post-matching balance is once again achieved.  A total of 755 control group cases 
and 1,536 treatment group cases are retained for matching.  The results are presented in 
Scenario #3 in Table 4.10.  Results once again show lower overall recidivism rates for the 
treatment group than for the control group, with a 4.6 percentage points lower 6-month 
recidivism rate, a 6.6 percentage points lower 1-year recidivism rate, and a 7.1 percentage 
points lower 3-year recidivism rate.  Once again, significantly lower re-incarceration 
rates also appear to drive the lower overall recidivism rates.  One different result from 
this model compared to the primary analysis model, however, is that the re-arrest rate at 
the 6-month mark is significantly higher for the treatment group than for the control 
group.  The re-arrest rate at the 1-year mark is also significantly higher for the treatment 
group than for the control group, but this was similarly found in the original primary 
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analysis model.  Only the 3-year re-arrest rate shows no statistically significant difference 
between the treatment and control group.   
Rosenbaum Bounds 
 
Another way to look at a sensitivity analysis is to ask what type of impact an 
unobserved variable or set of variables would need to have in order to alter the previously 
outlined findings.  While propensity score matching can do very well at creating suitable 
comparisons between the treatment and control groups on observed and measurable 
covariates, unobserved factors may still impact both the treatment assignment and the 
outcome, and thus lead to remaining hidden selection bias.  A randomized controlled 
experiment has the advantage of balancing on all group differences, both observed and 
unobserved.  Propensity score matching models are limited to balancing only on observed 
covariates.  In situations such as the one in this study where there is a strong 
understanding of the factors affecting treatment assignment, remaining hidden bias is 
theoretically less of a concern.  Nonetheless, it is informative to consider the potential 
impact of remaining hidden selection bias.   
Existing statistical procedures for performing sensitivity analysis after propensity 
score matching allow the user to simulate what impact potentially remaining hidden bias 
would need to have in order to alter findings.  One available procedure within Stata for 
doing this is the ‘mhbounds’ procedure (Becker & Caliendo, 2007).  The ‘mhbounds’ 
procedure is essentially an extension of the Rosenbaum bounds calculation (Rosenbaum, 
2002).  Essentially, Rosenbaum bounds evaluate the sensitivity of the observed effects 
under different scenarios where the magnitude of an unobserved confounder varies.  A 
bound estimate of Γ=1 is equivalent to no hidden bias.  Bound estimates higher than 1 
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represent varying degrees to which the treatment effect may be under-estimated or over-
estimated based on unobserved confounders.  As an example, a  Γ=1.2 represents a 
situation where there is hidden bias which would increase the odds of receiving the 
treatment by 20% compared to the control group.  An associated p value with each value 
of  Γ indicates the probability of accepting the null hypothesis, which is that the effect 
size remains statistically significantly different between the treatment and control group.  
At the point where Γ has an associated p value above the critical level of p=.05, this 
would indicate the critical level of the associated bias which would render the effect size 
no longer significantly different if present.     
Table 4.11 presents Rosenbaum bounds to show the robustness of the primary 
propensity score matching results in the presence of remaining hidden bias.  Overall 
recidivism rates are fairly sensitive to hidden bias.  A hidden bias that increases the odds 
of being sanctioned to imprisonment for a first TPV by between 5% and 10% would 
render the 1-year and 3-year overall recidivism treatment effects no longer significant at 
p < .05, meaning that it could no longer be assumed that TPVs sanctioned to 
imprisonment have a lower overall recidivism rate.  A hidden bias increasing the odds of 
treatment by between 35% and 50% could lead to a reverse in the sign of the effect size 
for the 1-year and 3-year overall recidivism rates, where it might be concluded that 
imprisonment for a first TPV actually leads to significantly higher overall recidivism 
rates compared to an alternative sanction for a first TPV.  Since the baseline estimated 
effect size for the 6-month overall recidivism rate was not statistically significant to begin 
with, Table 4.11 shows that a hidden bias increasing the odds of differential treatment 
assignment by 10% could lead to a significantly lower 6-month overall recidivism rate 
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for the treatment group, and a hidden bias increasing the odds of differential treatment 
assignment by 30% could lead to a significantly higher 6-month overall recidivism rate 
for the treatment group.   
Re-incarceration rates, on the other hand, are fairly robust and insensitive to 
hidden bias based on Rosenbaum bounds.  It would generally take a hidden bias that 
increases the odds of treatment by between 30% and 60% to render the estimated lower 
re-incarceration rates for the treatment group no longer statistically significant.  It would 
take a hidden bias that increases the odds of treatment by between 75% and 110% in 
order to potentially reverse the sign of the effect size for the re-incarceration rates, and 
lead to a conclusion that re-incarceration rates are in fact significantly higher for the 
treatment group of those imprisoned for a first TVP versus an alternative sanction.   
Re-arrest rates at baseline, based on the original propensity score matching model 
results, were significantly higher for the treatment group at the 6-month and 1-year 
follow-up mark, and did not significantly differ at the 3-year follow-up mark.  The 
Rosenbaum bound results show that these estimates are fairly sensitive.  For the 6-month 
and 1-year re-arrest rates, a hidden bias increasing the odds of differential treatment 
assignment by between 5% and 10% would lead to the conclusion that these re-arrest 
rates no longer significantly differ between the treatment and control groups.  A hidden 
bias increasing the odds of differential treatment assignment by 50% would reverse the 
sign of the effect size and lead to the conclusion that 6-month and 1-year re-arrest rates 
are actually significantly lower for the treatment group.  For the 3-year re-arrest rates, 
where the baseline re-arrest rates did not significantly differ between the treatment and 
control groups, a 10% increase in the odds of differential treatment assignment could lead 
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to the conclusion that 3-year re-arrest rates are significantly higher for the treatment 
group, and a 25% increase in the odds of differential treatment assignment could lead to 
the conclusion that 3-year re-arrest rates are significantly lower for the treatment group.     
To summarize the Rosenbaum bound estimates, overall recidivism rates and re-
arrest rates are generally fairly sensitive to hidden bias, whereas re-incarceration rates are 
generally fairly robust and insensitive to hidden bias.  An examination of the odds ratios 
for the individual covariates from Table 4.4 (which is the logistic regression model used 
to generate the original propensity scores by predicting the probability of treatment 
assignment using the observed covariates) shows that around two-thirds of the observed 
covariates have odds ratios of similar size to those for which the Rosenbaum bounds 
show that an unobserved bias would need to have in order to render the significant re-
arrest rate and overall recidivism rate differences insignificant.  Therefore it is certainly 
possible that an unobserved covariate with a moderately sized impact on treatment 
assignment could render null differences in recidivism for re-arrest rates and overall 
recidivism rates.  On the other hand, it has already been demonstrated that re-
incarceration rates appear to contribute heavily to the lower estimated overall recidivism 
rates for the treatment group, and re-incarceration rates are found here to be fairly robust 
and insensitive to hidden bias.  Further, as previously discussed, given that there appears 
to be a fairly good understanding of the factors affecting treatment assignment based on 
the strength of the relationship between some of the observed covariates and the 
probability of treatment assignment, it is unlikely that there exists a set of unobserved 
factors that are significantly related to treatment assignment which could thus alter the 
effect size estimates.   
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Further Exploring The Treatment Effect: Deterrence, Aging, or Exposure Time? 
 
Based on all of the evidence presented so far, it appears that sanctioning a first 
TPV violation to imprisonment has a slight deterrent effect on overall recidivism when 
compared to an alternative sanction such as treatment or a non-secure residential 
placement, and that these results are fairly robust and primarily driven by significantly 
lower re-incarceration rates for the treatment group.  The last type of sensitivity analysis 
that is examined here is to explore deeper this apparent deterrent effect on overall 
recidivism of sanctioning first TPVs to imprisonment.  One plausible theory is that the 
lower overall recidivism rates for sanctioning to imprisonment do not represent a 
deterrent effect but rather an aging or exposure time effect.  It is well established in the 
criminological literature that age is inversely related to crime (and recidivism).   
Recidivism follow-up for the control group of those sanctioned to an alternative to 
imprisonment begins immediately at the time of the sanction, given that all control group 
sanctions involve sanctions where the parolee is not securely confined and thus is at risk 
for potentially re-offending immediately.  On the other hand, recidivism follow-up for the 
treatment group only begins after the parolee is re-released from imprisonment since the 
parolee is confined for the TPV sanction.  The average confinement time for the TPVs in 
the treatment group who are imprisoned for a first TPV is 12.3 months.  Thus, on 
average, the TPVs in the treatment group are one year older at the time of the start of 
recidivism follow-up.  Since this aging occurs after treatment assignment, it is not 
considered in the balancing of observed covariates between the treatment and control 
groups.6  Therefore, those in the treatment group may show lower overall recidivism rates 
                                                 
6 The age variable used among the list of covariates for predicting treatment assignment represents the age 
at time of the first TPV violation, not the age at the time of the start of recidivism follow-up. 
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simply because they have aged by a year on average before being followed for 
recidivism.  In a sense, this aging might be considered as part of the treatment itself.  If 
this aging fully accounts for the lower overall recidivism rates for the treatment group, 
however, it might not be fair to call the treatment effect a deterrent effect.  Rather it 
might be more accurate to characterize the treatment effect as an aging effect.  Or the 
treatment effect might represent some combination of an aging effect and a  deterrent 
effect, where overall recidivism rates are lower for the treatment group both because they 
have aged in prison and because something about imprisonment has changed their 
individual cost-benefit assessment to where it deters from future recidivism. 
Another plausible explanation for why overall recidivism rates are lower for the 
treatment group than for the control group is that the treatment group is closer to reaching 
the maximum term of their sentence when recidivism follow-up begins.  Parolees are no 
longer under parole supervision when they reach their maximum sentence date.  Since re-
incarceration rates are largely driven by technical parole violations, and technical 
violations are no longer possible once a parolee is no longer under parole supervision, a 
shorter period of remaining supervision among the treatment group compared to the 
control group might explain the significantly lower re-incarceration rates and overall 
recidivism rates for the treatment group.  Since it has been previously shown that the 
lower re-incarceration rates for the treatment group show large effect sizes, are strongly 
robust, and are the driving force behind the lower overall recidivism rates, it is plausible 
that overall recidivism rates might be lower for the treatment group due to less remaining 
time on parole for which to be subject to potential re-incarceration as a result of parole 
violations. The observed remaining time on parole between the treatment and control 
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groups at the time of the start of recidivism follow-up shows that the treatment group has 
on average 17.1 fewer remaining months under parole supervision.  This differential 
impact may be referred to as exposure time, since recidivism follow-up begins right away 
for the control group yet begins on average more than one year later for the treatment 
group.   
One way to examine whether aging and exposure time could in part or fully 
explain the lower overall recidivism rates for the treatment group is to run a logistic 
regression model among only the sample retained in the propensity score matching model 
for matching, in which treatment assignment is used to predict recidivism rates 
controlling for age and residual time on parole at the beginning of recidivism follow-up.  
Table 4.12 shows the results of logistic regression models predicting 6-month, 1-year, 
and 3-year overall recidivism rates, controlling for the two aging factors (i.e., age and 
residual time on parole at the beginning of recidivism follow-up).  The results show that 
after controlling for age and residual time remaining on parole at the beginning of 
recidivism follow, the treatment group of those imprisoned for a first TPV no longer 
shows significantly lower 6-month, 1-year, and 3-year overall recidivism rates at a p-
critical value of p=.05.  Further, the aging and exposure time variables show a significant 
relationship with overall recidivism rates in the expected direction.  An increase in age is 
significantly related to lower overall recidivism rates, and a shorter remaining time on 
parole is also significantly related to lower overall recidivism rates.  So we find some 
evidence here that a large part (perhaps all) of the treatment effect observed from the 
propensity score matching results represents an aging and exposure time effect among the 






This chapter presented results of propensity score matching models to examine 
the treatment effect of sanctioning first TPV violations to imprisonment versus an 
alternative sanction.  An examination of observed recidivism rates before matching 
generally showed higher overall recidivism rates among the treatment group of those 
sanctioned to imprisonment.  After matching, however, it appears that overall recidivism 
rates and re-incarceration rates were generally significantly lower for TPVs first 
sanctioned to imprisonment, suggesting a deterrent effect of imprisonment.  Best 
estimates were that overall recidivism rates after at least one year of recidivism follow-up 
were around 5 to 6 percentage points lower for the treatment group than for the control 
group.  Lower overall recidivism rates for the treatment group were largely driven by 
significantly lower re-incarceration rates.  Re-arrest rates did not generally show 
statistically significant differences.  These average treatment effects are only 
generalizable to the treated (i.e., the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated, or ATT), 
which largely represents a comparison among high risk parolees who are under higher 
levels of parole supervision and are sanctioned for a high severity TPV violation.  Also, 
the relevant control group types of sanctions for comparing to the treatment group are 
largely sanctions to a non-secure residential halfway house or to inpatient treatment 
(although a significant proportion of written warnings are also present within the matched 
control group too).  Propensity score matching was successful at producing a high degree 
of post-matching balance across all observed covariates, and was generally successful at 
retaining a significant number of treatment and control group cases in the final matched 
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sample, without resorting to a heavy reliance on replacement among the control group 
cases for matching.  One-to-one nearest neighbor matching with replacement and a 
caliper of 0.01 generally produced the best propensity score matching models.   
A number of different types of sensitivity analyses were undertaken, in order to 
examine the robustness of these findings.  One type of sensitivity analysis involved 
adding back in cases that were removed based on decision rules for connecting violations 
to sanctions and for connecting PBPP data to PA DOC data. These results showed similar 
(and in some instances larger) effect sizes confirming the conclusion of a deterrent effect 
on recidivism for sanctioning first TPV violations to imprisonment.  A second sensitivity 
analysis limited the matched group to a comparison among only high severity first TPV 
violations, and also to a comparison of only control group cases who were sanctioned to a 
halfway house or inpatient treatment.  These results again confirmed generally robust 
findings, meaning lower overall recidivism rates for TPVs first sanctioned to 
imprisonment.  A third sensitivity analysis used Rosenbaum bounds to estimate the 
robustness of these findings in the presence of remaining hidden bias.  This analysis 
generally showed more sensitive results for overall recidivism rates, yet re-incarceration 
rates remained fairly insensitive to the existence of remaining hidden bias. Given the 
fairly robust re-incarceration rate findings, the fact that re-incarceration rates tended to 
drive overall recidivism rates, and evidence that treatment assignment is fairly well 
understood here, overall recidivism rates were likely not to be impacted by remaining 
hidden bias, although this can never fully be ruled out in the absence of a true 
experimental evaluation design using random assignment to treatment.  Overall, lower 
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recidivism rates among the treatment group showed a moderate to high degree of 
robustness.   
Finally, the treatment effect of lower overall recidivism rates for the treatment 
group was examined in further detail.  Specifically, some evidence was present to suggest 
that the lower overall recidivism rates among the treatment group were largely explained 
by an aging and exposure time effect, where the treatment group was on average one year 
older and around 17 months closer to being released from parole supervision at the time 
of the start of recidivism follow-up.  The treatment effect may thus likely be explained in 
part or in full by an aging and exposure time effect rather than by a deterrent effect, as 
deterrence is traditionally defined.  Therefore, setting aside the aging and exposure time 
differences between the treatment and control group, sanctioning TPVs to imprisonment 
may otherwise have a null impact on overall recidivism.   
The next chapter will examine the dose-response impact of differential lengths of 
imprisonment among those TPVs who are in the treatment group, meaning that they were 











CHAPTER 5: STRATIFICATION MODELS OF DOSE-RESPONSE EFFECTS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter details results from propensity score stratification models intended to 
answer the second of the two primary questions examined in this study – the dose-
response effect on recidivism of longer versus shorter times incarcerated for a TPV 
violation.  The chapter proceeds first by examining baseline differences on all examined 
covariates.  Second, the results of “naïve” regression-based models are presented, 
predicting differences in recidivism by length of stay in prison for a TPV, while 
controlling for all covariates.  Following the results from the naïve regression-based 
models, results are presented from propensity score stratification (or sub-classification) 
models in order to examine recidivism outcomes across different dosages of lengths of 
stay in prison once more fully accounting for covariate differences that may predict both 
assignment to differential lengths of stay in prison and recidivism.  Propensity score 
stratification models are also presented with control group TPVs included, in order to 
examine recidivism rates between different lengths of stay in prison compared to 
recidivism rates for an alternative sanction to imprisonment for a TPV violation.  By 
comparing dosages of the treatment condition to the control condition, this ties together 
the results from the previous chapter with the results presented below.  Finally, some 
extended analysis is presented, in order to examine the robustness of the propensity score 
stratification model results under different scenarios, and also in comparison to the 





BASELINE BIVARIATE COMPARISONS 
 
Prior to examining recidivism outcomes by different lengths of stay in prison 
among TPVs, it is first important to determine whether there is significant variation 
across the distribution of length of stay in prison among important covariates that may 
predict both the length of stay in prison and recidivism itself.  If important differences 
exist, this may lead to selection bias confounding the examination of the causal impact of 
the length of stay in prison itself on recidivism.  Table 5.1 presents simple correlations 
between each of the full list of covariates examined in the previous chapter, and the 
continuously measured length of stay in prison (in months) among the treatment group of 
TPVs sanctioned to imprisonment for a first violation.  All of the same covariates 
previously examined in Chapter 4 for considering the assignment of TPVs to 
imprisonment versus an alternative sanction are also theoretically relevant predictors of 
assignment to differential length of stay in prison given a sanction to imprisonment for a 
TPV violation.   
In addition to all of the previously examined covariates, one additional covariate 
is included in the analysis in this chapter, which is relevant as a predictor of “assignment” 
to differential lengths of stay in prison.  This new covariate measures whether the TPV 
violation was adjudicated as a “No Recommit Action” (NRA).  For TPVs who are 
sanctioned to confinement in prison, they are entitled to an adjudication hearing for their 
violation within three months of being sent back to prison.  At this hearing, some TPVs 
will essentially be found “not guilty” and will be released from prison as an NRA.  NRAs 
are disproportionately represented among the shortest lengths of stay in prison, as more 
fully described below, thus relevant as a predictor of dosage to be included for 
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examination with the other covariates.  NRA status only occurs after assignment to prison 
for a TPV charge and a subsequent adjudication hearing.  Thus the NRA status did not 
precede treatment assignment to imprisonment versus an alternative sanction and was not 
included as a covariate in the previous chapter for examining the impact of imprisonment 
versus an alternative sanction for a TPV.   
Table 5.1 also presents simple correlations between each of the full set of 
covariates and the three measures of recidivism (re-arrest, re-incarceration, and overall 
recidivism).  
An examination of Table 5.1 shows that nearly half of the covariates (16 
covariates) are significantly correlated with time served in prison at p < .05.  Significant 
correlations with length of stay in prison include: offense type for the original sentence, 
the LSI-R criminal risk score, the number of prior programs participated in, whether the 
parolee was under first time parole versus having been re-paroled for a previous 
violation, the total parole supervision length, the severity of the instant technical parole 
violation, the parole district where under supervision, the supervision level, and whether 
or not the TPV charge was adjudicated as an NRA.  Parolees originally sentenced for a 
violent offense, who have a higher LSI-R criminal risk score, who have participated in 
more prior treatment programs, who have a longer parole supervision period, who have a 
high severity TPV violation, who are under a maximum supervision level, and who are 
supervised in either Allentown or Harrisburg parole district, spend significantly longer 
lengths of time in prison for a TPV violation.  Parolees originally sentenced for a drug 
offense, who are under first time parole, who have a medium severity TPV violation, who 
are under a minimum supervision level, who are supervised in either Altoona or Scranton 
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parole district, and who are adjudicated as an NRA for the TPV charge, spend 
significantly shorter lengths of time in prison for a TPV violation.  There are clearly some 
significant differences across a number of relevant covariates in the length of stay spent 
in prison for a TPV violation, with longer lengths of stay generally associated with higher 
risk parolees who are supervised more intensely and are sanctioned for a more serious 
TPV violation.   
Simple bivariate correlations between all of the covariates and the various 
recidivism measures also show some significant differences, although generally less so 
than between the covariates and the length of stay in prison examined above.  Table 5.1 
shows that between 4 and 11 of the covariates are significantly correlated with recidivism 
at p < .05, depending on the recidivism definition. Higher overall recidivism rates are 
generally associated with younger age, higher LSI-R criminal risk scores, and being 
under higher levels of parole supervision intensity.  Being supervised in the Williamsport 
parole district appears to be associated with lower overall recidivism rates.   
Similar factors are associated with re-arrest rates too.  Higher re-arrest rates are 
generally associated with younger age, being original sentenced in a Class 3 or higher 
population county, having a shorter parole supervision length, being supervised in 
Philadelphia, being under higher levels of parole supervision intensity, and being in a 
community corrections center at the time of the parole violation.  Some indication is also 
present that re-arrest rates are also associated with race.  Higher re-arrest rates are 
generally observed among black parolees, and lower re-arrest rates generally observed 
among white parolees.  Being supervised in the Scranton parole district appears to be 
associated with lower re-arrest rates.  
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Higher re-incarceration rates are generally associated with younger age, higher 
LSI-R criminal risk scores, longer parole supervision lengths, lower severity TPV 
violations, being on first time parole supervision, and being adjudicated as an NRA for 
the TPV charge.  Being supervised in the Williamsport parole district is generally 
associated with lower re-incarceration rates.    
 
NAÏVE REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING RECIDIVISM 
 
Before moving on to present the propensity score stratification models for 
recidivism rates by dosages of time served in prison, Table 5.2 shows results from 
“naïve” logistic regression models to predict recidivism, using length of stay in prison in 
its original form as a continuously measured variable, and controlling for all covariates.  
As was detailed in Chapter 3, regression-based models hold several disadvantages to 
propensity score models for adequately drawing causal inference about the treatment 
effect.  The logistic regression models presented in Table 5.2 may thus be thought of as 
naïve baseline recidivism models to compare to later propensity score models in order to 
examine if results differ once selection bias is more fully accounted for.   
The results of Table 5.2 show that overall recidivism is only associated with the 
length of time TPVs serve in prison for the 3-year follow-up rate.  A one month increase 
in the length of time a TPV is incarcerated is associated with a 2% percent reduction in 
the odds of 3-year overall recidivism (p < .05).  Neither the 1-year nor the 6-month 
overall recidivism rates are significantly associated with length of stay in prison for a 
TPV.   
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Re-arrest rates are not significantly associated with length of stay in prison for a 
TPV at any of the follow-up time periods.  The coefficients are in a positive direction 
(i.e., longer lengths of stay associated with higher re-arrest rates), but the coefficients do 
not come close to statistical significance at a conventional p-level of .05.       
Re-incarceration rates at all follow-up time periods are significantly associated 
with length of stay in prison for a TPV.  Longer lengths of stay in prison are significantly 
associated with lower re-incarceration rates at 6-month, 1-year, and 3-year follow-ups.  
For a 3-year follow-up, a one month increase in length of stay in prison is associated with 
a 3.8% reduction in the odds of re-incarceration.  For a 1-year follow-up, a one month 
increase in length of stay in prison is associated with a 2.5% reduction in the odds of re-
incarceration.  For a 6-month follow-up, a one month increase in length of stay in prison 
is also associated with a 2.5% reduction in the odds of re-incarceration.  
  
DEFINING AND COMPARING TREATMENT DOSAGES 
Defining Treatment Dosages 
While the length of stay in prison variable is measured continuously (in months) 
in the original dataset, dosage categories need to be discretized in order to proceed with 
the propensity score stratification approach used later on.  Figure 3.1 shows a histogram 
of the distribution of lengths of stay in prison in months.  Lengths of stay vary from less 
than one month to just over 45 months.  When creating dosage categories, the actual 
categorization of doses is somewhat arbitrary, with no set a priori rule for either the 
number of dosage categories or the range of data to include within each dosage category.  
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Considerations for choosing dosage categories include sample size within each dosage 
bin and practical/policy implications for the selection of dosage cut-offs.   
Also, when selecting dosage categories, consideration should be given to the 
ability to balance across all relevant covariates after propensity score calculation in the 
later stratification models.  The selection of both the number of dosage categories and the 
number of cases within each category may have an impact on the later ability to 
adequately balance groups, which is critical to the approach taken here for estimating the 
casual impact of dosage on recidivism.  In this regard, as is detailed later on in this 
chapter, a number of different dosage categorizations were attempted in order to assist 
with difficulties that occurred in achieving balance across the covariates as the analysis 
proceeded.  None of the dosage categorization approaches successfully aided in the range 
of strategies attempted in order to achieve balance.  What became clear was that two 
covariates were essentially impossible to achieve adequate balance on, and therefore, for 
reasons later described below, the treatment group sample needed to be limited on these 
two covariates before proceeding with creating dosage categories and moving on to the 
propensity score stratification analysis.  These two covariates were: 1) whether or not the 
TPV was adjudicated as an NRA, and 2) seriousness level of the TPV violation(s).  
Before proceeding with creating dosage categories, the treatment sample was limited to: 
1) those who were not adjudicated as an NRA for their TPV violation(s), and 2) only 
TPVs who received high severity violations.  Because nearly all of the NRA cases were 
at the very low end of the distribution of length of stay, and most of the treatment group 
were sanctioned to imprisonment for high severity TPV violations, the implication that 
these two limiters had on the treatment group sample size across the full distribution of 
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lengths of stay in prison was minimal.  Again, this decision of limiting the treatment 
group to non-NRAs and to high severity TPV violations is further discussed later on in 
the discussion of the propensity score stratification models.  By removing NRAs and 
limiting to high severity TPV violations, the total treatment group size decreased by 403 
(26% reduction), from n = 1,547 to n = 1,144.   
Several dosage categorizations were considered after removing NRAs and 
limiting the sample to high severity TPV violations.  Ultimately the best categorization 
for achieving the highest degree of balance across all of the covariates in later analysis, 
while also maintaining adequate sample size within each dosage bin, was to categorize 
the length of stay into quintiles of five approximately equal size dosage categories.7  The 
five dosage categories are defined as 1) 0 to 5.1 months, 2) 5.2 to 8.4 months, 3) 8.5 to 
11.8 months, 4) 11.9 to 16.3 months, and 5) 16.4 to 45.3 months. Each dosage category 
contains approximately 230 TPV cases.    
Comparing Covariates Between Dosages Before Propensity Score Stratification 
 
Once the continuously measured dosage variable (length of stay in prison) has 
been discretized into categories, it is next important to examine differences between the 
dosage categories on all of the covariates in order to determine the level of balance 
between dosage categories before proceeding with the propensity score stratification 
approach used below.  This is similar to the pre-matching balance tests which were used 
in the previous chapter before proceeding with the propensity score matching models.  
                                                 
7 Different dosage categorizations considered included: 1) four dosage categories with an equal number of 
cases in each, 2) five dosage categories of 0-3 months, 3-6 months, 6-9 months, 9-12 months, and more 
than 12 months, 3) four dosage categories of 0-6 months, 6-12 months, 12-18 months, and more than 18 
months, and 4) six dosage categories with an equal number of cases in each. 
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Table 5.3 shows comparisons across the quintiles of the length of stay dosages for all of 
the covariates.  One-way ANOVAs are used to measure statistically significant 
differences between the dosage bins for the covariates.  Similar to the differences 
identified at the beginning of this chapter when looking at the bivariate correlations 
between the continuously measured time-served variable and all of the covariates (Table 
5.1), Table 5.3 shows a significant number of differences between the lengths of stay 
dosage bins for several of the covariates.  Specifically, 10 covariates (more than one-third 
of the covariates) show statistically significant differences (p < .05) between the discrete 
categories of lengths of stay in prison.  Longer lengths of stay in prison are associated 
with parolees who were originally sentenced for a violent offense and who are serving 
longer periods of total time under parole supervision.  Shorter lengths of stay in prison 
are associated with parolees who were originally sentenced for a drug offense.  Several of 
the out of balance covariates do not vary progressively or linearly across dosage 
categories.  Interestingly, for several of the covariates, the first dosage category seems to 
differ substantially from the other four dosage categories, with the other four dosage 
categories looking fairly similar among one another.  For example, approximately 59% of 
those parolees in the lowest dosage bin are black, while the percent black in the 
remaining four higher dosage bins only varies between 41% and 45%.  Similarly, 36% of 
those in the lowest dosage bin were in a community corrections center (halfway house) at 
the time of their first TPV violation, whereas only between 21% and 27% of the parolees 
in the remaining four higher dosage bins were in a community corrections center at the 
time of their first TPV violation.  Also, approximately 37% of those in the lowest dosage 
bin were originally sentenced from Philadelphia or Pittsburgh, whereas only between 
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20% and 29% in the remaining four dosage bins were originally sentenced from 
Philadelphia or Pittsburgh.  While 27% of parolees in the lowest dosage bin were 
supervised in the Pittsburgh parole district, only between 13% and 19% of parolees in the 
remaining four dosage bins were supervised in the Pittsburgh parole district.  While 
average LSI-R risk scores show a statistically significant difference between dosage bins, 
in absolute numerical terms the LSI-R risk scores show little variation, only varying 
between 25.8 and 27.1 across dosage bins.    
Altogether, these differences between dosage levels among many of the 
covariates clearly indicate potential for selection bias, which may confound an 
assessment of the causal impact of differential lengths of stay in prison on recidivism.  
Thus, it is important to first achieve balance across these covariates before moving on to 
an assessment of the impact of imprisonment dosage on recidivism.    
Comparing Observed Recidivism Rates by Dosage before Propensity Score Stratification 
 
Before moving on to the propensity score stratification method for attempt to 
balance covariates across dosage levels, Table 5.4 presents baseline observed recidivism 
rates by each of the length of stay dosage categories.  Generally it appears that lower 
overall recidivism rates and re-incarceration rates are associated with longer lengths of 
stay.  The results are less clear for re-arrest rates.  Even among overall recidivism rates 
and re-incarceration rates, differences are minimal across the five dosage bins.  
Interestingly, similar to the pattern observed previously where covariates significantly 
differed between the lowest dosage category and the other four dosage categories, 
observed recidivism rates show somewhat of a same pattern.  For instance, the observed 
3-year overall recidivism rate in the lowest dosage category is 75.7%, but the observed 3-
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year overall recidivism rate in the four higher dosage categories were between 68.1% and 
74.3%. Similarly, when looking at observed re-arrest rates, the 3-year re-arrest rate for 
the lowest dosage category is 61.3%, whereas the 3-year re-arrest rate for the remaining 
four dosage categories varies between 55.4% and 58.6%.  Only 3-year and 1-year 
observed re-incarceration rates show a pattern resembling a linear association with length 
of stay in prison, with 3-year and 1-year re-incarceration rates showing generally a 1 to 2 
percentage point drop in re-incarceration rates across each successively higher dosage 
category of length of stay in prison.   
 
PROPENSITY SCORE STRATIFICATION MODELS 
In order to estimate the effect of length of stay in prison for a TPV violation on 
recidivism rates while more fully accounting for potential selection bias, a recent 
extension of the propensity score methodology is utilized.  This methodology, set forth 
by Zanutto et al. (2005), is referred to as a propensity score stratification (or sub-
classification) approach.  Details of the propensity score stratification approach were 
provided in Chapter 3.  
Ordinal Logit Model for Generating the Propensity Score     
Similar to the traditional propensity score methodology, a single balancing score 
(i.e., propensity score) is first generated in order to proceed with the propensity score 
stratification methodology.  However, since there are more than two treatment categories 
(i.e., multiple dosage categories), the propensity score is modeled using an ordinal 
logistic regression.  The propensity score is the likelihood, based on the distribution of 
covariates, that an individual will be in one of the treatment dosage categories.  The goal 
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is to identify an ordinal logit model which generates a propensity score distribution that 
best balances all of the covariates across the dosage categories.  As such, the modeling of 
the propensity score is an iterative process.   
During the iterative process of generating a propensity score, before removing the 
NRA parolees and limiting the cases to only parole violators who had a high severity 
TPV violation, a full ordinal logit model was first attempted using main effects for all 32 
covariates (n = 1,547).  Once a predicted propensity score was generated after running the 
ordinal logit model, the propensity score was then stratified into quintiles based on the 
propensity score distribution.  Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984) suggest that over 90% of 
bias due to covariate imbalance can be eliminated by stratifying the propensity score 
distribution into five equal sub-classes.  This is the core of the propensity score 
stratification approach. 
Balance across the covariates was then assessed using two-way ANOVAs (for 
continuously measured covariates) and logit regressions (for binary covariates), with each 
covariate as the dependent variable and the dose category and propensity score category 
as the two predictor factors.  A covariate is considered out of balance if there is a 
statistically significant main effect of the dose or a statistically significant interaction 
effect between the dose category and the propensity score quintile (Zanutto et. al., 2005).  
Balance was not achieved using main effects for the full set of 32 covariates in the 
ordinal logit model, without excluding NRAs or TPV violations other than high severity 
violations.  Since both the main effect of the dose category and the interaction effect 
between the dose category and the propensity score quintile are tested for statistical 
significance when assessing post-stratification balance, there are two statistical 
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significance tests associated with each covariate examined.  As such, when examining 32 
covariates for balance, there are in fact 64 statistical significance tests.  We can 
reasonably assume that perhaps 5% of these statistical significance tests will show 
statistically significant differences (p<.05) by chance alone.  Thus, out of 64 statistical 
significance tests, a tolerance of approximately 3.2 tests could be statistically significant 
without assuming that the full range of covariates remain out of balance post-
stratification.  Or in terms of the number of covariates, out of 32 covariates, we might 
expect 1.5 covariates to be out of balance by chance alone.  However, using main effects 
for all 32 covariates in the ordinal logit model to predict the propensity score, and before 
removing NRAs and TPV violations that are not high severity violations, 21 of the 64 
statistical significance tests showed statistically significant results (indicating lack of 
balance) post propensity score stratification.8  This translates into 12 covariates remaining 
out of balance, which is significantly higher than would be expected by chance along, 
thus indicating that the dosage categories remain poorly balanced.   
When dosage groups remain out of balance after initial propensity score 
stratification, several approaches may be utilized as part of an iterative modeling process 
in order to attempt to create a propensity score distribution that can achieve balance 
across the range of covariates after stratification.  First, as recommended by Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1984), the ordinal logit model can be improved by adding quadratic terms and 
interaction terms involving the out-of-balance covariates.  Second, the dosage categories 
can be revisited, by going back and creating more or fewer dosage categories (e.g., four 
categories, six categories, etc.), and/or by changing the cut-off points for categories or 
                                                 
8 For the dosage categories of this first model using all treatment group cases before removing NRAs and 
limiting to high severity TPV violations, a quintile of five equally sized dosage categories was utilized.  
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creating unequally sized categories rather than equally sized quintiles.  Third, the ordinal 
logit model may be over-specified with too many covariates, so a pared down set of 
covariates may be attempted.9   
All of the above strategies were attempted, in a systematic process, in order to 
improve the ordinal logit model so as to create a propensity score distribution that when 
stratified led to optimal balance across all covariates.  First, quadratic and interaction 
terms were created and added back into the ordinal logit model for all combinations of 
the 12 covariates that remained out of balance after the initial model attempt.  The best 
model after including various combinations of quadratic and interaction terms still left at 
least 5 covariates (15.6% of the covariates) out of balance.  This is significantly more 
than would be expected by chance alone.  Second, reformulation of various 
categorization of the dosage categories were attempted.  Four equally sized dosage 
categories, six equally sized dosage categories, five dosage categories with an unequal 
number of cases (0-3 months, 3-6 months, 6-9 months, 9-12 months, and more than 12 
months), and four dosage categories with an unequal number of cases (0-6 months, 6-12 
months, 12-18 months, and more than 18 months) were attempted.  Also, dropping cases 
in the sample with a length of stay of less than one month, of more than 18 months, and 
of both less than one month and more than 18 months was attempted, also using various 
combinations of quadratic and interaction terms for unbalanced covariates in addition to 
main effects for all of the covariates.  The best model among all of these combinations 
                                                 
9 It is important to note that not all of the covariates need to be used in the ordinal logit model for 
generating the propensity score, as long as later balance is assessed across all of the covariates, regardless 
of if they were used in the ordinal logit model or not.  The goal is to specify the ordinal logit model which 
will generate a predicted propensity score that when stratified into quintiles will lead to optimal balance 
across all covariates.  
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still left four covariates out of balance (12.5%), which is still more than expected by 
chance alone.  Third, the ordinal logit model was modified for possible over-
specification.  Specifically, the ordinal logit model was run with only the 12 covariates 
which remained out of balance after the initial model.  The remaining covariates were 
dropped from the ordinal logit model.  This model came close to generating balance after 
propensity score stratification, with only three covariates remaining out of balance 
(9.4%).  This is still higher than expected by chance alone.  The set of 12 covariates in 
the ordinal logit model were further adjusted, based on the three covariates which 
remained out of balance, to include quadratic and interaction terms.  This still did not 
improve balance better than three covariates remaining out of balance after propensity 
score stratification.  Further ordinal logit models were attempted, with more or less 
covariates added in or out of the model, and all sorts of different combinations of 
quadratic and interaction terms included.  This was done iteratively, by running the 
ordinal logit model, stratifying the predicted propensity score, checking for balance 
across all of the covariates, and making adjustments back in the ordinal logit model to 
covariates which remained out of balance.  At no point could a model be produced where 
less than three covariates remained out of balance, which is not of sufficient balance for 
adequately isolating and addressing potential selection bias before attempting to estimate 
the causal impact of dosage variation on recidivism. 
After the above systematic attempts to improve balance, a further exploration of 
each of the individual covariates revealed some discoveries.  First, parolees who were 
adjudicated for their TPV violation charge(s) as an NRA (i.e., essentially a “not guilty” 
finding) showed some interesting patterns. There were 286 NRAs in the full treatment 
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group sample (18.5% of the full treatment group sample).  The NRAs had very short 
lengths of stay in prison when compared against the full distribution of lengths of stay for 
the full sample of TPVs.  Approximately 79% of the NRAs fell into the first quintile of 
the length of stay dosage, meaning that they spent 2.8 months or less incarcerated.  This 
left only 21% of the NRAs in the remaining four quintiles of dosage categories, with 
most of the remaining NRAs (80%) in the next lowest quintile (i.e., between 2.9 and 6.2 
months served in prison).  Further, 77% of all of the cases in the lowest dosage category 
were NRAs, so NRAs made up the vast majority of the low dosage category.  An 
interesting pattern was also discovered when looking at observed recidivism rates for the 
NRAs.  Specifically, the observed re-incarceration rates for NRAs were significantly 
higher than for the remaining non-NRA TPVs.  For instance the 3-year re-incarceration 
rate for NRAs was 61.5%, whereas the 3-year re-incarceration rate for non-NRAs was 
45.0%.  Recidivism differences were only evident for re-incarceration rates (i.e., not for 
overall recidivism rates or re-arrest rates), but were quite dramatically different for re-
incarceration rates.  Clearly the NRAs were disproportionately composing a large percent 
of the shortest dosage category and were also showing significantly higher re-
incarceration rates.  The re-incarceration rate difference between NRAs and non-NRAs 
sets up a perfect example of why it is important to balance covariates across the 
distribution of dosages before examining the causal impact of the dosage itself on 
recidivism.  Obviously a fair amount of selection bias appears present among NRAs.  
Ideally this would be handled by balancing NRA cases across the full distribution of the 
dosage bins of lengths of stay in prison, but the problem is that there are so few NRA 
cases outside of the first dosage category, that it makes balancing on NRA status even 
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after stratification extremely difficult.  The NRA status was consistently one of the 
covariates which remained out of balance regardless of any of the approaches 
documented above for attempting to modify the ordinal logit model in order to achieve 
balance.  Thus the decision was made to attempt balancing after excluding NRA cases.  
This essentially also had the impact of changing the range of the dosage bins, since NRAs 
disproportionately represented the cases in the lowest dosage category before their 
removal.  Thus, the examination of the dose-response impact on recidivism rates is 
limited after removing NRAs, in what can be concluded about those cases at the very low 
end of the length of stay distribution.  By removing the NRAs and creating new dosage 
quintiles, the lowest dosage category essentially changes from being between 0 and 2.8 
months before removing NRAs, to between 0 and 5.1 months after removing NRAs.  
After removing NRAs, the same iterative process as was previously described was used 
in order to attempt to find an ordinal logit model which produced a predicted propensity 
score than when stratified maximized balance across all of the covariates.  Unfortunately, 
after many iterations, even removing the NRAs could not produce a model leading to 
remaining imbalance on less than three covariates.  The dosage categories thus still 
remained out of balance by more than what would be expected by chance alone.  
The second observation that was made was that the set of variables capturing the 
severity of the TPV violation for which the parolee was sanctioned to prison were 
consistently remaining out of balance as well. Three binary variables indicate the severity 
of the TPV violation: ‘Low Severity Violation’ indicates whether the TPV was a low 
severity violation, ‘Medium Severity Violation’ indicates whether the TPV was a 
medium severity violation, and ‘High Severity Violation’ indicates whether the TPV 
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violation was a high severity violation.  In most of the attempted ordinal logit models, 
‘Low Severity Violation’ was excluded as the reference category.  What was identified 
was that 89% of all of those in the full treatment group were sanctioned to imprisonment 
for a high severity TPV violation.  This was in fact previously discussed in Chapter 4 
when comparing common support between the treatment group and the control group, 
since a disproportionate percent of TPVs with high severity TPV violations are found in 
the treatment group of those sanctioned to imprisonment.  In fact, only 7 cases in the 
treatment group (less than 1% of the treatment group) were sanctioned for a low severity 
TPV violation.  While observed recidivism rates between the degrees of TPV violation 
severity did not differ substantially, and the high violation severity cases were not 
clustered at one end or another of the dosage categories like the pattern with the NRAs, 
the very low number of cases without a high violation severity in the total treatment 
group likely makes it difficult to balance across dosages for the range of TPV violation 
severity.  It was thus attempted to remove the 164 treatment group cases which were not 
for a high violation severity, thus limiting the treatment group to only high violation 
severity TPVs for the dose-response examination.  
After removing NRAs and limiting the treatment group to only high severity TPV 
violations, it then became possible to generate an ordinal logit model which achieved 
maximal balance.  In fact, balance was now achieved among all of the covariates in the 
model.  Table 5.5 presents results from the final ordinal logit regression model used to 
predict the propensity score for stratification.  The final ordinal logit model included 
main effects for 14 of the covariates, quadratic terms for two of the covariates, and six 
interaction terms between covariates.    
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Propensity Score Stratification 
 
Based on the results of the final selected ordinal logit model, a predicted 
propensity score is generated for each case in the sample.  As recommended by Zanutto 
et. al. (2005), the propensity score is then stratified (or sub-classified) into quintiles of 
five equally sized categories.  Table 5.6 shows a tabulation of the number of cases within 
each dosage (exposure) category by each of the quintiles of the propensity score 
grouping.  Also, Figure 5.1 shows histograms of the distribution of the propensity scores 
among the five dosage (exposure) categories.  Table 5.6 and Figure 5.1 show generally 
high overlap and a decent number of cases in each cell of the propensity score quintile by 
dosage quintile tabulation (n in each cell varies from 15 to 88), suggesting that the data 
will support comparisons across the five dosage categories.   
Post-Stratification Examination of Covariate Balance 
 
As discussed previously, once the sample is divided into quintiles based on the 
stratification of the propensity score generated from the ordinal logit model, it is next 
important to examine post-stratification balance.  This is evaluated using two-way 
ANOVAs (for continuously measured covariates) and logit regressions (for binary 
covariates), with each covariate as the dependent variable and the dosage category and 
propensity score quintile as the two predictors.  A covariate is considered out of balance 
if there is a statistically significant main effect of the dosage categories or a statistically 
significant interaction effect between the dosage categories and the propensity score 
quintiles.  Table 5.7 shows results from the ANOVAs and logit regressions to test post-
stratification balance for each of the covariates, and also comparing to pre-stratification 
balance for each covariate.  As is seen in Table 5.7, after propensity score stratification 
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based on the final produced ordinal logit model (see above description for iterations of 
the ordinal logit model), none of the covariates remain out of balance.  Thus, a level of 
balance at least as good as (if not better than) what would be expected by randomized 
dosage assignment is achieved, since by chance alone approximately 1 or 2 covariates 
would show imbalance at p < .05.   
Dose-Response Curves and Recidivism Rates 
Now that balance is achieved on all covariates through propensity score 
stratification, the effect of length of stay in prison on recidivism rates can be assessed by 
creating a dose-response curve.  First, the average likelihood of recidivism (using the 
various definitions of recidivism; a separate dose-response curve is generated for each 
recidivism definition) is estimated.  The average likelihood of recidivism estimate is 
simply the average recidivism rate for each dosage category, weighted by the size of the 
propensity score quintile.  These estimates are calculated as: 
 
where,  is the observed mean outcome among individuals receiving dosage level, d, in 
balancing score quintile, i.  A common estimate of the corresponding standard error 




where,  and  are the sample variance and frequency, respectively, among 
individuals in treatment dose level d in propensity score quintile i.10   
Figure 5.2 shows separate dose-response curves for each of the recidivism 
definitions and follow-up time periods (i.e., 6-month, 1-year, and 3-year overall 
recidivism, re-arrest, and re-incarceration rates).  Also, Table 5.8 provides the numerical 
outputs (average recidivism rates and standard errors) associated with the graphical 
presentation of the dose-response curves in Figure 5.2.  Overall recidivism rates generally 
show a slight downward trend with successfully longer lengths of stay in prison but some 
of the point estimates for the overall recidivism rates have associated standard errors that 
overlap across dosage categories, suggesting that the downward trend in overall 
recidivism rates may not be statistically significant.  For the 3-year overall recidivism 
rates, the lowest and highest dosage categories have associated standard errors which do 
not overlap, suggesting that the longest dosage category has a statistically significant 
lower overall recidivism rate than the shortest dosage category.  The standard error is 
wide for the longest dosage category for the 3-year overall recidivism rate though, so it 
may be that the longest dosage category is being influenced by extremely long lengths of 
stay in prison which are outliers.  This is further explored later on.  For the 1-year overall 
recidivism rates, the standard errors for all of the dosages overlap except for the highest 
dosage category, suggesting little statistically significant difference in overall recidivism 
rates between successively longer dosages except for a drop in recidivism associated with 
the longest dosage.  For 6-month overall recidivism rates, the higher four dosages appear 
                                                 
10 One note, while the standard error estimate has been found to be a reasonable approximation, as noted by 
Zanutto et al. (2005), it is not totally unbiased due to the fact that the sub-classification is based on 
propensity scores, which are estimated from the data, and the outcomes, both between and within each sub-
class, are not independent. 
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to have a significantly lower recidivism rate than the lowest dosage level, based on non-
overlapping standard errors.   
Re-arrest rates generally show a quite flat pattern across dosages of length of stay 
in prison, with no indication of statistically significant differences in re-arrest rates 
between dosage categories.  Standard errors overlap for all re-arrest rates among all three 
follow-up periods (i.e., 3-year, 1-year, and 6-month re-arrest rates).   
Re-incarceration rates generally show the clearest evidence of a downward trend 
across successfully higher dosages of lengths of stay in prison, suggesting a deterrent 
effect on re-incarceration rates for longer lengths of stay in prison.  Important to note 
though is that the standard errors for most of the re-incarceration rates are quite wide, and 
are generally larger than the standard error rates for re-arrest rates and overall recidivism 
rates.  Most of the standard errors overlap between the different dosages for the 3-year 
and 1-year re-incarceration rates.  For 6-month re-incarceration rates, the re-incarceration 
rate in the lowest dosage category is between 6.5 and 12 percentage points higher than for 
the other successively higher dosage categories, and most differences are statistically 
significant (based on non-overlapping standard errors).   
Another way to examine the impact of dosage length on recidivism rates post 
propensity score stratification is to run logistic regressions for each of the recidivism 
measures, predicting the likelihood of recidivism with treatment dose category (treated as 
continuous) and the propensity score quintile as predictors.  In addition, a two-way 
ANOVA analysis can be conducted (treating the dosage categories as ordered categorical 
data rather than continuously measured), with both treatment dosage and propensity score 
quintiles again used to predict recidivism rates based on each of the definitions of 
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recidivism.  Table 5.9 shows the results from these logit regression and ANOVA models.  
For overall recidivism rates, the logit and ANOVA models generally confirm no 
statistically significant differences in overall recidivism rates after propensity score 
stratification.  Only the 3-year overall recidivism rate based on the logit model (not for 
the ANOVA model) shows a statistically significant reduction in recidivism with 
progressively longer lengths of stay in prison at p < .05.  No statistically significant 
results are found for the 1-year or 6-month overall recidivism rates, nor for the 3-year 
overall recidivism rate based on the ANOVA model.  This generally confirms 
observations from the dose-response curves. 
For re-arrest rates, none of the logit or ANOVA models for the 3-year, 1-year, or 
6-month re-arrest rates show a statistically significant coefficient for dosage.  The p-
values for all of the re-arrest rate coefficients are far from reaching statistical 
significance, thus again confirming the visual inspection of the dose-response curves 
showing no difference in re-arrest rates by length of stay in prison. 
For re-incarceration rates, all of the logit and ANOVA models show statistically 
significant differences across dosages at p < .05, except for the 6-month re-incarceration 
rate from the ANOVA model.  These results confirm the findings from the dose-response 
curves that longer lengths of stay in prison appear to produce lower re-incarceration rates 
at all follow-up points. 
In summary, these results suggest that the effects of length of stay in prison on 
recidivism after release, prior to propensity score stratification, are confounded by pre-
existing differences between TPV violators.  Once controlled for, there is little 
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relationship between length of stay in prison and recidivism rates, except for re-
incarceration rates which are generally reduced with longer lengths of stay in prison.  
 
EXTENDED ANALYSIS 
  This chapter concludes with supplemental analyses of the propensity score 
stratification models examined above, in order to further understand and contextualize the 
findings described above.  For economy of space, and because to this point results have 
not substantially varied by the recidivism follow-up period within each measure of 
recidivism, only 3-year recidivism rates (overall recidivism, re-arrest, and re-
incarceration) are examined in the below analysis.   
Comparison of Treatment Doses to the Control Group 
The first extended analysis which is performed is to compare the recidivism rates 
of the various doses of lengths of stay in prison among the treatment group TPVs, to the 
control group of TPVs who are not sanctioned to imprisonment.  This analysis essentially 
ties together the findings from this chapter and the previous chapter (Chapter 4), by 
contextualizing dosage differences in recidivism rates within the context of recidivism 
rates for the control group of TPVs who are not sanctioned to imprisonment for a first 
TPV violation.  In order to do this, the propensity score stratification method will again 
be utilized.  This time the control group is added as the first category within the exposure 
categories.  Since the control group cases essentially represent a prison exposure time of 
0 because they are not sanctioned to imprisonment and they are thus at exposure for 
recidivism immediately, they becomes the first “dosage” category.  The treatment group 
is then stratified into quintiles exactly as performed above in the primary analysis.  There 
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are therefore now six exposure categories (1 = control group; 2 = more than 0 to 5.1 
months in prison, 3 = 5.2 to 8.4 months in prison, 4 = 8.5 to 11.8 months in prison, 5 = 
11.9 to 16.3 months in prison, and 6 = 16.4 or more months in prison).   
As with the models examined above, NRAs are excluded, and only high severity 
TPV violations are included in both the control group and the treatment group doses.  In 
addition, because the control group is so much larger than the treatment group (control 
group n = 3,269; more than two times the entire treatment group), a random sample of 
10% of the control group cases were drawn for this analysis.  Because conventional 
statistical significance tests are used to assess balance of the covariates across dosage 
categories after propensity score stratification, and because conventional statistical 
significance tests are influenced by sample size, it was virtually impossible to attain 
balance across enough of the covariates without limiting the control group sample to a 
random 10% draw, even though the absolute numerical differences across the dosage 
categories for the vast majority of the covariates were minimal.  Smaller absolute 
differences show statistical significance as sample size increases.   
The final ordinal logit model included main effects for all of the covariates, two 
quadratic terms, and five interaction terms.  After the propensity score was stratified, 
ANOVA and logit regressions run to show post-stratification balance revealed that only 
one of the covariates remained out of balance (3.4% of the covariates), which is what 
might be expected by chance alone. The remaining out of balance covariate was the total 
length of time supervised on parole (in months).  Even though the this covariate remained 
out of balance (p < .05), absolute numerical differences were generally less than 10 
months between dosage categories within each propensity score quintile.  Differences on 
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this covariate were thus minimal, even though statistically significant.  Again, this 
covariate may be out of balance by chance alone.  It is thus safe to conclude that balance 
is achieved after the best propensity score stratification model.   
Figure 5.3 presents dose-response curves comparing the control group to the five 
dosages of length of stay in prison among the treatment group.  Table 5.10 also presents 
the numerical outputs of recidivism rates and standard errors associated with the dose-
response curves. For 3-year overall recidivism, the control group recidivism rate is higher 
than the recidivism rate among all doses of lengths of stay in prison in the treatment 
group.  The control group recidivism rate is 4.6 to 11.8 percentage points higher than the 
treatment dosages.     
Re-arrest rates appear to be consistently flat between the control group and each 
of the five treatment group dosage categories.  Thus there is no evidence here that the 3-
year re-arrest rates significantly differ between the control group and any of the treatment 
dosages for a TPV violation.  The absolute value of the 3-year re-arrest rates for three of 
the treatment group dosages shows higher re-arrest rates than the control group, but again 
these differences are not statistically significant. 
Re-incarceration rates show a generally large downward trend among the 
treatment group across successively higher dosages when compared to the control group.  
All treatment group dosages show statistically significant lower 3-year re-incarceration 
rates than the control group, by between 12 and 20.5 percentage points.  None of the 
treatment group dosages except for the longest dosage show significantly different 3-year 
re-incarceration rates among one another, however, even though all are significantly 
lower than the control group. 
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Controlling For Aging and Exposure Time 
In the previous chapter, it was explored as to whether the reduced overall 
recidivism rates among the treatment group might be related more to aging and exposure 
time mechanisms rather than to deterrence mechanisms.  Recidivism follow-up for the 
control group of those sanctioned to an alternative to imprisonment begins immediately at 
the time of the sanction, given that control group sanctions involve those where the 
parolee is not securely confined and thus is at risk for potential recidivism immediately.  
On the other hand, recidivism follow-up for the treatment group only begins after the 
parolee is re-released from imprisonment.  Depending on how long the term of 
imprisonment for the TPV violation is, a parolee might age by a year or more before 
being released.  It is well established that recidivism declines with age.  Since this aging 
occurs after treatment assignment, it is not considered as a covariate to balance when 
predicting treatment assignment.  Similarly, treatment group parolees are closer to 
reaching their maximum sentence date and thus being discharged from parole 
supervision.  A large mechanism for recidivism (i.e., return to prison for a parole 
violation) is taken away once a parolee is no longer under parole supervision.  These two 
explanations were referred to in the last chapter as aging and exposure time effects, in 
contrast to a deterrent effect as deterrence is typically conceptualized in the 
criminological literature.  In the previous chapter, it was found that once controlling for 
the age at the time of the start of recidivism follow-up, and for residual supervision time 
left at the time of the start of recidivism follow-up, overall recidivism rates between the 
treatment and control groups were no longer statistically significant.  This suggests that 
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the “deterrent” impact of imprisonment might actually be largely due to an aging and 
exposure time effect.   
This similar logic applies to the current examination of the dose-response impact 
of differential lengths of stay in prison for a TPV on recidivism.  Longer lengths of stay 
in prison might show lower recidivism rates because of aging and exposure time rather 
than deterrence mechanisms.  In order to explore this possibility, covariates measuring 
the age at time of release from prison and the residual time remaining under parole 
supervision are added as predictors to the logit model generated after the primary 
propensity score stratification model presented previously, in order to predict recidivism 
rates while controlling for the propensity score quintile.  The only overall recidivism rate 
that differed significantly across dosages from the primary models presented before was 
the 3-year overall recidivism rate, based on the logit model (the 3-year overall recidivism 
rate did not show statistically significant differences based on the ANOVA model).  After 
running the logit model to control for age at time of release from prison and residual time 
under parole supervision, the dosage no longer predicts 3-year overall recidivism (p = 
.20).  Both the age at time of release (p < .01) and residual time left under parole 
supervision at the time of release (p < .01) were significant predictors of 3-year overall 
recidivism, with a shorter residual time under parole supervision and older age both 
significantly related to a lower 3-year overall recidivism rate.  None of the re-arrest 
models showed statistically significant differences across dosages of length of stay in 
prison based on the primary models previously presented.  The dosage remained 
consistently insignificant for all re-arrest rates after controlling for age at time of release 
from prison and residual time remaining under parole supervision.  Based on the logit 
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models, all three follow-up periods for re-incarceration rates showed significantly lower 
re-incarcerations rates for successively longer dosages of length of stay in prison, based 
on the primary models previously presented.  After controlling for age at time of release 
and residual parole supervision length, all three measures of re-incarceration rates no 
longer reached statistical significance (p = .016 for 3-year re-incarceration; p = .032 for 
1-year re-incarceration; p = .047 for 6-month re-incarceration).  Older age and shorter 
residual lengths of time under parole supervision at time of release from prison were once 
again significantly related to lower re-incarceration rates.  Altogether, this analysis once 
again suggests that aging and recidivism exposure time are the primary “treatment” 
mechanism at work rather than traditionally formulated deterrence.  It appears that where 
longer times in prison are related to lower recidivism rates, aging and exposure time may 
largely explain these differences.   
Censoring Outliers of Long Exposures 
As a final sensitivity analysis, it is explored whether censoring the right tail of the 
distribution of length of stays in prison, by removing very long stays in prison for a TPV, 
will generate similar or different results.  This may be another way to attempt to 
disentangle aging effects, since by removing extreme outliers of long dosages will reduce 
the extent of aging within the highest dosage category.  Currently the highest dosage 
category in the main propensity score stratification model varies from 16.4 to 45.3 
months.  This is a quite wide range of lengths of stay in prison compared to the lower 
four dosage categories.  Further, on the surface, parole violators sanctioned to 
imprisonment should likely not be spending years in prison simply for TPV violations.  
Extremely long dosages might represent outliers where criminal behavior is actually 
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present along with the technical violation(s), and yet was not identified or detected in the 
arrest records and violation data for removal from the sample.    
This analysis limits the maximum length of stay in prison to 18 months, and drops 
all cases with a length of stay of longer than 18 months in prison.  Once cases with 
lengths of stay of longer than 18 months are dropped, the dosage covariate measured 
continuously (in months) is once again discretized into quintiles of five equally sized 
dosage categories.  NRAs and low/medium severity TPV violations are once again 
dropped in order to achieve later balancing across covariates.  The new dosage categories 
are: 1 = 0 to 4.5 months; 2 = 4.6 to 7.3 months; 3 = 7.4 to 10.4 months; 4 = 10.5 to 13.4 
months; and 5 = 13.5 to 18 months.  The best fitting ordinal logit model for predicting the 
propensity score in order to stratify and achieve balance was the same model as used in 
the primary analysis above (see Table 5.5 for the covariates included in the ordinal logit 
model), including 14 main effect covariates, 2 quadratic terms, and 6 interaction terms.  
The predicted propensity score from this ordinal logit model was then stratified, and post-
stratification balance was assessed.  Only one covariate remained out of balance at p < 
.05, which is still better than chance alone.  The one remaining covariate out of balance 
was the total parole supervision length.  While out of balance at p < .05, the absolute 
numerical differences across dosage categories in average parole supervision lengths 
varied minimally, with a maximum difference of 10 months in the average parole 
supervision lengths between dosage categories across propensity score quintiles.  It is 




Figure 5.4 presents the dose-response curves for the 3-year recidivism rates for 
the five dosage categories after limiting the sample only to doses under 18 months.  Table 
5.11 also presents the numerical outputs of 3-year recidivism rates and standard errors 
associated with the dose-response curves.  For 3-year overall recidivism, only the first 
dosage has non-overlapping standard errors with other dosages.  Otherwise the 3-year 
overall recidivism rates are fairly flat across dosages, with overlapping standard errors. 
Logit regression and ANOVA models, controlling for the propensity score quintile, show 
non-significant differences between dosages (p = .268 for logit; p = .416 for ANOVA).   
For 3-year re-arrest rates, no statistically differences are identified between 
dosages, and re-arrest rates remain remarkably flat across lengths of stay in prison  To 
confirm this, logit regression and ANOVA models, controlling for the propensity score 
quintile, show non-significant differences between dosages (p = .771 for logit; p = .792 
for ANOVA). 
For 3-year re-incarceration rates, the re-incarceration rates are more flat across 
lengths of stay in prison by dropping cases with a length of stay above 18 months, when 
compared to the main models presented earlier, except for the longest dosage category 
(13.5 to 18 months).  However, logit regression and ANOVA models, controlling for the 
propensity score quintile, still show statistically significant differences between dosages 
(p = .004 for logit; p = .026 for ANOVA).  These statistically significant differences from 
the logit and ANOVA equations appear to be influenced by the highest dosage category 
(13.5 to 18 months).  The re-incarceration rate for the highest dosage category is 35%, 
whereas the re-incarceration rates for the lower four dosage categories range from 45.1% 
to 51.7%.  Other than this drop in re-incarceration rate from the fourth to the fifth dosage 
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category, the dose-response curve in Figure 5.4 shows a fairly flat re-incarceration rate 
between doses.   
To summarize, results do not substantially differ by removing cases with more 
than 18 months in prison for a TPV.  There appears to be some influence on re-
incarceration rates, leading to slightly flatter re-incarceration rates than were seen in the 
main models previously presented, but otherwise very little difference. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the dose-response impact of differential lengths of stay in 
prison for a first TPV violation on recidivism rates post-release.  In order to address 
selection bias impacting the assignment to differing lengths of stay in prison for a TPV 
violation, a recent extension of the propensity score modeling approach was utilized – the 
propensity score stratification approach (Zanutto et al., 2005).  Before propensity score 
stratification, balance was assessed among a large set of covariates that are theoretically 
relevant for impacting the assignment of differing lengths of stay in prison for a TPV 
violation.  By examining simple bivariate correlations between each of the covariates and 
the continuously measured length of stay in prison (measured in months), approximately 
half of the covariates showed statistically significant correlations with length of stay in 
prison.  After creating discrete dosage categories (quintiles) of length of stay in prison, 
and running logit and ANOVA models to examine pre-propensity score stratification 
balance, approximately one-third of the covariates were out of balance.  Clearly there 
exists a potentially large degree of selection bias in assignment to differential lengths of 
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stay in prison for a TPV violation, which may confound examination of the causal impact 
of exposure time (i.e., length of stay in prison) on recidivism.   
Naïve logit regression models predicting recidivism rates using continuously 
measured length of stay in prison while controlling for all the other covariates, showed 
that the 3-year overall recidivism rate was significantly lower for longer lengths of stay in 
prison.  No statistically significant association between length of stay in prison and re-
arrest rates were identified from the naïve regression models.  Contrarily, lower re-
incarceration rates at all follow-up time periods were statistically significantly associated 
with longer lengths of stay in prison.   
When proceeding to propensity score stratification, it became extremely difficult 
to balance the set of covariates across dosage categories.  It was observed that a very 
large percent of the full treatment group were sanctioned for high severity TPV 
violations, and a very large percent of those cases in the lowest dosage category were re-
released under a ‘No Recommit Action” (NRA) status.  Nearly all of the NRAs were in 
the lowest dosage category.  Further, NRA’s had significantly higher re-incarceration 
rates.  Propensity score stratification was thus attempted after removing NRAs and 
low/medium severity TPV violations from the full treatment group.  After removing 
NRAs and low/medium TPV violations, balance was achieve on all of the covariates.  
After removing NRAs and low/medium severity TPV violations, five dosage categories 
of lengths of stay in prison were created, which roughly equated to 0-5 months, 5-8.5 
months, 8.5-12 months, 12-16 months, and more than 16 months. 
After propensity score stratification, overall recidivism rates appeared to drop 
slightly with progressively longer lengths of stay in prison, but these differences were 
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generally not statistically significant.  Re-arrest rates were remarkably flat across 
progressive doses of length of stay in prison, showing no statistical differences.  Re-
incarceration rates trended downwards with progressively longer lengths of stay in 
prison, with mixed but stronger evidence that this downward trend was statistically 
significant.  Crossover in standard errors for some of the doses in the dose-response 
curves for re-incarceration rates showed no statistically significant differences, but logit 
and ANOVA models predicting re-incarceration rates controlling for propensity score 
stratification showed statistically significant differences, with lower re-incarceration rates 
resulting from longer lengths of stay in prison.  It is important to note that these results 
can only be generalized to TPVs who were sanctioned to imprisonment for their first high 
severity TPV violation(s), and who were not adjudicated as a NRA upon being sent to 
prison.   
This chapter concluded with several extension analyses.  One such extension was 
to compare imprisonment dosages among the treatment group, to the control group of 
those who were not sanctioned to imprisonment for a first TPV.  Propensity score 
stratification was again utilized, with the control group representing the lowest “dosage” 
category.  Results showed mixed evidence of differences between the control group and 
the treatment group dosages for overall recidivism rates, with some evidence that short 
and medium term lengths of stay in imprisonment for a TPV produced lower 3-year 
overall recidivism rates than the control group of those not sanctioned to imprisonment.  
No differences were identified between the control group and the treatment group doses 
based on re-arrest rates.  Re-incarceration rates were generally 12 to 20.5 percentage 
153 
 
points lower for all of the treatment group doses when compared to the control group of 
those not sanctioned to imprisonment.  
Another extended analysis was conducted to examine the degree to which aging 
and exposure time mechanisms might explain some of the apparent lower recidivism 
rates for longer lengths of stay in prison.  From all of the previous models, it appeared 
that longer lengths of stay in prison deterred TPV violators from recidivating, at least 
when considering re-incarceration as a measure of recidivism.  No evidence of deterrence 
was present based on re-arrest rates though.  One factor related to re-incarceration rates is 
that it is heavily influenced by the residual length of time remaining under parole 
supervision.  Revocation for a parole violation is a major contributor to re-incarceration 
rates, which is not possible once a parolee finishes the period of parole supervision.  
After controlling for age at time of release from prison and the residual parole 
supervision length at time of release from prison, re-incarceration rates were no longer 
statistically significantly related to length of stay in prison.  This suggests that the mixed 
evidence possibly suggesting a deterrent effect on re-incarceration rates for longer 
lengths of stay in prison from the primary models, may in fact not represent deterrence 
mechanisms as traditionally formulated, but may instead reflect aging and exposure time 
mechanisms.   
Finally, a sensitivity analysis was performed to see if the primary recidivism 
results held after removing cases with longer lengths of stay in prison (lengths of stay in 
prison longer than 18 months).  The conclusions from these models confirmed all of the 
findings from the primary analysis, with very little differences identified.  The downward 
trend in re-incarceration rates for longer lengths of stay in prison flattened out somewhat 
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after removing doses higher than 18 months, perhaps providing more confirming 
evidence that aging mechanisms might be at work.  Overall recidivism rates and re-arrest 
rates remained unchanged. 
Overall, there is little evidence that longer lengths of stay in prison for a TPV 
violation lead to appreciably lower recidivism rates.  Especially for re-arrest rates, it 
appears that lengths of stay in prison for less than 5 months have the same impact on 
recidivism as lengths of stay in prion of more than 15 months.   
Chapter six concludes with a further discussion of findings and policy 
implications from the results of both this chapter and the previous chapter.  Chapter six 
also outlines limitations of the current study, and provides recommendations for future 















CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
REVISITING STUDY MOTIVATION 
A natural result of nearly four decades of build-up of the U.S prison population is 
that an increasingly large number of inmates are now finishing their prison term and 
being released back to the community.  One mechanism for managing this transition of a 
large number of inmates from prison to the community is through conditional release to 
parole supervision.  In addition to being monitored for a return to criminal behavior, 
those under parole supervision are also subject to various supervision conditions which 
do not constitute criminal behavior if broken, but can nonetheless result in sanctioning up 
to a return to prison when violated.  Parole violators who break these supervision 
conditions are typically referred to as technical parole violators (TPVs). 
In many states, TPVs represent a significant percent of state prison admissions, 
and a significant contributor to prison population.  As states look for ways to contain 
prison costs and reduce prison population, they are increasingly revisiting the use of 
imprisonment for TPVs.  Several states have greatly reduced the number of TPVs 
returned to prison, or eliminated the use of imprisonment as an option for TPV 
sanctioning altogether.  One concern with this approach is that virtually no research exists 
to inform whether specifically sanctioning TPVs to prison has a deterrent, null, or 
criminogenic effect on subsequent recidivism. While a larger body of literature 
examining the overall impact of incarceration on recidivism has mostly concluded that 
imprisonment has a null or even slightly criminogenic effect, this overall finding is not 
necessarily generalizable to all sub-populations within the prison population.  Strong 
theoretical cases can be made each way, for the impact on recidivism of incarcerating 
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TPVs.  Reducing the use of imprisonment for TPVs might be penny wise but pound 
foolish if indeed imprisonment deters recidivism among TPVs.  Conversely, if 
imprisonment of TPVs has a null or criminogenic effect on recidivism, reducing the use 
of incarceration in response to TPVs can reduce prison spending and prison population 
while at the same time not jeopardizing (and perhaps even enhancing) public safety. 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This dissertation examined two primary questions in response to the above set of 
issues.  The first question examined was whether sanctioning TPVs to imprisonment 
versus any other alternative sanction for a first violation has a deterrent, null, or 
criminogenic effect on subsequent recidivism.  The bulk of the evidence supports the 
conclusion that recidivism rates are mostly lowered by using incarceration in response to 
TPV violations.  Overall recidivism rates appear to be reduced by 5 to 6 percentage 
points when TPVs are sanctioned to imprisonment versus another alternative.  Lower 
overall recidivism rates for TPVs sanctioned to imprisonment are especially influenced 
by lower re-incarceration rates for TPVs sanctioned to imprisonment.  In fact re-arrest 
rates are mostly unaffected by the mode of sanctioning (prison vs. an alternative sanction) 
for TPVs.  Some possible reasons for this difference in findings between re-incarceration 
rates and re-arrest rates are discussed further below.  It should be noted too that this 
finding is not generalizable to all TPVs.  The study focused on sanctioning in response to 
the first instance of a TPV violation after initial release from prison onto parole.  Parolees 
who committed a new crime after initial release from prison were not included, nor were 
repeat TPV violators.  Further, findings were mostly limited in comparability to higher 
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risk TPVs who were supervised more intensely on parole and who committed a technical 
violation that was considered more serious.  Finally, while overall recidivism rates appear 
to be lowered among first time high risk TPVs sanctioned to imprisonment, evidence was 
found to suggest that the specific mechanism for lowering recidivism rates among 
incarcerated TPVs is largely attributable to aging and exposure time rather than to 
deterrence.  Further discussion of this finding is also provided below.   
The second question examined in this study was the impact on recidivism of 
differential lengths of stay in prison among those TPVs sentenced to imprisonment for a 
first violation.  This type of investigation is often referred to as an investigation into the 
“dose-response” effect of imprisonment on recidivism.  The findings here are more 
mixed, but suggest somewhat lowered recidivism rates attributable to longer lengths of 
stay in prison for a TPV violation, yet with contingencies.  The effect sizes are generally 
smaller and in some cases statistically insignificant for the impact of longer lengths of 
stay in prison on recidivism, when compared to the effect sizes for the impact of 
imprisonment itself versus an alternative sanction.  When recidivism is measured by re-
arrest rates, the evidence suggests no impact at all of differential lengths of stay in prison.  
When directly comparing TPVs sanctioned to an alternative sanction to TPVs sanctioned 
to varying lengths of stay in prison, recidivism rates look more similar among different 
lengths of stay in prison than between any time in prison versus an alternative to prison.  
Finally, where evidence existed that recidivism rates were lowered by longer periods of 
incarceration for a TPV, it again appears that the particular mechanism for this recidivism 
reduction is largely aging and a reduced recidivism exposure time rather than 
traditionally formulated deterrence mechanisms.  It should again be noted that these 
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findings are limited in their generalizability to first-time, high severity TPV violations.  
Further, TPVs sent to prison who were adjudicated “not guilty” of the TPV and re-
released (i.e., NRAs) were excluded from the dose-response analysis.  Practically 
speaking, this means that the analysis can say very little about the impact on recidivism 
of extremely short lengths of stay in prison for a TPV violation. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES OF THE STUDY 
One of the primary difficulties that this study had to wrestle with was attempting 
to draw causal conclusions about the impact of incarceration on recidivism among TPVs.  
Chapter 4 and 5 presented evidence that there were significant pre-existing differences 
across a large set of relevant covariates between TPVs sanctioned to imprisonment versus 
an alternative sanction, and between TPVs sanctioned to longer versus shorter periods of 
confinement in prison for a TPV violation.  This evidence shows that TPVs sanctioned to 
imprisonment, and for longer periods of imprisonment, tend to be higher risk parolees 
who are supervised more intensely and who are sanctioned for a more severe technical 
violation.  These pre-existing differences can affect both the sanctioning assignment and 
the recidivism outcome, leading to significant selection bias which confounds the ability 
to directly tie the impact of the “treatment” itself (i.e., imprisonment vs. an alternative 
sanction; varying lengths of imprisonment) to the outcome (i.e., recidivism).  Ideally a 
prospective randomized controlled trial would be used to examine the questions in this 
study, where TPVs are randomly assigned to imprisonment versus an alternative 
sanction, and, conditional upon being sanctioned to imprisonment, randomly assigned to 
varying lengths of imprisonment.  This was unfortunately not possible here (or likely 
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anywhere), so this study was left with observational data in order to attempt to draw 
causal conclusions about the impact of imprisonment among TPVs. 
This study made use of a relatively robust quasi-experimental approach for 
attempting to draw a causal inference about the impact of imprisonment among TPVs.  
Propensity score methods provide several advantages to non-experimental regression-
based methods in addressing selection bias.  Most important for this study, propensity 
score methods facilitate creating a more convincing counterfactual by: a) focusing 
analysis only on the subset of cases within both the treatment and control groups that 
demonstrate sufficient overlap in the distribution of the covariates that predict treatment 
assignment, and b) facilitating balance through the use of a propensity score between the 
matched treatment and control groups over many observed covariates affecting treatment 
assignment.  By focusing only on comparable cases within the treatment and control 
groups which have sufficient overlap in the distribution of relevant covariates predicting 
treatment assignment, propensity score models estimate a quantity known as the Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT).  By contrast, regression-based models estimate 
an overall Population Average Treatment Effect (PATE).  Regression-based models 
ignore the concern of whether there is sufficient overlap between the treatment and 
control groups, and thus can lead to conclusions being drawn which are outside of the 
range of comparable cases.  This produces less convincing counterfactuals, and is also 
less useful (and possibly misleading) for understanding the policy-relevant group for 
which results can be accurately generalized to.   
In this regard, this study benefited from propensity score modeling by generating 
a better understanding of the group of TPVs who can accurately be compared to TPVs 
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who are sanctioned to imprisonment, an understanding that regression-based models 
overlook.  It was found that there was a relatively large group of first time TPVs who 
were sanctioned to an alternative sanction with very little probability of ever receiving a 
sanction to imprisonment based on observed covariates predicting sanctioning 
assignment, and that these control group cases did not have similar cases within the 
treatment group (i.e., cases with a low probability of being sanctioned to imprisonment 
even though they were in fact sanctioned to imprisonment).  Further, there was a smaller 
group of cases who were sanctioned to imprisonment and were in fact almost guaranteed 
to be sanctioned to imprisonment based on their very high predicted propensity for 
receiving an imprisonment sanction, and this group had no comparable cases within the 
control group.  Propensity score matching thus aided a causal inference by focusing the 
analysis on cases demonstrating “common support”, so that there is a clearer 
understanding of exactly what group of TPVs the findings on the causal impact of 
imprisonment may be generalizable to.  The conclusion here was essentially that the 
results of this study can be generalized primarily to high risk TPVs who are supervised at 
a more intense level and who commit a relatively more serious TPV violation.  Further, 
the results are most applicable to comparisons primarily between imprisonment and non-
secure residential sanctioning options like inpatient treatment or a non-secure halfway 
house.  Lower level sanctions are less comparable to imprisonment.  This is important 
context for the conclusions of this study, which was facilitated by the use of the 
propensity score methodology.  
One flip side to this, however, is that the population for which the ATT effect size 
can be generalized may become so small and limited in scope that it loses policy 
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relevance.  Some might consider the population average effect size to be the more 
interesting and policy relevant effect size to estimate.  Unfortunately there is a trade-off 
here between methodological rigor and generalizability.  It might be desirable to be able 
to generalize the results of this study to the full population of TPVs facing a sanction.  
Notwithstanding, the ATT effect size seems quite policy relevant from a specific 
deterrence standpoint here, since the treated population in this study represents a 
significantly large share of parolees, and since it focuses in on the group of TPVs for 
which imprisonment would actually be seriously considered as a sanctioning response 
while ignoring TPVs with no real likelihood of being sanctioned to imprisonment.    
This study also benefitted from the propensity score methodology by making use 
of a relatively new and innovative extension of the propensity score framework in order 
to examine the question of the dose-response impact of imprisonment.  The propensity 
score stratification approach (Zanutto et al., 2005) is relatively new to criminology, but 
proved useful to this study for building upon the previously mentioned benefits of 
propensity score matching while also accommodating a situation which traditional 
propensity score matching is not designed to handle.  Specifically, traditional propensity 
score matching is only designed for examining a binary treatment assignment situation 
where cases are assigned to either a treatment or control group, yet the second question of 
this study (i.e., the dose-response question) involved a continuously measured treatment 
variable of the length of stay in prison (in months).  The propensity score stratification 
approach is an extension of the propensity score methodology, for situations with a 
continuously measured or multi-categorical measured treatment variable.  It is hoped that 
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this study will encourage further use of the propensity score stratification approach within 
criminological research.   
One final interesting observation from the methodology used to answer the 
questions in this study is that regression-based models essentially produced the same 
results as the propensity score models.  In the analysis used to answer each of the two 
primary questions in this study, the analysis first started with what was termed a “naïve” 
regression model, and then proceeded to the primary propensity score models.  In both 
cases, the naïve regression-based models generated similar findings to the propensity 
score models, although in the case of the dose-response question the evidence of lowered 
recidivism rates associated with longer imprisonment terms was weaker and less 
consistent in the propensity score models than in the naïve regression models.  It might be 
tempting to conclude from this that there was no added benefit to using the propensity 
score models given that they largely came to the same conclusion as the regression-based 
models.  However the discussion above about the generalizability of the results is 
important to keep in mind.  By focusing on estimating the ATT effect, the propensity 
score models had the added benefit of clarifying exactly for whom the results of the study 
can be generalized to.  This benefit should not be overlooked, and is important for 
moving to policy discussions of what exactly may be done with the findings from this 





Aging and Exposure Time 
This study set out to determine whether there is a deterrent, null, or criminogenic 
effect of sanctioning TPVs to imprisonment.  In a sense, the conclusion of the study is 
“none of the above.”  While the direction of the effect sizes tended to favor a conclusion 
of a deterrent impact of imprisonment, further analysis suggested that the “treatment” 
effect was probably less due to deterrence as has been traditionally formulated, and more 
due to an aging and a recidivism exposure time effect.  One inherent limitation of studies 
on the impact of incarceration, which has been previously noted in research on the dose-
response impact of incarceration in general (see Nagin et al., 2009; Snodgrass et al., 
2011), is that it is not possible to completely disentangle the elements of the “treatment 
effect” of imprisonment in order to separate the contribution of deterrence from aging.  
Aging is of course perfectly correlated with the length of incarceration, but both 
deterrence and aging may be thought of as components of the “treatment” of 
incarceration itself.  While impossible to completely disentangle aging from deterrence, 
this is an important issue that should not simply be overlooked.  Unfortunately this issue 
has been mostly overlooked in previous research on the general dose-response impact of 
imprisonment.  As Nagin et al. (2009) note in their review of the existing studies on the 
general dose-response impact of incarceration, all of the 19 studies that they reviewed 
suffered from a methodological weakness of failing to account for the impact of aging on 
recidivism.   
While again impossible to fully address, this study has made an effort to 
overcome the limitation of previous dose-response studies by at least raising the issue of 
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aging and attempting as best as possible to separate the impact of aging versus 
deterrence.  In addition to aging, differential recidivism exposure time was also explored 
in this study.  In terms of aging, since exposure time for recidivism did not begin until re-
release from imprisonment, those sanctioned to imprisonment for a TPV, and those 
sanctioned to longer terms of imprisonment for a TPV, were thus older in biological age 
at the time of re-release from prison.  In terms of recidivism exposure time, TPVs 
sanctioned to imprisonment and sanctioned to longer terms of imprisonment had less 
residual time left to serve under parole supervision at the beginning of their recidivism 
exposure (i.e., at the time of their re-release from prison).  This is important because 
those under parole supervision are subject to a major and prevalent mechanism of 
recidivism that those no longer under parole supervision are no longer subject to, which 
is re-incarceration for a technical parole violation.  The prevalence of re-incarceration for 
technical parole violations was in fact a major motivating factor for this study to begin 
with.  Once parolees finish their parole supervision term, they can only be returned to 
imprisonment through the court system for a new crime, and can no longer be returned to 
imprisonment for a technical violation.  Thus those serving longer lengths of stay in 
prison should have lower re-incarceration rates (especially at longer follow-up periods) 
simply because they have less of a chance to be returned for a technical violation since 
they are ending their supervision terms earlier.  This is indeed what this study found.  
Recall that lower recidivism rates for imprisonment (and for longer terms of 
imprisonment) were found when measuring recidivism by re-incarceration but not when 
measuring recidivism by police re-arrest.  Further, after propensity score modeling, both 
chapters used regression models among the matched (or stratified) samples, in order to 
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examine the impact of the treatment assignment on overall recidivism after controlling 
for the aging and recidivism exposure time (i.e., the age at time of re-release from prison 
and the residual time left under parole supervision at the time of re-release from prison).  
In both instances it was found that imprisonment and longer lengths of imprisonment 
were no longer correlated with overall recidivism when controlling for aging and 
exposure time.  Both aging and exposure time were statistically significant predictors of 
overall recidivism, however.  Together this suggests that aging and exposure time were 
the primary mechanism at work for the treatment effect of imprisonment for TPVs.   
It is sometimes said in corrections circles that the most effective treatment 
program that we have is age.  There is of course a tradition in criminological theory 
which would support this assertion as well (e.g., Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990).  Using 
imprisonment to generate an aging effect will look very different than using 
imprisonment for a deterrent effect.  Treatment through aging (and reducing recidivism 
exposure time) is mostly pessimistic about the criminal justice system’s ability to 
meaningfully and directly affect offender behavioral change, whereas treatment through 
deterrence is more optimistic in this regard.  Treatment through aging basically holds that 
the passage of time itself will take care of reducing future recidivism, and that younger 
parolees need simply to “catch up” in age in order for their propensity for recidivism to 
be reduced.  For an aging impact, there is very little left for the correctional system to do 
but to wait.   
On the other hand, specific deterrence is a process by which offenders are 
expected to learn from the punishment itself in a way that will alter their future 
calculation of the cost of recidivism such that any benefit of re-offending is perceived as 
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no longer worth the cost.  Deterrence may even come in the positive form of 
rehabilitation programming, whereby the weighing of costs and benefits of returning to 
offending is altered by impacting fundamental internal change within the offender 
through programming.   
If aging and reduced recidivism exposure time are the primary mechanisms 
generating lower recidivism rates among TPVs who are incarcerated, then this would 
suggest that there is little else for a correctional system to do but to incapacitate/house 
TPVs in prison for an appropriate amount of time until they have “aged” to a point of a 
lowered recidivism probability.  However, at this point the cost of incarceration must be 
considered.  Incarceration is a very expensive option for simply providing a constraining 
environment for violators to pass time until reaching an appropriate age.  It should be 
considered that it may be possible to incapacitate TPVs in an alternative environment 
until “aging” occurs, so that similar recidivism outcomes are observed once aging has 
occurred.  In other words, say that a TPV violator is placed under house arrest with a 
GPS ankle bracelet for 6 months, instead of being incarcerated for 6 months.  At the end 
of the 6 month period, if the violator is effectively incapacitated from re-offending during 
the 6 month period via house arrest, does the recidivism probability after house arrest 
then look similar to that of the violator who spent that same 6 month period incarcerated 
in prison?  The findings from this study suggest that this may indeed be the case, since 
recidivism rates were no longer significantly different between treatment and control 
group conditions once controlling for aging and recidivism exposure time.  If so, there is 
a potentially large cost advantage of using a cheaper setting than imprisonment (e.g., 
house arrest with GPS monitoring).  The ability of an alternative sanction other than 
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incarceration to effectively incapacitate is an important contingency though, one that will 
be discussed further below.    
Deterrence 
While the conclusion of this study was that deterrence was largely not responsible 
for lower recidivism rates among TPVs sanctioned to imprisonment, it is important to 
note that this does not provide evidence that deterrence through the use of imprisonment 
in response to TPVs cannot work.  Rather, it suggests that deterrence is not currently a 
primary mechanism at work under the TPV sanctioning regime currently in operation 
within the Pennsylvania parole system.  As is well noted in the existing research 
literature, there are three primary components of deterrence: 1) the certainty of detection 
for a violation and of sanctioning given detection, 2) the swiftness of sanctioning for a 
violation, and 3) the severity of sanctioning for a violation.  The general literature on 
deterrence has found that swiftness and certainty matter much more than the severity of 
the sanction.  It may well be that sanctioning for a TPV in Pennsylvania’s currently 
operating parole system is not delivered with a high degree of certainty or swiftness, and 
that if the system could be changed to increase the certainty and swiftness of sanctioning 
then a significant deterrent effect of imprisonment might be detected.  This study was not 
able to provide any measure of the degree of certainty and swiftness of sanctioning in 
response to TPV violations.  If Pennsylvania’s parole system operates like most other 
parole systems around the country, however, it is likely not set up to produce a high 
degree of certainty or swiftness in sanctioning.  The typical parole system is often under 
immense pressure to resist sanctioning parole violators to imprisonment due to prison bed 
constraints, and parole systems often lack the resources to respond certainly and quickly 
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to all violations as well.  Some evidence of this can be seen in the data for this current 
study, given that the modal type of sanction for a TPV violation is by far a written 
warning.  While a written warning is considered a TPV sanction within the Pennsylvania 
parole violator sanctioning continuum, a case could be made that in fact a written 
warning is not a sanction at all, but instead is a warning of a sanction promised in the 
future.  So the observation that a written warning is the most frequent type of sanction in 
response to a TPV suggests that violators may be warned repeatedly without a credible 
sanction being delivered.  This may serve to minimize the consistency (the certainty) and 
swiftness of sanctioning for TPV violations.  There is emerging evidence from 
supervision models like the Hawaii HOPE model (Kleiman, 2009) that when the certainty 
and swiftness of sanctioning in response to technical violations are increased, short 
periods of confinement can lead to a rather large deterrent effect on recidivism.    
Another contingency to the conclusion of little to no deterrent effect of 
incarceration here is that procedural justice research suggests that sanctioning must be 
perceived as fair in order to deter.  It may also be the case that in this particular example 
(i.e., parole supervision in Pennsylvania), the parole sanctioning system is not perceived 
by parolees as being fair.  This in fact goes along with the certainty and swiftness of 
sanctioning, in that if sanctioning is not consistent it may ultimately be viewed as 
arbitrary and thus less procedurally fair.  This study provides no evidence of the degree of 
perceived legitimacy of the TPV sanctioning process in Pennsylvania.   
In summary, when a particular treatment is found not to work, the important next 
question to ask is whether it can’t work at all or rather is simply not currently designed to 
work.  What policy decisions to make will differ based on the answer to this question.  In 
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the case of this study it is concluded that imprisonment in response to a TPV violation in 
Pennsylvania is not generating a large deterrent effect, so one question for future 
exploration is why.  If a deterrent effect is not being detected because it can’t exist, then 
policy makers should stop using imprisonment in response to TPVs based on the 
justification of deterrence alone.  If a deterrent effect is not being detected because the 
system isn’t currently set up to facilitate one, then the policy response for consideration is 
how to re-engineer the supervision and sanctioning regiment so that a deterrent effect can 
be realized.  A cost-benefit calculation should also accompany this.  The goal should be 
to provide the maximum optimal deterrent effect from the sanction, while minimizing the 
costs resulting from the sanction.  A deterrent effect might be possible through the use of 
incarceration, but the benefit might not be enough to outweigh the significant cost of 
incarceration in comparison to a less restrictive option.  These are the policy relevant 
factors that should be considered.     
Recidivism Measures 
Another important point of discussion from the findings of this study is around 
the differences in outcomes found when using different measures of recidivism.  Recall 
that imprisonment for a first TPV was found to produce significantly lower re-
incarceration rates, but no differences in re-arrest rates.  Since re-incarceration largely 
reflects a return to prison for technical violations, which generally are not new crimes, it 
may be tempting to conclude that imprisonment for a first TPV reduces subsequent 
technical violations but does not reduce new crime, since re-arrest rates are unaffected.  
To be sure, this may indeed be the case.  If this were the case, it would seem that public 
safety is not significantly enhanced by the use of incarceration in response to TPVs.  If 
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new criminal activity is not reduced through the use of incarceration, then it might be 
concluded that a higher rate of technical violations coming from using alternative 
sanctions to imprisonment is worth the cost in order to benefit from the cheaper and less 
restrictive sanctioning environment presented by alternatives to imprisonment.   
It cannot necessarily be concluded from these findings, however, that lower re-
incarceration rates but re-arrest rates that are not lower means no reduction in criminal 
activity by returning TPVs to imprisonment.  The reason this cannot be concluded is two-
fold.  First, some proportion of cases which are re-incarcerated are indeed returned to 
prison for charges of new criminal behavior. Not all of re-incarceration is for technical 
violations.  In some instances this happens when a parolee is first re-arrested for a 
criminal charge and then re-incarcerated.  Such a case would be counted in both the re-
arrest measure and the re-incarceration measure.  In fact nearly half of all of the re-
incarceration instances in this study (48%) were first preceded by an arrest incident, 
suggesting that nearly half of those re-incarcerated were first re-arrested for a new 
criminal charge.  Another scenario is that a parolee is caught by his or her parole agent 
with a charge of criminal activity, but the parole department decides to handle the 
criminal charges internally or directly with the court rather than turning over to the 
police.  In this situation the parolee would not be counted in the re-arrest measure, but 
would be counted in the re-incarceration measure with a charge of a new crime.  In either 
situation, re-incarceration can certainly capture new criminal behavior.   
The second reason that lower re-incarceration rates but not lower re-arrest rates 
cannot necessarily be equated with a null impact of imprisonment on criminal behavior is 
that even if re-incarceration rates did completely represent recidivism for technical parole 
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violations, it may be the case that re-incarcerating technical violators anticipates and 
prevents criminal recidivism.  This explanation fits within a “broken windows” type of 
model, where minor violations and disorder are precursors to more serious crime.  Thus, 
while lower re-incarceration rates may primarily (or only) directly reduce recidivism for 
technical violations, there may be an indirect benefit of incapacitating technical violators 
before they have the chance to return to more serious criminal behavior.  
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
  Direct policy implications are a bit difficult to draw from this study given the 
contingencies and limitations in generalizability of the results found here.  In general, the 
primary policy conclusion appears to be that once adjusting for aging and recidivism 
exposure time, the use of imprisonment (and longer periods of imprisonment) in response 
to first-time, high risk TPVs mostly has a null impact on subsequent recidivism.  The 
empirical basis for using imprisonment in response to TPVs in order to specifically deter 
future recidivism is thus weak.  Therefore, within the given context of this study, the use 
of imprisonment in response to TPV violations should not be justified on specific 
deterrence grounds.  Arguments might be made for the use of imprisonment as a response 
to TPV violations on the basis of incapacitation or general deterrence grounds, but this 
study did not directly examine either of these two types of impacts and thus cannot speak 
to their hypothetical benefits.  Also important to note is that it should not be implied from 
this study that imprisonment in response to TPVs cannot possibly serve a specific 
deterrent role.  Based on the contingencies outlined in this chapter, it is certainly possible 
that under different circumstances (e.g., increased swiftness and certainty in responses to 
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violations) the use of imprisonment may serve a specific deterrent role among TPVs.  It 
can only be said from this study that within the specific context of the study it does not 
appear that a specific deterrent impact currently exists.  It is thus imperative for those 
policymakers working within the policy environment where this study was conducted 
(i.e., within parole supervision in Pennsylvania as it currently exists) that the full range of 
the costs of imprisonment in response to TPVs be considered.  Since the use of 
imprisonment cannot be justified on specific deterrence grounds, the question is whether 
the cost of using imprisonment in response to TPVs can be justified on other grounds 
such as based on general deterrence or incapacitation.  Also, Pennsylvania policymakers 
should take stock of the current supervision approach in order to see how important 
contingencies such as the swiftness, certainty, and perceived fairness of sanctioning 
might be modified in order to realize a specific deterrent effect from the use of 
imprisonment among TPVs.               
       
LIMITATIONS 
A few limitations of this study should be noted.  The primary limitation is the 
generalizability of the results.  Several aspects limit the generalizability of these findings.  
First, this study is only of one state (Pennsylvania).  It is unclear as to how the results of 
sanctioning TPVs in Pennsylvania generalize to other states with parole systems that may 
operate differently.  For example, as previously discussed, other states may have parole 
systems with a higher degree of certainty, swiftness, and perceived fairness in 
sanctioning, which may in turn lead to a larger deterrent effect on recidivism produced by 
incarceration of TPVs.  Or another possibility, other states may have more effective 
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alternative sanctioning options for TPVs (e.g., effective rehabilitation programming, 
etc.), which may produce lower recidivism rates for TPVs who are not sanctioned to 
imprisonment.  Also, other states may have varying averages and distributions in the 
length of stay in prison for TPVs sanctioned to imprisonment, which may affect the 
outcomes of the dose-response impact.  For example in Pennsylvania very few TPVs are 
sanctioned to a short stay of imprisonment (one month or less).  Very short stays of 
imprisonment may be more or less effective, yet this study is unable to generalize 
findings to a comparison between very short stays in prison and alternatives to 
imprisonment on the one hand, and between very short stays versus longer stays of 
imprisonment on the other hand.      
The generalizability of these results is also limited to only a sub-set of TPV 
violators within Pennsylvania.  Results were only examined here for sanctioning 
outcomes associated with the first TPV violation incident after initial release from prison.  
Results may differ based on the sanction used in response to second and subsequent TPV 
violations.  Also, as previously discussed, one advantage of using the propensity score 
methodology is that it forces the analysis to focus on only comparable cases based on the 
propensity to receive the treatment.  The limitation of this approach, however, is that it 
has the potential to narrow the generalizability of the findings to only a sub-set of the 
population of interest.  In this case, results were mostly narrowed to high risk TPVs who 
were supervised at a higher intensity level, who committed a more serious technical 
violation associated with their first TPV sanction, and who faced a higher level 
sanctioning option for the technical violation.   
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Another limitation of this study is that it cannot easily separate the aging and 
exposure time effects of incarceration from the deterrent effect of incarceration.  An 
attempt has been made here to at least raise the issue of the difference between aging, 
exposure time, and deterrent effects, and some attempt has been made to separate these.  
The conclusion is that incarceration for a TPV appears to mostly serve an aging and 
exposure time effect.  It would be ideal for future studies to look at comparisons of 
parolees in treatment and control group conditions who are similar in age at time of 
recidivism exposure and who have a similar amount of recidivism exposure time left at 
the beginning of recidivism exposure.  Essentially that was what was attempted in this 
study by controlling for age and exposure time at the beginning of recidivism exposure 
within the final matched sample group.  Future studies might make this comparison more 
explicitly.  However, it is impossible to completely separate out the contribution of the 
aging effect from the exposure time effect from the deterrent effect, since they together 
comprise the treatment effect here.  In a real sense, this problem is an intractable problem 
which cannot be completely overcome.     
This study is also limited by relying on a quasi-experimental approach for 
estimating a treatment effect, rather than being able to benefit from a true experimental 
design.  The underlying concern is that while a strong quasi-experimental design has been 
carefully used here (i.e., propensity score modeling), it can only account for observed 
factors known to impact the treatment assignment decision.  The added benefit of a true 
experimental design is that it can also account for unobserved factors that may influence 
the treatment assignment decision.  If important unobserved factors exist which influence 
whether TPVs are sanctioned to imprisonment or not, it might change the size or 
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direction of the effect sizes found in this study.  Based on the Rosenbaum Bounds 
sensitivity analysis performed in Chapter 4, this is certainly a real possibility since most 
of the effect sizes appeared relatively sensitive to the simulated impact of possible 
unobserved factors.  Any relevant missing or unobserved covariate(s) would thus not 
need to have a substantial impact on the treatment assignment in order to alter the 
findings made in the study.      
A final limitation of this study is that there are no measures of the swiftness, 
certainty, or perceived fairness of sanctioning among TPVs in the study sample.  
Unfortunately no measures of these dimensions were available.  It will be important in 
future research to look for ways to measure these dimensions.   
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several important avenues that future research should focus on for 
extending the findings of this study in order to better understand the impact of 
imprisonment in response to technical parole violations.  One important area for future 
research is to explore the potential role that imprisonment serves in incapacitating 
technical parole violators from committing criminal activity during the period of 
incarceration.  This study only explored the impact of imprisonment on subsequent re-
offending after re-release from imprisonment.  Even if imprisonment has a null impact on 
re-offending after release, it may still serve an incapacitation role by preventing re-
offending during the period of confinement.  Ideally both the deterrent and incapacitation 
effects of incarceration for TPVs would be understood so that the full benefits and costs 
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of incarceration for TPVs could be weighed.  Incapacitation is difficult to measure and 
untangle, but it is important for future research to attempt to do so.   
In addition to investigating the incapacitation effect of imprisonment for TPVs, it 
is also important that future research investigates the general deterrent impact of the use 
of imprisonment in response to TPV violations.  In addition to any specific deterrent and 
incapacitation effects of imprisonment, the use of imprisonment in response to TPVs 
might also serve as a general deterrent within the broader population of parolees under 
supervision.  Would-be parole violators may be deterred from recidivating by the 
presence and use of re-imprisonment as a sanctioning response used among parole 
violators.  This is where the broken windows framework described earlier on in Chapter 2 
is particularly germane.  Under broken windows policing, addressing community disorder 
is theorized to serve a general deterrent impact on preventing more serious criminal 
behavior within neighborhoods.  Similarly, a policy of addressing minor technical 
violations through the use of imprisonment may generally prevent more serious criminal 
behavior by deterring would-be offenders under parole supervision.  It will be important 
for future research to attempt to separate out estimates of the specific deterrent versus the 
general deterrent impact of the use of incarceration in response to TPV violations.    
A second important area for future research is to explore potentially 
heterogeneous effects of incarceration of TPVs.  It may be found that incarceration has 
more or less of a deterrent effect among sub-populations of TPVs.  As one example, this 
study only focused on sanctioning in response to the first TPV violation incident after 
release from prison to parole.  A natural question then is what impact sanctioning to 
imprisonment has among second and subsequent TPV incidences given that the first 
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incident was not sanctioned to imprisonment.  Also of interest would be to understand 
what impact sanctioning to imprisonment has among second and subsequent TPV 
incidences given that the first incident was sanctioned to imprisonment.   
Another important contingency to consider in future research is the swiftness, 
certainty, and perceived fairness of sanctioning for TPVs.  Future studies should attempt 
to find ways to measure these dimensions so that it can be understood how the deterrent 
effect of incarceration among TPVs varies based on these dimensions.     
Also of importance for future research is to further explore the impact of 
incarcerating TPVs based on different types of recidivism.  As was previously discussed, 
the re-incarceration measure used in this study is a measure which mixes recidivism for 
technical violations with recidivism for new crimes.  It would be interesting to separate 
these, so that it can be understood whether lower re-incarceration rates produced by 
sanctioning first TPVs to imprisonment is reflective primarily of lower rates of return to 
prison for technical violations versus lower rates of return to prison for new crimes.  
Also, for both re-incarceration for new crimes and for police re-arrest, it would be 
important to understand whether imprisonment for a first TPV is more or less effective at 
deterring different crime types. 
Another important area for future research is to explore whether the apparently 
observed aging effect of incarceration can be actualized within a different setting.  The 
objective of parole should be to optimally reduce recidivism while also delivering the 
minimal level of sanctioning necessary to do so.  One example for further exploration is 
whether the same aging effect can be observed from incarcerating TPVs in a prison 
versus a secure halfway house.  The PA DOC operates secure halfway houses called 
178 
 
Parole Violator Centers (PVCs).  Violators housed in a PVC are included in the PA DOC 
population count, and a PVC is considered a secure detention where violators are 
detained and not allowed out of the Center for any reason.  For this study, TPVs housed 
in a PVC were counted in the treatment group (i.e., TPVs imprisoned for a first 
violation).  TPVs sanctioned to a PVC represented a small fraction of the treatment group 
since PVCs were only recently introduced in Pennsylvania.  It would be interesting to 
know whether the same aging effect is observed for TPVs sanctioned to a PVC versus to 
a prison.  The reason this is of interest is that housing in a PVC can have a different cost 
than housing in a prison, depending on the group size.  PVC beds are contracted out to 
private contractors and have a fixed per diem cost per resident, whereas a prison bed 
comes at a variable cost depending on the number of inmates.  A PVC bed typically costs 
between $60 and $70 per day, whereas a prison bed when looking at a group size of 500 
or more inmates is typically around $90 per day.  When looking at a smaller group of 
inmates (100 inmates or less), the cost of a prison bed is only around $15 per day, 
however.  The reason for different costs of a prison bed based on the size of the 
population is due to the difference between marginal cost and average cost.  Moving one 
inmate from a prison bed to a PVC bed saves very little in prison spending since the same 
level of staffing is needed.  On the other hand, if 500 or more inmates are moved from a 
prison to a PVC, larger costs can be saved since a whole prison unit can be de-staffed and 
closed.  There are enough TPV violators currently sanctioned to imprisonment each year 
in Pennsylvania that it could save a significant amount of money by moving TPVs from 
prison to a secure PVC if it were found that secure PVCs generated the same 
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aging/deterrence effect on recidivism.  Future studies should explore whether there are 
differential impacts based on different types of sanctioning environments.          
Finally, future studies are needed on this topic more generally, to build a larger 
body of knowledge about the impact of imprisonment specifically among TPVs.  As was 
noted earlier in this study, this is only the second known study which has directly tested 
the impact of incarceration on subsequent offending specifically among TPVs.  An 
accumulation of future studies will help to build a body of knowledge around this topic.  
It is hoped that at some point in the future, when enough studies have been conducted, a 
review can be conducted to synthesize the findings from multiple studies on this topic in 
order to build confidence in conclusions.  Similar to meta-analyses and reviews of 
research on the general impact of imprisonment, it would be beneficial to one day have 
meta-analyses and reviews of research on the impact of imprisonment specifically among 













Summary of Data Exclusion Reasons 
# % 
No recidivism 7,739 41.0% 
First violation is criminal offense 6,457 34.2% 
Matching first violation to first sanction 1,465 7.8% 
Matching PA DOC data to PBPP data 2,943 15.6% 
Other/Miscellaneous  252 1.3% 













Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Age (at first violation)** 35.08 10.07 35.25 9.83 34.63 9.68 
Race       
            White* 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.41 0.49 
            Black 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.50 
            Hispanic 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.33 
Gender (male) 0.92 0.28 0.92 0.27 0.91 0.28 
LSI-R criminal risk score** 22.82 7.83 22.44 7.81 23.94 7.78 
Offense type (original sentence)       
            Violent 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 
            Property 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.42 
            Drugs 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47 
            Public Order/Other 0.18 0.37 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.38 
Prior treatment programs** 2.77 2.29 2.86 2.27 2.53 2.32 
Sentencing county       
            Philadelphia/Pittsburgh 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.45 
            Class 3+ county** 0.71 0.45 0.72 0.45 0.68 0.47 
Release type       
            Initial parole 0.77 0.42 0.76 0.43 0.77 0.42 
            Re-parole 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42 
Parole supervision length 46.84 56.87 46.91 60.47 46.64 44.49 
Parole district office       
            Allentown** 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.31 
            Altoona** 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.21 0.02 0.13 
            Central Office** 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.06 













Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
            Erie 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 
            Harrisburg* 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.37 0.14 0.35 
            Mercer 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.15 
            Philadelphia** 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.31 0.46 
            Pittsburgh 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.38 
            Scranton* 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27 
            Williamsport* 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.13 
Supervision level       
            Minimum** 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 
            Medium* 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.34 0.12 0.33 
            Maximum** 0.72 0.45 0.71 0.45 0.76 0.43 
            Enhanced/Special 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20 
First violation severity (most serious)       
            Low** 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.36 0.06 0.23 
            Medium** 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.26 0.44 
            High** 0.45 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.68 0.46 
In Center at Time of Violation** 0.09 0.28 0.16 0.37 0.04 0.20 
Note: Due to rounding, some categories may not equal 100% 
* p < .01 







Tabulation of First TPV Sanctions for the Control Group (N=18,886) 
SANCTION TYPE # % 
Written Warning 6,128 32.4% 
Placement in Outpatient D & A Treatment 1,813 9.6% 
Increased Reporting Requirements 1,586 8.4% 
Imposition of Curfew 1,539 8.1% 
Community Parole Corrections Half Way Back 1,524 8.1% 
Other Low-level Sanction 1,017 5.4% 
Imposition of Increased Curfew 818 4.3% 
Placement in Inpatient Drug and Alcohol Treatment 814 4.3% 
Other Medium-level Sanction 779 4.1% 
Imposition of Increased Urinalysis Testing 710 3.8% 
Imposition of Electronic Monitoring 569 3.0% 
Placement in Violation Center Contract Facility 314 1.7% 
Other High-level Sanction 304 1.6% 
Written Travel Restriction 266 1.4% 
Documented Job Search 162 0.9% 
Obtain treatment evaluation 157 0.8% 
Refer to ASCRA Group 120 0.6% 
Deadline for Securing Employment 74 0.4% 
Imposition of Community Service 70 0.4% 
Placement in Drug and Alcohol Detox Facility 60 0.3% 
Placement in a Mental Health Facility 19 0.1% 
Imposition of Mandatory Antabuse Use 17 0.1% 
Refer to Violence Prevention Booster 14 0.1% 
Placement in a Day Reporting Center 6 0.0% 
Refer to Re-entry Court 3 0.0% 
Community Parole Corrections Half Way Out 1 0.0% 
Imposition of Global Positioning 1 0.0% 
Imposition of Passive Global Positioning 1 0.0% 

















Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Age (at first violation)* 35.19 9.81 34.82 9.72 35.25 9.83 
Race       
            White 0.42 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.42 0.49 
            Black 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.46 0.50 
            Hispanic 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.33 
Gender (male)** 0.92 0.27 0.95 0.22 0.91 0.28 
LSI-R criminal risk score** 22.36 7.82 25.15 7.60 21.91 7.76 
Offense type (original sentence)       
            Violent** 0.27 0.45 0.31 0.46 0.27 0.44 
            Property* 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41 
            Drugs** 0.33 0.47 0.28 0.45 0.34 0.47 
            Public Order/Other 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 
Prior treatment programs** 2.85 2.26 3.17 2.40 2.80 2.23 
Sentencing county       
            Philadelphia/Pittsburgh 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.29 0.45 
            Class 3+ county** 0.71 0.45 0.68 0.47 0.72 0.45 
Release type       
            Initial parole** 0.76 0.42 0.68 0.47 0.78 0.42 
            Re-parole** 0.24 0.42 0.32 0.47 0.22 0.42 
Parole supervision length** 47.25 62.11 42.17 48.76 48.07 63.97 
Parole district office       
            Allentown** 0.15 0.35 0.19 0.39 0.14 0.35 
            Altoona 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 
            Central Office 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 













Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
            Erie* 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.23 
            Harrisburg** 0.17 0.37 0.13 0.33 0.17 0.38 
            Mercer** 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.18 
            Philadelphia 0.24 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.42 
            Pittsburgh** 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.35 
            Scranton** 0.06 0.25 0.11 0.32 0.06 0.23 
            Williamsport** 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.18 
Supervision level       
            Minimum** 0.20 0.40 0.10 0.30 0.22 0.41 
            Medium** 0.23 0.42 0.13 0.34 0.24 0.43 
            Maximum** 0.53 0.50 0.72 0.45 0.50 0.50 
            Enhanced/Special* 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.18 
First violation severity (most serious)       
            Low** 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.06 0.19 0.39 
            Medium** 0.45 0.50 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.50 
            High** 0.39 0.48 0.90 0.31 0.31 0.46 
In Center at Time of Violation** 0.16 0.37 0.25 0.43 0.14 0.35 
Note: Due to rounding, some categories may not equal 100% 
* p < .01 


















# % # % # % 
Positive Urinalysis/Use of Alcohol (Previous History) 3,404 19.5% 414 9.5% 3,818 17.5% 
Positive Urinalysis/Use of Drugs (No History) 3,230 18.5% 137 3.2% 3,367 15.5% 
Failure to Abide by Board Imposed Special Conditions 1,138 6.5% 378 8.7% 1,516 7.0% 
Failure to Pay Supervision Fee 1,386 7.9% 13 0.3% 1,399 6.4% 
Changing Residence without Permission 655 3.8% 624 14.4% 1,279 5.9% 
Removal From Treatment/CCC Failure 640 3.7% 630 14.5% 1,270 5.8% 
Failure to Report as Instructed 694 4.0% 277 6.4% 971 4.5% 
Violating Curfew/Approved Schedule 842 4.8% 64 1.5% 906 4.2% 
Failure to Abide by Field Imposed Special Conditions 763 4.4% 133 3.1% 896 4.1% 
Failure to Abide by Written Instructions 727 4.2% 93 2.1% 820 3.8% 
Absconding 131 0.8% 677 15.6% 808 3.7% 
Travel Violation 360 2.1% 149 3.4% 509 2.3% 
Failure to Participate/Attend Treatment 417 2.4% 30 0.7% 447 2.1% 
Positive Urinalysis/Use of Drugs (Previous History) 319 1.8% 92 2.1% 411 1.9% 
Assaultive Behavior 225 1.3% 180 4.1% 405 1.9% 
Entering Prohibited Establishment 321 1.8% 52 1.2% 373 1.7% 
Failure to Maintain Employment 353 2.0% 7 0.2% 360 1.7% 
Conviction Summary Offense (No Court Record) 336 1.9% 17 0.4% 353 1.6% 
Possession of Unauthorized Contraband, Cell Phone or Beeper 259 1.5% 37 0.9% 296 1.4% 
Failure to Notify Agent of Changes of Status 241 1.4% 34 0.8% 275 1.3% 
Failure to Complete Treatment 130 0.7% 73 1.7% 203 0.9% 
Failure to Pay Restitution and/or Other Court Ordered Fee 173 1.0% 5 0.1% 178 0.8% 
Associating with Known Felons, Gangs, Co-Defendant, etc. 124 0.7% 9 0.2% 133 0.6% 
Changing Employment Without Agent Notification/Permission 102 0.6% 10 0.2% 112 0.5% 
Possession of Offensive Weapon 62 0.4% 39 0.9% 101 0.5% 
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 # % # % # % 
Failure to Pay Urinalysis Fee 63 0.4% 0 0.0% 63 0.3% 
Failure to Report Upon Release 17 0.1% 29 0.7% 46 0.2% 
Failure to Provide Urine 40 0.2% 3 0.1% 43 0.2% 
Electronic Monitoring Violation 36 0.2% 5 0.1% 41 0.2% 
Failure to Take Prescribed Medication as Prescribed by MD 34 0.2% 7 0.2% 41 0.2% 
Associating with Crime Victims 27 0.2% 11 0.3% 38 0.2% 
Possession of Firearms 12 0.1% 18 0.4% 30 0.1% 
Failure to Support Dependent 14 0.1% 1 0.0% 15 0.1% 
Failure to Participate in Community Service 7 0.0% 2 0.0% 9 0.0% 
Other/Unknown 153 0.8% 98 2.2% 251 1.1% 















Descriptive Statistics for Treatment Group Prison Length of Stay Quintiles 
 
Quintile 1: 
0 – 3 months 
(N=345) 
Quintile 2: 
3.1 – 6.8 months 
(N=351) 
Quintile 3: 
6.9 – 11.3 months 
(N=355) 
Quintile 4: 
11.4 – 16.8 months 
(N=356) 
Quintile 5: 
16.9 – 78.5 months 
(N=352) 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Age (at first violation)* 34.43 8.71 35.40 10.00 34.80 9.42 34.14 9.68 36.56 9.74 
Race (white)* 0.51 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.43 0.50 
Gender (male) 0.95 0.22 0.93 0.26 0.92 0.27 0.97 0.17 0.96 0.19 
LSI-R criminal risk score** 23.59 7.81 24.77 7.59 24.78 7.78 25.13 7.34 26.53 7.75 
Offense type (original sentence)                     
            Violent** 0.24 0.43 0.20 0.40 0.27 0.44 0.32 0.47 0.50 0.50 
            Property 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42 
            Drugs** 0.31 0.46 0.34 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.45 0.16 0.37 
            Public Order/Other** 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.38 0.10 0.30 
Prior treatment programs** 2.95 2.57 3.12 2.34 2.95 2.33 3.38 2.49 3.56 2.40 
Sentencing county                     
            Philadelphia/Pittsburgh* 0.22 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.31 0.46 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46 
            Class 3+ county 0.65 0.48 0.74 0.44 0.73 0.45 0.76 0.43 0.67 0.47 
Release type                     
            Initial parole 0.70 0.46 0.69 0.46 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46 0.61 0.49 
            Re-parole 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.39 0.49 
Parole supervision length** 33.53 32.83 28.43 28.12 39.19 37.13 44.33 43.90 63.85 71.08 
Parole district office                     
            Allentown 0.15 0.36 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.15 0.35 
            Altoona 0.08 0.28 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.21 
            Central Office 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
            Chester 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.13 
            Erie 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.23 
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0 – 3 months 
(N=345) 
Quintile 2: 
3.1 – 6.8 months 
(N=351) 
Quintile 3: 
6.9 – 11.3 months 
(N=355) 
Quintile 4: 
11.4 – 16.8 months 
(N=356) 
Quintile 5: 
16.9 – 78.5 months 
(N=352) 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
            Harrisburg 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.34 
            Mercer 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 
            Philadelphia** 0.18 0.39 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.47 
            Pittsburgh 0.18 0.39 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.39 
            Scranton** 0.18 0.38 0.10 0.31 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26 
            Williamsport 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 
Supervision level                     
            Minimum 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.25 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21 
            Medium 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.28 
            Maximum 0.77 0.42 0.79 0.41 0.78 0.41 0.76 0.43 0.83 0.38 
            Enhanced/Special 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26 0.04 0.19 
First violation severity (most serious)                     
            Low 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 
           Medium** 0.16 0.37 0.12 0.32 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.10 0.30 
           High** 0.83 0.38 0.88 0.33 0.93 0.26 0.93 0.25 0.90 0.30 
Note: Due to rounding, some categories may not equal 100% 
* p < .01 








(N=10,947) % Bias 
T-Test 
T p 
Age (at first violation) 34.82 35.25 -4.5% -1.74 0.08 
Race 
White 0.44 0.42 4.2% 1.64 0.10 
Black 0.44 0.46 -2.6% -1.01 0.31 
Hispanic 0.11 0.12 -1.9% -0.72 0.47 
Other 0.00 0.00 -3.2% -1.15 0.25 
Gender (male) 0.95 0.91 13.2% 4.78 0.00 
LSI-R criminal risk score 25.15 21.91 42.1% 16.26 0.00 
Offense type (original sentence) 
Violent 0.31 0.27 8.4% 3.30 0.00 
Property 0.24 0.21 6.8% 2.71 0.01 
Drugs 0.28 0.34 -14.7% -5.60 0.00 
Public Order/Other 0.18 0.18 0.4% 0.14 0.89 
Prior treatment programs 3.17 2.80 16.2% 6.47 0.00 
Sentencing county 
Philadelphia/Pittsburgh 0.27 0.29 -4.3% -1.67 0.10 
Class 3+ county 0.68 0.72 -8.2% -3.22 0.00 
Initial parole 0.68 0.78 -21.4% -8.70 0.00 
Parole supervision length 42.17 48.07 -10.4% -3.70 0.00 
Parole district office 
Allentown 0.19 0.14 12.6% 5.10 0.00 
Altoona 0.06 0.05 3.0% 1.18 0.24 
Central Office 0.00 0.00 -0.8% -0.30 0.76 
Chester 0.02 0.06 -19.8% -6.67 0.00 
Erie 0.04 0.06 -6.9% -2.55 0.01 
Harrisburg 0.13 0.17 -13.2% -4.90 0.00 
Mercer 0.01 0.04 -18.8% -6.07 0.00 
Philadelphia 0.24 0.24 0.9% 0.34 0.73 
Pittsburgh 0.18 0.14 9.7% 3.89 0.00 
Scranton 0.11 0.06 19.7% 8.62 0.00 
Williamsport 0.02 0.04 -12.1% -4.20 0.00 
Supervision level 
Administrative 0.00 0.01 -10.3% -3.41 0.00 
Minimum 0.10 0.22 -32.6% -11.48 0.00 
Medium 0.13 0.24 -28.5% -10.28 0.00 
Maximum 0.72 0.50 47.7% 17.88 0.00 
Enhanced/Special 0.04 0.03 5.7% 2.36 0.02 
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(N=10,947) % Bias 
T-Test 
T p 
First violation severity (most serious)      
                         Low 0.00 0.19 -66.1% -19.80 0.00 
                        Medium 0.10 0.50 -97.6% -32.83 0.00 
High 0.90 0.31 150.3% 51.64 0.00 
In Center at Time of Violation 0.25 0.14 27.8% 11.73 0.00 
      















6-Month 16.9% 18.4% 2.1 0.143 
1-Year 27.6% 32.5% 16.7 0.000 
3-Year 48.0% 54.3% 21.1 0.000 
Re-arrest Rates 
6-Month 16.4% 14.4% 4.8 0.028 
1-Year 29.5% 25.2% 14.4 0.000 
3-Year 56.2% 51.5% 12.0 0.001 
Overall Recidivism Rates 
6-Month 29.7% 26.6% 6.9 0.008 
1-Year 47.6% 43.5% 10.2 0.001 
































"Naïve" Logistic Regression Models Predicting Recidivism (N=11,934) 
Re-incarceration 
6-Month 1-Year 3-Year 
OR p OR p OR p 
Sanctioned to Imprisonment (treatment) 0.60 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.50 0.00 
Age (at first violation) 0.98 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.97 0.00 
Race 
White 1.37 0.43 0.91 0.76 1.01 0.97 
Black 1.28 0.55 0.82 0.50 1.10 0.75 
Hispanic 1.37 0.44 0.85 0.59 1.11 0.72 
Gender (male) 1.51 0.00 1.55 0.00 1.52 0.00 
LSI-R criminal risk score 1.03 0.00 1.03 0.00 1.04 0.00 
Offense type (original sentence) 
Violent 0.88 0.10 0.85 0.01 0.75 0.00 
Property 1.08 0.31 1.03 0.62 1.08 0.23 
Drugs 0.76 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.76 0.00 
Prior treatment programs 1.01 0.33 1.01 0.22 1.02 0.01 
Sentencing county 
Philadelphia/Pittsburgh 0.98 0.80 0.95 0.46 0.89 0.09 
Class 3+ county 0.85 0.02 0.95 0.45 1.01 0.93 
Initial parole 0.76 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.89 0.02 
Parole supervision length 1.00 0.76 1.00 0.00 1.01 0.00 
Parole district office 
Allentown 1.15 0.79 0.88 0.74 0.96 0.90 
Altoona 1.34 0.57 1.06 0.87 1.10 0.80 
Chester 0.86 0.77 0.73 0.43 0.87 0.71 
Erie 1.18 0.75 0.78 0.53 0.79 0.52 
Harrisburg 1.19 0.73 0.98 0.97 1.04 0.92 
Mercer 0.76 0.60 0.79 0.56 0.76 0.48 
Philadelphia 1.47 0.44 1.12 0.77 1.05 0.89 
Pittsburgh 1.31 0.59 1.09 0.83 1.04 0.91 
Scranton 2.06 0.15 1.63 0.20 1.38 0.39 
Williamsport 1.23 0.68 0.95 0.91 0.86 0.70 
Supervision level 
Administrative 0.30 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.25 0.00 
Minimum 1.02 0.88 0.85 0.21 0.65 0.00 
Medium 1.08 0.61 0.95 0.66 0.72 0.01 
Maximum 1.30 0.06 1.08 0.49 0.85 0.15 
First violation severity (most serious) 
Medium 1.78 0.00 1.53 0.00 1.61 0.00 
High 2.11 0.00 1.93 0.00 1.94 0.00 
In Center at Time of Violation 1.22 0.00 1.19 0.00 1.17 0.01 
194 
 
TABLE 4.3 (continued) 
"Naïve" Logistic Regression Models Predicting Recidivism (N=11,934) 
Re-arrest 
6-Month 1-Year 3-Year 
OR p OR p OR p 
Sanctioned to Imprisonment (treatment) 1.09 0.32 1.18 0.02 1.04 0.51 
Age (at first violation) 0.98 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.97 0.00 
Race 
White 1.70 0.25 0.71 0.26 1.33 0.31 
Black 1.78 0.21 0.77 0.38 1.47 0.17 
Hispanic 1.48 0.40 0.62 0.11 1.19 0.54 
Gender (male) 1.37 0.01 1.31 0.00 1.24 0.00 
LSI-R criminal risk score 1.01 0.00 1.02 0.00 1.02 0.00 
Offense type (original sentence) 
Violent 0.88 0.13 0.85 0.02 0.79 0.00 
Property 1.12 0.17 1.11 0.14 1.20 0.00 
Drugs 0.99 0.91 0.94 0.31 0.93 0.18 
Prior treatment programs 1.01 0.35 1.02 0.06 1.02 0.08 
Sentencing county 
Philadelphia/Pittsburgh 1.21 0.04 1.21 0.01 1.13 0.07 
Class 3+ county 1.09 0.31 1.18 0.02 1.11 0.06 
Initial parole 0.90 0.08 0.85 0.00 0.83 0.00 
Parole supervision length 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.86 
Parole district office 
Allentown 1.75 0.36 1.34 0.50 1.59 0.20 
Altoona 1.85 0.32 1.53 0.34 1.67 0.17 
Chester 2.03 0.25 1.50 0.36 2.22 0.03 
Erie 1.41 0.58 0.94 0.89 1.21 0.61 
Harrisburg 2.23 0.19 1.70 0.22 1.91 0.08 
Mercer 2.65 0.12 1.94 0.14 2.11 0.05 
Philadelphia 2.18 0.20 1.79 0.18 2.50 0.01 
Pittsburgh 1.45 0.55 1.10 0.82 1.49 0.27 
Scranton 1.21 0.76 1.02 0.97 1.33 0.44 
Williamsport 1.50 0.52 1.26 0.61 1.30 0.49 
Supervision level 
Administrative 0.76 0.48 0.63 0.15 0.73 0.20 
Minimum 0.90 0.53 0.85 0.22 0.97 0.80 
Medium 0.99 0.96 0.89 0.36 0.99 0.96 
Maximum 1.05 0.72 0.92 0.48 1.00 0.97 
First violation severity (most serious) 
Medium 1.09 0.30 1.18 0.01 1.32 0.00 
High 1.18 0.07 1.17 0.03 1.40 0.00 
In Center at Time of Violation 0.68 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.85 0.00 
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TABLE 4.3 (continued) 
"Naïve" Logistic Regression Models Predicting Recidivism (N=11,934) 
Overall Recidivism 
6-Month 1-Year 3-Year 
OR p OR p OR p 
Sanctioned to Imprisonment (treatment) 0.83 0.01 0.82 0.00 0.73 0.00 
Age (at first violation) 0.98 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.97 0.00 
Race 
White 1.66 0.16 0.91 0.73 1.42 0.23 
Black 1.71 0.14 0.91 0.75 1.60 0.11 
Hispanic 1.66 0.17 0.84 0.55 1.38 0.28 
Gender (male) 1.45 0.00 1.54 0.00 1.55 0.00 
LSI-R criminal risk score 1.03 0.00 1.03 0.00 1.04 0.00 
Offense type (original sentence) 
Violent 0.89 0.09 0.87 0.02 0.79 0.00 
Property 1.12 0.08 1.09 0.15 1.15 0.04 
Drugs 0.84 0.01 0.82 0.00 0.75 0.00 
Prior treatment programs 1.01 0.18 1.03 0.00 1.03 0.00 
Sentencing county 
Philadelphia/Pittsburgh 1.01 0.92 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.42 
Class 3+ county 0.96 0.54 1.04 0.46 1.11 0.10 
Initial parole 0.81 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.80 0.00 
Parole supervision length 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.00 
Parole district office 
Allentown 1.38 0.46 1.09 0.80 1.20 0.63 
Altoona 1.49 0.37 1.30 0.48 1.37 0.42 
Chester 1.29 0.57 1.05 0.90 1.37 0.41 
Erie 1.27 0.59 0.89 0.76 0.94 0.87 
Harrisburg 1.53 0.33 1.27 0.51 1.40 0.37 
Mercer 1.33 0.53 1.16 0.69 1.24 0.58 
Philadelphia 1.56 0.31 1.25 0.54 1.49 0.29 
Pittsburgh 1.44 0.41 1.18 0.65 1.31 0.48 
Scranton 1.91 0.14 1.58 0.21 1.47 0.32 
Williamsport 1.32 0.54 1.07 0.87 1.04 0.93 
Supervision level 
Administrative 0.52 0.08 0.39 0.00 0.45 0.00 
Minimum 0.96 0.76 0.87 0.25 0.81 0.13 
Medium 1.05 0.69 0.89 0.32 0.85 0.21 
Maximum 1.21 0.11 1.01 0.92 0.94 0.61 
First violation severity (most serious) 
Medium 1.40 0.00 1.47 0.00 1.62 0.00 
High 1.67 0.00 1.76 0.00 2.05 0.00 




Logit Regression Predicting Treatment Assignment (N=11,934) 
β OR Z p 
Age (at first violation) -0.01 0.99 -3.50 0.00 
Race 
White 0.19 1.21 0.33 0.74 
Black 0.21 1.23 0.37 0.71 
Hispanic 0.04 1.04 0.06 0.95 
Gender (male) 0.43 1.54 3.31 0.00 
LSI-R criminal risk score 0.02 1.02 3.58 0.00 
Offense type (original sentence) 
Violent -0.02 0.98 -0.23 0.82 
Property -0.05 0.95 -0.52 0.60 
Drugs -0.25 0.78 -2.57 0.01 
Prior treatment programs 0.02 1.02 1.46 0.14 
Sentencing county 
Philadelphia/Pittsburgh -0.19 0.82 -1.82 0.07 
Class 3+ county -0.26 0.77 -2.86 0.00 
Initial parole -0.36 0.69 -5.10 0.00 
Parole supervision length 0.00 1.00 -3.80 0.00 
Parole district office 
Allentown -0.01 0.99 -0.02 0.98 
Altoona 0.10 1.10 0.17 0.87 
Chester -0.93 0.40 -1.59 0.11 
Erie -0.16 0.86 -0.28 0.78 
Harrisburg -0.87 0.42 -1.58 0.12 
Mercer -1.31 0.27 -2.07 0.04 
Philadelphia -0.20 0.82 -0.36 0.72 
Pittsburgh -0.11 0.90 -0.19 0.85 
Scranton 0.45 1.57 0.82 0.41 
Williamsport -0.85 0.43 -1.43 0.15 
Supervision level 
Administrative -0.80 0.45 -1.23 0.22 
Minimum -0.53 0.59 -2.80 0.01 
Medium -0.64 0.53 -3.55 0.00 
Maximum -0.07 0.93 -0.44 0.66 
First violation severity (most serious) 
Medium 1.98 7.26 5.11 0.00 
High 4.61 100.02 12.08 0.00 
In Center at Time of Violation 0.11 1.11 1.40 0.16 














(N=1,103) T p 
Age (at first violation) 34.15 34.59 -4.6% 50.9% -1.31 0.19 
Race 
White 0.44 0.45 -2.0% 53.8% -0.54 0.59 
Black 0.45 0.43 2.7% -23.5% 0.76 0.45 
Hispanic 0.11 0.12 -1.2% 50.9% -0.34 0.74 
Gender (male) 0.94 0.95 -2.5% 77.5% -0.80 0.43 
LSI-R criminal risk score 25.33 25.40 -1.0% 97.5% -0.28 0.78 
Offense type (original sentence) 
Violent 0.29 0.26 5.5% -9.5% 1.53 0.13 
Property 0.24 0.25 -2.8% 61.2% -0.75 0.45 
Drugs 0.28 0.29 -1.4% 89.2% -0.40 0.69 
Prior treatment programs 3.13 3.12 0.4% 97.0% 0.11 0.92 
Sentencing county 0.0% 0.0% 
Philadelphia/Pittsburgh 0.27 0.27 -1.2% 72.9% -0.32 0.75 
Class 3+ county 0.69 0.68 1.0% 86.7% 0.27 0.79 
Initial parole 0.68 0.68 -0.1% 99.3% -0.04 0.97 
Parole supervision length 38.93 40.01 -2.3% 86.5% -0.69 0.49 
Parole district office 
Allentown 0.18 0.21 -6.3% 42.2% -1.64 0.10 
Altoona 0.06 0.06 0.6% 85.0% 0.15 0.88 
Chester 0.02 0.01 3.1% 85.2% 1.32 0.19 
Erie 0.04 0.03 4.5% 39.3% 1.43 0.15 
Harrisburg 0.13 0.12 1.5% 89.2% 0.44 0.66 
Mercer 0.01 0.01 0.5% 97.6% 0.21 0.83 
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(N=1,103) T p 
Philadelphia 0.24 0.23 3.0% -263.2% 0.85 0.39 
Pittsburgh 0.18 0.19 -0.3% 96.5% -0.09 0.93 
Scranton 0.12 0.12 -2.8% 87.2% -0.67 0.51 
Williamsport 0.02 0.02 -1.6% 87.3% -0.55 0.58 
Supervision level 
Administrative 0.00 0.00 -0.9% 91.0% -0.38 0.71 
Minimum 0.09 0.10 -0.7% 97.6% -0.25 0.81 
Medium 0.13 0.14 -1.7% 94.3% -0.53 0.60 
Maximum 0.73 0.72 2.6% 94.4% 0.77 0.44 
First violation severity (most serious) 
Medium 0.10 0.10 0.0% 100.0% 0.00 1.00 
High 0.89 0.89 0.2% 99.9% 0.06 0.95 
















(N=1,103) ATT S.E. T 
Re-incarceration Rates 
6-Month 18.3% 25.5% -7.2% 0.02 -3.99** 
1-Year 29.2% 43.2% -13.9% 0.02 -6.70** 
3-Year 48.1% 61.2% -13.1% 0.02 -6.16** 
Re-arrest Rates 
6-Month 16.6% 13.6% 3.0% 0.02 1.94 
1-Year 30.1% 25.6% 4.5% 0.02 2.33* 
3-Year 56.2% 54.8% 1.4% 0.02 0.66 
Overall Recidivism Rates 
6-Month 30.9% 33.0% -2.1% 0.02 -1.03 
1-Year 49.2% 54.4% -5.3% 0.02 -2.43* 
3-Year 72.5% 78.5% -6.0% 0.02 -3.24** 
* p < .05 























(N=9,289) % Bias 
T-Test 
T p 
Age (at first violation) 34.38 35.08 -7.4% -3.31 0.00 
Race 
White 0.44 0.42 4.2% 1.91 0.06 
Black 0.45 0.46 -2.2% -0.99 0.32 
Hispanic 0.11 0.12 -2.4% -1.08 0.28 
Other 0.00 0.01 -3.8% -1.60 0.11 
Gender (male) 0.94 0.91 11.9% 5.15 0.00 
LSI-R criminal risk score 25.12 21.95 42.0% 18.95 0.00 
Offense type (original sentence) 
Violent 0.28 0.27 2.6% 1.21 0.23 
Property 0.24 0.21 7.2% 3.33 0.00 
Drugs 0.29 0.35 -11.4% -5.09 0.00 
Public Order/Other 0.19 0.18 2.8% 1.29 0.20 
Prior treatment programs 3.12 2.76 15.6% 7.24 0.00 
Sentencing county 
Philadelphia/Pittsburgh 0.27 0.28 -2.6% -1.18 0.24 
Class 3+ county 0.69 0.72 -7.2% -3.32 0.00 
Initial parole 0.69 0.78 -20.5% -9.60 0.00 
Parole supervision length 40.33 47.34 -15.2% -6.80 0.00 
Parole district office 
Allentown 0.18 0.14 12.4% 5.84 0.00 
Altoona 0.06 0.05 3.2% 1.49 0.14 
Central Office 0.00 0.00 0.9% 0.44 0.66 
Chester 0.02 0.06 -23.3% -9.24 0.00 
Erie 0.04 0.06 -9.2% -3.99 0.00 
Harrisburg 0.13 0.18 -12.2% -5.36 0.00 
Mercer 0.01 0.04 -19.3% -7.56 0.00 
Philadelphia 0.24 0.23 1.2% 0.55 0.59 
Pittsburgh 0.18 0.14 11.2% 5.26 0.00 
Scranton 0.11 0.05 20.7% 10.38 0.00 
Williamsport 0.02 0.04 -10.9% -4.56 0.00 
Supervision level 
Administrative 0.00 0.01 -9.1% -3.60 0.00 
Minimum 0.10 0.21 -30.4% -12.79 0.00 
Medium 0.14 0.25 -29.2% -12.49 0.00 
Maximum 0.71 0.50 46.2% 20.40 0.00 
Enhanced/Special 0.04 0.03 5.8% 2.75 0.01 
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(N=9,289) % Bias 
T-Test 
T p 
First violation severity (most serious) 
Low 0.01 0.20 -67.3% -24.80 0.00 
Medium 0.12 0.55 -104.5% -42.76 0.00 
High 0.88 0.25 164.6% 69.67 0.00 










(N=9,289) % Bias 
T-Test 
T p 
Changing Residence without Permission 21.4% 3.7% 55.5% 31.60 0.00 
Positive Urinalysis/Use of Alcohol (Previous History) 21.3% 18.0% 8.2% 3.78 0.00 
Failure to Abide by Board Imposed Special Conditions 15.8% 5.7% 33.0% 17.17 0.00 
Removal From Treatment /CCC Failure  15.8% 2.1% 49.5% 29.34 0.00 
Absconding               6.4% 0.2% 35.2% 23.30 0.00 
Assaultive Behavior      3.8% 1.0% 18.2% 10.01 0.00 
Positive Urinalysis/Use of Drugs (No History) 3.6% 24.2% -62.3% -24.09 0.00 
Positive Urinalysis/Use of Drugs (Previous History) 2.7% 1.6% 7.4% 3.60 0.00 
Failure to Report as Instructed   1.6% 4.0% -14.9% -6.08 0.00 
Failure to Abide by Field Imposed Special Conditions 1.2% 4.4% -19.2% -7.62 0.00 
Possession of Offensive Weapon  0.9% 0.4% 6.5% 3.36 0.00 
Failure to Complete Treatment 0.7% 0.5% 2.7% 1.27 0.20 
Failure to Abide by Written Instructions 0.6% 3.9% -21.9% -8.41 0.00 
Entering Prohibited Establishment 0.5% 1.6% -11.5% -4.57 0.00 
Possession of Unauthorized Contraband, Cell Phone, or Beeper 0.5% 1.7% -12.2% -4.81 0.00 
Associating with Crime Victims 0.4% 0.1% 5.0% 2.66 0.01 
Failure to Maintain Employment 0.4% 2.2% -16.1% -6.20 0.00 
Failure to Participate/Attend Treatment 0.4% 2.8% -19.4% -7.39 0.00 
Travel Violation         0.4% 1.9% -14.5% -5.61 0.00 
Violating Curfew/Approved Schedule 0.3% 3.8% -24.4% -9.17 0.00 
Failure to Notify Agent of Changes of Status 0.3% 1.6% -13.4% -5.17 0.00 
Failure to Report Upon Release 0.3% 0.1% 4.9% 2.71 0.01 
Conviction Summary Offense (No Court Record) 0.3% 1.9% -16.1% -6.12 0.00 
Failure to Pay Supervision Fee 0.2% 10.3% -46.4% -17.02 0.00 
Associating with Known Felons, Gangs, Co-Defendents, etc. 0.1% 0.4% -5.3% -2.10 0.04 







(N=9,289) % Bias 
T-Test 
T p 
      
Changing Employment Without Agent Notification/Permission 0.0% 0.3% -7.0% -2.63 0.01 
Failure to Provide Urine 0.0% 0.1% -2.6% -1.03 0.30 
Failure to Take Prescription Medication as Prescribed by MD 0.0% 0.1% -3.6% -1.43 0.15 
Electronic Monitoring Violation 0.0% 0.1% -4.6% -1.68 0.09 
Failure to Participate in Communnity Service 0.0% 0.0% -2.9% -1.06 0.29 
Failure to Pay Restitution and/or Other Court Ordered Fees 0.0% 0.5% -10.2% -3.72 0.00 
Failure to Pay Urinalysis Fee 0.0% 0.2% -6.4% -2.31 0.02 
Failure to Support Dependent 0.0% 0.1% -4.1% -1.50 0.13 












(N=9,287) % Bias 
T-Test 
T p 
Community Parole Corrections Halfway Back 24.9% 8.3% 45.7% 17.55 0.00 
Written Warning          16.9% 33.3% -38.6% -11.16 0.00 
Placement in Inpatient Drug and Alcohol Treatment 12.1% 5.1% 25.3% 9.48 0.00 
Placement in Outpatient Drug and Alcohol Treatment 9.9% 11.6% -5.5% -1.67 0.09 
Imposition of Curfew 5.6% 7.3% -6.6% -2.00 0.05 
Other High-Level Sanction 5.3% 2.2% 16.8% 6.43 0.00 
Electronic Monitoring    4.9% 4.0% 4.2% 1.36 0.17 
Other Medium-Level Sanction 4.9% 4.9% 0.2% 0.06 0.95 
Increased Curfew         4.3% 5.8% -6.9% -2.06 0.04 
Other Low-Level Sanction 4.2% 6.4% -9.9% -2.89 0.00 
Increased Reporting Requirements 2.0% 4.7% -15.0% -4.11 0.00 
Increased Urinalysis Testing 1.5% 2.1% -4.5% -1.32 0.19 
Placement in Drug and Alcohol Detox Facility 0.5% 0.4% 2.4% 0.80 0.42 
Deadline for Securing Employment 0.5% 0.6% -1.7% -0.51 0.61 
Documented Job Search    0.5% 0.6% -2.0% -0.59 0.56 
Community Service        0.4% 0.6% -3.1% -0.90 0.37 
Placement in a Mental Health Facility 0.4% 0.1% 5.0% 2.04 0.04 
Mandatory Antabuse Use   0.3% 0.1% 4.1% 1.64 0.10 
Obtain Treatment Evaluation 0.3% 0.5% -3.4% -0.96 0.34 
Refer to ASCRA Group     0.3% 0.5% -3.1% -0.88 0.38 
Refer to Violence Prevention Booster 0.3% 0.1% 4.7% 2.01 0.04 
Written Travel Restrictions 0.2% 1.0% -11.1% -2.79 0.01 
Imposition of Passive Global Positioning 0.0% 0.0% -1.5% -0.34 0.73 





Sensitivity Analysis Results 




(N=1,468) ATT S.E. T 
Re-incarceration Rates 
6-Month** 16.8% 27.3% -10.5% 0.02 -6.71 
1-Year** 27.1% 42.6% -15.4% 0.02 -8.68 
3-Year** 43.8% 62.9% -19.1% 0.02 -10.53 
Re-arrest Rates 
6-Month 14.6% 13.9% 0.7% 0.01 0.53 
1-Year 26.7% 25.2% 1.4% 0.02 0.90 
3-Year 49.8% 53.2% -3.3% 0.02 -1.80 
Overall Recidivism Rates 
6-Month** 27.8% 34.8% -7.0% 0.02 -4.03 
1-Year** 44.6% 52.9% -8.3% 0.02 -4.47 
3-Year** 65.0% 77.3% -12.3% 0.02 -7.49 




(N=937) ATT S.E. T 
Re-incarceration Rates 
6-Month** 17.6% 29.4% -11.8% 0.02 -5.95 
1-Year** 28.4% 46.6% -18.2% 0.02 -8.11 
3-Year** 47.5% 69.0% -21.4% 0.02 -9.61 
Re-arrest Rates 
6-Month 16.4% 16.6% -0.3% 0.02 -0.17 
1-Year 30.6% 29.3% 1.3% 0.02 0.62 
3-Year 57.0% 56.3% 0.7% 0.02 0.32 
Overall Recidivism Rates 
6-Month** 30.5% 37.9% -7.5% 0.02 -3.41 
1-Year** 49.2% 57.6% -8.4% 0.02 -3.64 
3-Year** 72.8% 81.5% -8.7% 0.02 -4.53 
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TABLE 4.10 (continued) 
Sensitivity Analysis Results 




(N=755) ATT S.E. T 
Re-incarceration Rates 
6-Month** 18.4% 30.7% -12.3% 0.02 -5.15 
1-Year** 29.4% 48.4% -19.0% 0.03 -7.15 
3-Year** 48.2% 69.1% -20.9% 0.03 -8.17 
Re-arrest Rates 
6-Month** 16.7% 10.4% 6.3% 0.02 3.55 
1-Year** 30.1% 22.1% 8.1% 0.02 3.46 
3-Year 56.3% 52.3% 4.0% 0.03 1.49 
Overall Recidivism Rates 
6-Month 31.1% 35.7% -4.6% 0.03 -1.80 
1-Year* 49.3% 55.9% -6.6% 0.03 -2.44 
3-Year** 72.7% 79.8% -7.2% 0.02 -3.21 
* p < .05 







Rosenbaum Bounds for the Treatment Effects 
Bias for Non-significant  
Group Difference 
Bias for Reversal 
of Treatment Effect Sign 
Γ p critical Γ p critical 
Re-incarceration Rates 
6-Month 1.30 0.09 1.75 0.05 
1-Year 1.60 0.08 2.10 0.04 
3-Year 1.50 0.09 1.95 0.03 
Re-arrest Rates 
6-Month 1.05 0.09 1.50 0.04 
1-Year 1.10 0.06 1.50 0.03 
3-Year** 1.10 0.01 1.25 0.04 
Overall Recidivism Rates 
6-Month** 1.10 0.02 1.30 0.02 
1-Year 1.05 0.09 1.35 0.04 
3-Year 1.10 0.07 1.50 0.03 
** Since these effect sizes were non-significant (p < .05) at baseline in the main Propensity Score Matching 
Model, these Rosenbaum Bounds indicate the size of the bias in order to move the effect size to a statistically 
significant level in each direction. Thus, for the 3-year re-arrest rate and 6-month overall recidivism rate, the bias 
under the “Bias for Non-Significant Group Difference” column is actually the bias needed to move these two 





Logit Regression Predicting Overall Recidivism Among Matched Sample, Controlling for Aging and Exposure Time Effects 
Overall Recidivism Rates (N=2,580) 
6-Month 1-Year 3-Year 
β OR Z p β OR Z p β OR Z p 
Sanctioned to  
Imprisonment (treatment) 
-0.0493 0.95 -0.56 0.57 -0.12 0.89 -1.46 0.14 -0.13 0.88 -1.33 0.19 
Age at Time of Recidivism  
Follow-up 
-0.0164 0.98 -3.54 0.00 -0.02 0.98 -4.85 0.00 -0.03 0.97 -6.75 0.00 
Residual Parole Time at  
Recidivism Follow-up 









3-Year 1-Year 6-Month 
Corr. p Corr. p Corr. p Corr. p 
Age (at first violation) 0.01 0.70 -0.15 0.00 -0.13 0.00 -0.09 0.00 
Race   
White 0.00 0.87 -0.01 0.65 -0.04 0.12 -0.01 0.69 
Black -0.03 0.27 0.01 0.75 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.50 
Hispanic 0.03 0.20 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.88 -0.01 0.70 
Gender (male) -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.35 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.95 
LSI-R criminal risk score 0.13 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.00 
Offense type (original sentence) 
Violent 0.13 0.00 -0.01 0.83 -0.02 0.45 0.00 0.94 
Property -0.01 0.83 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.50 0.02 0.37 
Drugs -0.09 0.00 -0.02 0.34 0.00 0.88 -0.05 0.04 
Prior treatment programs 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.37 0.00 0.98 -0.01 0.59 
Sentencing county 
Philadelphia/Pittsburgh 0.00 0.98 -0.01 0.82 0.00 0.88 0.01 0.58 
Class 3+ county -0.01 0.66 0.01 0.69 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.49 
Initial parole -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.12 
Parole supervision length 0.21 0.00 0.02 0.50 0.01 0.57 0.00 0.96 
Parole district office 
Allentown 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.63 -0.01 0.77 -0.02 0.51 
Altoona -0.06 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.37 0.04 0.11 
Chester -0.03 0.26 0.01 0.77 -0.02 0.50 -0.02 0.49 
Erie 0.00 0.91 -0.02 0.54 0.01 0.80 0.05 0.06 
Harrisburg 0.08 0.00 -0.03 0.22 0.00 0.95 -0.03 0.27 
Mercer 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.85 -0.03 0.27 -0.01 0.65 
Philadelphia 0.02 0.37 0.01 0.70 -0.01 0.77 0.01 0.69 
Pittsburgh -0.03 0.30 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.57 0.01 0.66 
Scranton -0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.53 0.01 0.70 0.00 0.90 
Williamsport 0.02 0.45 -0.07 0.01 -0.05 0.06 -0.07 0.01 
Supervision level 
Administrative -0.04 0.08 -0.01 0.82 -0.01 0.58 0.00 0.93 
Minimum -0.09 0.00 -0.05 0.06 -0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.03 
Medium -0.05 0.06 0.04 0.16 0.02 0.53 0.02 0.54 
Maximum 0.09 0.00 -0.02 0.39 0.02 0.44 0.01 0.62 
First violation severity (most serious) 
Medium -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.01 0.77 0.04 0.09 
High 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.86 -0.01 0.70 -0.04 0.14 
In Center at Time of Violation 0.01 0.64 -0.01 0.59 -0.02 0.50 0.02 0.52 
No Recommit Action (NRA) -0.48 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.44 
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TABLE 5.1 (continued) 
Bivariate Correlations (N = 1,547) 
Re-Arrest Rates 
3-Year  1-Year 6-Month 
Corr. p Corr. p Corr. p 
Age (at first violation) -0.13 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.09 0.00 
Race 
White -0.03 0.29 -0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
Black 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.32 
Hispanic -0.03 0.31 0.00 0.90 -0.01 0.66 
Gender (male) 0.02 0.45 0.02 0.55 0.02 0.44 
LSI-R criminal risk score 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.53 
Offense type (original sentence) 
Violent -0.03 0.18 -0.02 0.47 0.01 0.84 
Property 0.04 0.14 -0.01 0.82 -0.01 0.74 
Drugs -0.01 0.66 0.00 0.88 -0.03 0.20 
Prior treatment programs 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.19 -0.02 0.54 
Sentencing county 
Philadelphia/Pittsburgh 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.14 
Class 3+ county 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.19 
Initial parole 0.00 0.90 0.01 0.64 0.01 0.60 
Parole supervision length -0.13 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.02 
Parole district office 
Allentown -0.03 0.23 0.01 0.69 0.01 0.60 
Altoona 0.01 0.60 0.02 0.53 0.06 0.03 
Chester 0.01 0.63 0.00 0.86 -0.01 0.74 
Erie -0.01 0.70 -0.03 0.21 -0.01 0.79 
Harrisburg -0.02 0.43 0.00 0.99 -0.02 0.46 
Mercer 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.81 0.02 0.43 
Philadelphia 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.07 
Pittsburgh 0.00 0.85 -0.03 0.22 -0.02 0.36 
Scranton -0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.08 -0.05 0.06 
Williamsport -0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.43 -0.04 0.08 
Supervision level 
Administrative 0.01 0.71 0.00 0.90 0.02 0.44 
Minimum -0.05 0.04 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.25 
Medium 0.02 0.53 -0.01 0.56 0.00 0.94 
Maximum 0.00 0.88 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.63 
First violation severity (most serious) 
Medium -0.02 0.38 -0.02 0.43 0.03 0.27 
High 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.33 -0.02 0.41 
In Center at Time of Violation -0.05 0.07 -0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.02 
No Recommit Action (NRA) -0.06 0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.33 
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TABLE 5.1 (continued) 
Bivariate Correlations (N = 1,547) 
Re-Incarceration Rates 
3-Year  1-Year 6-Month 
Corr. p Corr. p Corr. p 
Age (at first violation) -0.10 0.00 -0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.36 
Race 
White -0.02 0.46 0.00 0.98 -0.01 0.61 
Black -0.01 0.62 0.00 0.92 0.02 0.54 
Hispanic 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.98 -0.01 0.83 
Gender (male) 0.02 0.35 -0.01 0.76 0.00 0.98 
LSI-R criminal risk score 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 
Offense type (original sentence) 
Violent -0.01 0.66 0.00 0.91 -0.01 0.83 
Property 0.03 0.20 0.01 0.57 0.03 0.26 
Drugs 0.00 0.87 -0.02 0.53 -0.04 0.14 
Prior treatment programs -0.02 0.51 -0.03 0.25 0.00 0.87 
Sentencing county 
Philadelphia/Pittsburgh -0.03 0.26 -0.03 0.24 -0.01 0.72 
Class 3+ county -0.02 0.44 -0.03 0.24 -0.01 0.79 
Initial parole 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.07 
Parole supervision length 0.21 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.08 0.00 
Parole district office 
Allentown 0.01 0.69 -0.04 0.16 -0.04 0.10 
Altoona 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.94 
Chester -0.02 0.35 -0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.30 
Erie 0.01 0.84 0.03 0.26 0.06 0.02 
Harrisburg -0.04 0.16 -0.02 0.38 -0.02 0.45 
Mercer -0.04 0.11 -0.04 0.11 -0.02 0.37 
Philadelphia -0.02 0.46 -0.01 0.57 0.00 0.89 
Pittsburgh 0.02 0.39 0.02 0.47 0.03 0.23 
Scranton 0.02 0.38 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.21 
Williamsport -0.06 0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.05 0.05 
Supervision level 
Administrative -0.01 0.61 0.00 0.88 0.02 0.50 
Minimum -0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.69 -0.03 0.33 
Medium 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.38 0.03 0.31 
Maximum -0.03 0.20 -0.02 0.36 -0.02 0.55 
First violation severity (most serious) 
Medium 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.01 
High -0.04 0.13 -0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.02 
In Center at Time of Violation -0.01 0.81 0.04 0.12 0.08 0.00 




"Naïve" Logistic Regression Models Predicting Recidivism (N=1,547) 
Re-incarceration 
6-Month 1-Year 3-Year 
OR p OR p OR p 
Length of Stay in Prison (Dosage) 0.98 0.03 0.98 0.01 0.96 0.00 
Age (at first violation) 0.99 0.19 0.98 0.01 0.97 0.00 
Race 
White 0.56 0.63 0.44 0.44 0.36 0.42 
Black 0.75 0.81 0.54 0.56 0.41 0.49 
Hispanic 0.78 0.84 0.56 0.59 0.50 0.59 
Gender (male) 0.85 0.60 0.77 0.33 1.08 0.76 
LSI-R criminal risk score 1.03 0.01 1.03 0.00 1.03 0.00 
Offense type (original sentence) 
Violent 0.79 0.27 0.89 0.53 0.74 0.08 
Property 1.10 0.64 1.07 0.71 1.12 0.50 
Drugs 0.72 0.13 0.89 0.51 0.87 0.42 
Prior treatment programs 1.00 0.94 0.98 0.41 1.00 0.99 
Sentencing county 
Philadelphia/Pittsburgh 0.78 0.26 0.72 0.10 0.79 0.21 
Class 3+ county 0.96 0.84 0.91 0.58 0.90 0.47 
Initial parole 1.19 0.27 1.39 0.02 1.32 0.03 
Parole supervision length 1.01 0.00 1.01 0.00 1.02 0.00 
Parole district office 
Allentown 0.35 0.27 0.28 0.20 0.30 0.30 
Altoona 0.42 0.37 0.45 0.43 0.37 0.40 
Chester 0.27 0.25 0.18 0.12 0.30 0.32 
Erie 0.71 0.73 0.41 0.39 0.30 0.32 
Harrisburg 0.36 0.29 0.28 0.20 0.24 0.22 
Mercer 0.20 0.26 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.11 
Philadelphia 0.51 0.49 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.36 
Pittsburgh 0.53 0.50 0.39 0.34 0.36 0.38 
Scranton 0.50 0.47 0.42 0.38 0.35 0.37 
Williamsport 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.13 0.11 
Supervision level 
Administrative 1.84 0.65 0.67 0.76 0.18 0.19 
Minimum 0.85 0.70 0.76 0.46 0.34 0.00 
Medium 1.04 0.93 0.80 0.50 0.47 0.03 
Maximum 0.76 0.40 0.69 0.21 0.41 0.00 
First violation severity (most serious) 
Medium 1.15 0.90 0.22 0.06 0.53 0.45 
High 0.76 0.80 0.17 0.03 0.48 0.37 
In Center at Time of Violation 1.50 0.01 1.15 0.32 0.85 0.24 
No Recommit Action (NRA) 1.24 0.27 1.76 0.00 1.47 0.02 
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TABLE 5.2 (continued) 
"Naïve" Logistic Regression Models Predicting Recidivism (N=1,547) 
Re-arrest 
6-Month 1-Year 3-Year 
OR p OR p OR p 
Length of Stay in Prison (Dosage) 1.00 0.80 1.01 0.46 1.00 0.63 
Age (at first violation) 0.97 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.97 0.00 
Race 
White n.a. n.a. 0.44 0.42 0.45 0.50 
Black n.a. n.a. 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.55 
Hispanic n.a. n.a. 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.45 
Gender (male) 1.18 0.61 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.88 
LSI-R criminal risk score 1.01 0.64 1.01 0.26 1.01 0.36 
Offense type (original sentence) 
Violent 0.86 0.46 0.80 0.22 0.84 0.31 
Property 0.78 0.23 0.90 0.58 1.11 0.55 
Drugs 0.61 0.02 0.76 0.12 0.78 0.15 
Prior treatment programs 0.98 0.50 1.03 0.21 1.04 0.08 
Sentencing county 
Philadelphia/Pittsburgh 1.33 0.10 1.11 0.57 0.91 0.61 
Class 3+ county 1.17 0.36 1.68 0.00 1.30 0.07 
Initial parole 1.00 0.99 1.09 0.53 0.95 0.70 
Parole supervision length 0.99 0.03 1.00 0.01 0.99 0.00 
Parole district office 
Allentown n.a. n.a. 1.94 0.56 0.29 0.28 
Altoona n.a. n.a. 3.06 0.34 0.43 0.46 
Chester n.a. n.a. 1.50 0.74 0.34 0.38 
Erie n.a. n.a. 1.36 0.79 0.28 0.27 
Harrisburg n.a. n.a. 1.99 0.55 0.30 0.29 
Mercer n.a. n.a. 3.13 0.38 0.94 0.96 
Philadelphia n.a. n.a. 2.03 0.54 0.46 0.50 
Pittsburgh n.a. n.a. 1.76 0.62 0.37 0.39 
Scranton n.a. n.a. 1.54 0.71 0.24 0.22 
Williamsport n.a. n.a. 1.92 0.60 0.15 0.12 
Supervision level 
Administrative 3.07 0.39 2.32 0.52 2.80 0.44 
Minimum 0.64 0.30 0.63 0.20 0.71 0.31 
Medium 0.80 0.57 0.89 0.71 0.99 0.96 
Maximum 0.83 0.58 0.91 0.74 0.75 0.33 
First violation severity (most serious) 
Medium n.a. n.a. 1.53 0.70 4.20 0.20 
High n.a. n.a. 1.61 0.67 4.51 0.18 
In Center at Time of Violation 0.62 0.01 0.64 0.00 0.77 0.04 
No Recommit Action (NRA) 0.90 0.63 0.85 0.35 0.80 0.18 
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TABLE 5.2 (continued) 
"Naïve" Logistic Regression Models Predicting Recidivism (N=1,547) 
Overall Recidivism 
6-Month 1-Year 3-Year 
OR p OR p OR p 
Length of Stay in Prison (Dosage) 0.99 0.19 0.99 0.20 0.98 0.02 
Age (at first violation) 0.98 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.96 0.00 
Race 
White 1.56 0.71 0.34 0.35 0.00 0.99 
Black 1.80 0.62 0.43 0.47 0.00 0.99 
Hispanic 1.72 0.65 0.39 0.43 0.00 0.99 
Gender (male) 0.83 0.47 0.82 0.40 1.01 0.98 
LSI-R criminal risk score 1.02 0.01 1.03 0.00 1.02 0.01 
Offense type (original sentence) 
Violent 0.83 0.29 0.84 0.31 0.89 0.51 
Property 0.97 0.88 1.03 0.85 1.16 0.44 
Drugs 0.65 0.02 0.81 0.20 0.77 0.16 
Prior treatment programs 0.98 0.53 1.00 0.95 1.02 0.37 
Sentencing county 
Philadelphia/Pittsburgh 1.07 0.74 0.94 0.74 0.77 0.19 
Class 3+ county 1.13 0.44 1.31 0.06 1.13 0.44 
Initial parole 1.07 0.59 1.17 0.18 1.05 0.70 
Parole supervision length 1.00 0.42 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.06 
Parole district office 
Allentown 0.76 0.77 0.29 0.28 0.00 0.99 
Altoona 1.15 0.88 0.42 0.45 0.00 0.99 
Chester 0.64 0.66 0.24 0.24 0.00 0.99 
Erie 1.13 0.90 0.32 0.33 0.00 0.99 
Harrisburg 0.69 0.69 0.30 0.29 0.00 0.99 
Mercer 0.68 0.74 0.21 0.23 0.00 0.99 
Philadelphia 0.81 0.82 0.29 0.28 0.00 0.99 
Pittsburgh 0.82 0.84 0.35 0.35 0.00 0.99 
Scranton 0.77 0.78 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.99 
Williamsport 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.99 
Supervision level 
Administrative 1.25 0.87 0.70 0.78 0.60 0.70 
Minimum 0.65 0.23 0.69 0.26 0.43 0.05 
Medium 0.92 0.79 0.92 0.79 0.61 0.24 
Maximum 0.77 0.35 0.80 0.41 0.43 0.03 
First violation severity (most serious) 
Medium 1.93 0.55 0.45 0.31 1.08 0.92 
High 1.45 0.74 0.44 0.29 1.10 0.91 
In Center at Time of Violation 1.01 0.95 0.83 0.13 0.89 0.40 




Descriptive Statistics for Treatment Group Prison Length of Stay Quintiles 
  
Quintile 1: Quintile 2: Quintile 3: Quintile 4: Quintile 5: 
(0 – 5.1 months) (5.2 – 8.4 months) (8.5 – 11.8 months) (11.9 – 16.3 months) (16.4 – 45.3 months) 
(n=230) (n=233) (n=222) (n=233) (n=226) 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Age (at first violation) 32.98 9.14 34.89 10.17 33.81 9.12 33.3 9.5 34.48 8.98 
Race 
          
White* 0.33 0.47 0.45 0.5 0.4 0.49 0.48 0.5 0.43 0.5 
Black** 0.59 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.45 0.5 
Hispanic 0.09 0.28 0.13 0.34 0.17 0.38 0.1 0.3 0.11 0.31 
Gender (male) 0.96 0.2 0.93 0.24 0.92 0.27 0.95 0.22 0.94 0.23 
LSI-R criminal risk score* 25.79 6.77 25.6 7.31 25.15 7.65 25.69 7.23 27.16 7.56 
Offense type (original sentence) 
          
Violent** 0.24 0.43 0.2 0.4 0.28 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.41 0.49 
Property 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.45 0.24 0.42 0.24 0.43 
Drugs** 0.34 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.27 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.21 0.41 
Prior treatment programs 3.33 2.76 2.95 2.28 3.04 2.39 3.26 2.35 3.4 2.45 
Sentencing county 
          
Philadelphia/Pittsburgh** 0.37 0.48 0.2 0.4 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.45 
Class 3+ county 0.74 0.44 0.67 0.47 0.69 0.46 0.72 0.45 0.65 0.48 
Initial Parole 0.64 0.48 0.7 0.46 0.69 0.46 0.69 0.46 0.59 0.49 
Parole supervision length** 30.96 40.44 27.14 23.18 37.9 34.56 43.36 51.31 57.96 84.6 
Parole district office 
          
Allentown** 0.14 0.35 0.22 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.18 0.39 0.18 0.39 
Altoona 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.21 
Chester 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.17 0 0.07 






Quintile 1: Quintile 2: Quintile 3: Quintile 4: Quintile 5: 
0 – 5.1 months 5.2 – 8.4 months 8.5 – 11.8 months 11.9 – 16.3 months 16.4 – 45.3 months 
(N=230) (N=233) (N=222) (N=233) (N=226) 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Harrisburg 0.1 0.3 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37 
Mercer 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09 0 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 
Philadelphia 0.33 0.47 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.28 0.45 
Pittsburgh** 0.26 0.44 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.39 
Scranton 0.07 0.25 0.11 0.32 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.07 0.26 
Williamsport 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 0 0.07 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.17 
Supervision level 
          
Minimum 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.21 
Medium 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.31 0.1 0.3 0.16 0.37 0.1 0.3 
Maximum 0.79 0.41 0.77 0.42 0.76 0.43 0.72 0.45 0.82 0.39 
First violation severity 
          
Medium - - - - - - - - - - 
High - - - - - - - - - - 
In Center at Time of Violation** 0.36 0.48 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44 
















Observed Recidivism Rates Before Stratification 
Quintile 1: 
0 - 5.1 months 
(n=230) 
Quintile 2: 
5.2 - 8.4 months 
(n=233) 
Quintile 3: 
8.5 - 11.8 months 
(n=222) 
Quintile 4: 
11.9 - 16.3 months 
(n=233) 
Quintile 5: 
16.4 - 45.3 months 
(n=226) 
Re-incarceration Rates 
6-Month 20.9% 15.9% 14.9% 15.9% 15.9% 
1-Year 27.8% 25.3% 24.8% 27.5% 23.5% 
3-Year 47.0% 45.1% 47.3% 43.4% 41.6% 
Re-arrest Rates 
6-Month 17.0% 15.5% 19.4% 15.9% 15.9% 
1-Year 33.0% 30.0% 32.0% 30.5% 31.0% 
3-Year 61.3% 55.4% 58.6% 58.4% 55.8% 
Overall Recidivism Rates 
6-Month 33.9% 27.9% 30.2% 30.5% 27.9% 
1-Year 52.2% 47.6% 46.9% 50.2% 45.6% 





Ordinal Logit Regression Predicting Dosage Assignment (N=1,144) 
coefficient std. err. Z p 
Age (at first violation) 0.02 0.04 0.41 0.68 
% White -1.34 1.19 -1.12 0.26 
%Black -1.67 1.19 -1.40 0.16 
%Hispanic -1.48 1.20 -1.24 0.22 
LSI-R criminal risk score 0.00 0.01 -0.08 0.94 
Violent (original offense) 0.55 0.19 2.92 0.00 
Drugs (original offense) -0.13 0.14 -0.95 0.35 
Prior treatment programs 0.01 0.03 0.22 0.83 
Philadelphia/Pittsburgh Sentencing County -0.08 0.14 -0.58 0.56 
Initial parole -0.17 0.12 -1.40 0.16 
Parole supervision length 0.01 0.01 1.63 0.10 
Allentown Parole District Office 0.01 0.15 0.07 0.95 
Pittsburgh Parole District Office -0.73 0.54 -1.35 0.18 
In Center at Time of Violation -0.20 0.13 -1.55 0.12 
Age2 0.00 0.00 -0.37 0.72 
Age*Pittsburgh 0.01 0.01 0.95 0.34 
Age*ParoleTime 0.00 0.00 -0.94 0.35 
ParoleTime2 0.00 0.00 -3.58 0.00 
ParoleTime*Violent -0.01 0.00 -1.49 0.14 
ParoleTime*PriorTreatmentPrograms 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.93 
ParoleTime*LSI-R 0.00 0.00 2.54 0.01 




















Cross-tabulation of Number of Cases in  
Each Dosage by Propensity Score Quintile 
 
Propensity Score  
Quintile 
Length of Stay Dosage 
Dosage 1 Dosage 2 Dosage 3 Dosage 4 Dosage 5 
Quintile 1 88 51 37 37 15 
Quintile 2 50 61 50 41 26 
Quintile 3 36 60 48 41 44 
Quintile 4 27 36 39 63 63 











Z or F Score p Z or F Score p Z or F Score p 
Age (at first violation) 1.66 0.16 1.31 0.26 1.35 0.16 
Race 
White 2.30 0.02 -1.48 0.14 1.41 0.16 
Black -2.61 0.01 1.20 0.23 -1.09 0.28 
Hispanic 0.25 0.80 0.72 0.47 -0.86 0.39 
Gender (male) -0.31 0.76 0.38 0.70 -0.37 0.71 
LSI-R criminal risk score 2.40 0.05 0.45 0.77 1.02 0.43 
Offense type (original sentence) 
Violent 4.83 0.00 -1.42 0.16 1.36 0.17 
Property -0.27 0.79 -0.27 0.79 0.29 0.77 
Drugs -3.62 0.00 1.06 0.29 -0.90 0.37 
Prior treatment programs 1.40 0.23 1.77 0.13 1.34 0.17 
Sentencing county 
Philadelphia/Pittsburgh -0.74 0.46 0.47 0.64 -0.45 0.66 
Class 3+ county -1.29 0.20 0.73 0.46 -1.14 0.26 
Initial parole -1.14 0.26 1.56 0.12 -1.65 0.10 
Parole supervision length 12.72 0.00 2.35 0.05 1.43 0.12 
Parole district office 
Allentown 0.56 0.58 1.35 0.18 -1.48 0.14 
Altoona 0.54 0.59 0.60 0.55 -0.71 0.48 
Chester -1.33 0.18 -0.23 0.82 0.01 0.99 
Erie 0.82 0.41 0.09 0.93 0.00 1.00 
Harrisburg 1.89 0.06 0.11 0.91 0.42 0.67 
Mercer -0.43 0.67 0.86 0.39 -1.20 0.23 
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 Z or F Score p Z or F Score p Z or F Score p 
Philadelphia -1.03 0.30 -0.62 0.54 0.27 0.79 
Pittsburgh -1.17 0.24 -0.89 0.38 1.23 0.22 
Scranton -0.16 0.87 0.08 0.94 -0.10 0.92 
Williamsport 0.66 0.51 -0.27 0.79 0.55 0.58 
Supervision level 
Minimum -1.51 0.13 0.13 0.89 0.82 0.41 
Medium 0.92 0.36 0.45 0.66 0.45 0.65 
Maximum 0.01 0.99 -0.34 0.74 0.62 0.53 
























Recidivism Rates and Standard Errors from Primary Dose-Response Curve 
Quintile 1: 
0 - 5.1 months 
(n=230) 
Quintile 2: 
5.2 - 8.4 months 
(n=233) 
Quintile 3: 
8.5 - 11.8 months 
(n=222) 
Quintile 4: 
11.9 - 16.3 months 
(n=233) 
Quintile 5: 
16.4 - 45.3 months 
(n=226) 
Rate S.E. Rate S.E. Rate S.E. Rate S.E. Rate S.E. 
Re-incarceration Rates 
6-Month 23.2% 0.027 16.9% 0.015 14.6% 0.012 14.8% 0.028 11.2% 0.050 
1-Year 32.1% 0.038 28.3% 0.043 24.5% 0.027 25.7% 0.043 16.3% 0.075 
3-Year 52.2% 0.046 48.6% 0.058 46.4% 0.057 41.1% 0.059 33.3% 0.083 
Re-arrest Rates  
6-Month 18.0% 0.021 14.8% 0.011 19.4% 0.026 16.2% 0.013 15.5% 0.026 
1-Year 32.7% 0.037 28.8% 0.017 32.5% 0.029 31.2% 0.024 29.3% 0.032 
3-Year 60.4% 0.036 52.2% 0.045 58.7% 0.026 56.2% 0.017 55.8% 0.022 
Overall Recidivism Rates 
6-Month 35.8% 0.027 28.5% 0.014 30.4% 0.015 24.7% 0.014 23.9% 0.050 
1-Year 52.4% 0.042 48.1% 0.016 47.0% 0.012 49.7% 0.016 39.5% 0.073 











Logistic Regressions and ANOVAs  
Predicting Recidivism Using Dosage, Post Propensity Score Stratification 
Logit Models ANOVAs 
Z p F p 
Re-incarceration Rates 
6-Month -2.61 0.009 2.14 0.074 
1-Year -3.07 0.002 2.83 0.024 
3-Year -4.29 0.000 4.84 0.001 
Re-arrest Rates 
6-Month 0.18 0.855 0.45 0.769 
1-Year 0.33 0.742 0.20 0.936 
3-Year 0.17 0.862 0.59 0.673 
Overall Recidivism Rates 
6-Month -1.46 0.145 0.98 0.416 
1-Year -1.70 0.088 1.14 0.337 



















Treatment Dose 1: 
0 - 5.1 months 
(n=237) 
Treatment Dose 2: 
5.2 - 8.4 months 
(n=226) 
Treatment Dose 3: 
8.5 - 11.8 months 
(n=235) 
Treatment Dose 4: 
11.9 - 16.3 months 
(n=224) 
Treatment Dose 5: 
16.4 - 45.3 months 
(n=222) 
Rate S.E. Rate S.E. Rate S.E. Rate S.E. Rate S.E. Rate S.E. 
Re-incarceration Rates 
3-Year 58.9% 0.030 46.9% 0.034 45.0% 0.024 45.7% 0.036 42.6% 0.050 38.4% 0.035 
Re-arrest Rates    
3-Year 58.2% 0.019 59.5% 0.031 55.0% 0.030 58.5% 0.026 59.3% 0.033 55.5% 0.035 
Overall Recidivism Rates 























Recidivism Rates and Standard Errors from Dose-Response Curve (Dropping Doses > 18 Months) 
Quintile 1: 
0 - 4.5 months 
(n=191) 
Quintile 2: 
4.6 - 7.3 months 
(n=187) 
Quintile 3: 
7.4 - 10.4 months 
(n=214) 
Quintile 4: 
10.5 - 13.4 months 
(n=188) 
Quintile 5: 
13.5 - 18 months 
(n=191) 
Rate S.E. Rate S.E. Rate S.E. Rate S.E. Rate S.E. 
Re-incarceration Rates 
3-Year 51.7% 0.043 47.1% 0.075 45.8% 0.043 45.1% 0.081 35.0% 0.075 
Re-arrest Rates  
3-Year 58.3% 0.045 55.2% 0.045 56.5% 0.048 60.2% 0.031 58.4% 0.025 
Overall Recidivism Rates 
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FIGURE 5.1 
Histograms of the Estimated Propensity Score, in the Five Exposure Levels 
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FIGURE 5.2 (continued) 
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FIGURE 5.2 (continued) 
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